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DEDICATION
 To my grandfather, Manuel Polanco who was gone too soon in my life but whose 




 I must have imagined this moment many times and yet surprisingly find myself at 
a loss for words. But there are so many people to thank I hope I include you all. I would 
like to start first with God for watching over me for these years. My faith has been 
something that has carried me through difficult times and has kept me level headed 
during my graduate student career. I am grateful for my family who raised me and 
instilled in me the values of hard work, faith, and the importance of relationships. My 
mother Ana Polanco served as one of my inspirations raising four children and her 
decision to go back to school while I was still young. It showed me that anything is 
possible and to never give up on your dreams. My father Wayne Keane-Dawes whose 
conversations on history, race and, nation as a kid shaped me and so the direction of this 
project. I may not have always looked like I was listening Dad but looking back I 
appreciate that you took the time to teach me things and share with me your perspective 
growing up in Jamaica. Paula Spicer, who became another mother to me and encouraged 
me to pursue my passion in history. And to my grandparents on both sides of my family 
who migrated from the Dominican Republic and Jamaica in search of a new life. 
Particularly, my maternal Grandfather Manuel Polanco who I lost all too soon. Espero 
que esté orgulloso de tu nieto. 
Even with the changes that have come with my decision to go to graduate school, 
I have appreciated that my siblings, close friends, and extended family continued to treat 
me no differently. That sense of normalcy is something that I try not to take for granted. 
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To my siblings Gabi, Jerome, Monet, Elijah, and Magi I want to thank you for the good 
times we have shared and I apologize for the time I have been away since I made that 
decision to pursue this endeavor. To my aunts, uncles, and cousins I thank you for your 
taking an interest, supporting me, and for sharing my triumphs and my falls. I think 
specifically of my cousins Felix and Nicholas who are like brothers to me and my tias 
Juana and Xiomara who made sure a bright young boy did not get too full of himself. 
Paul, Jacques, David, and Claire, you all became family after our wedding and I 
appreciate the support and the interest in my work. Alix and Ines, thank you for accepting 
me as a son and for believing in my work and in myself  
St. Johns University was my first collegiate home and foundational for propelling 
me forward to continue in graduate studies. My special thanks to many of my professors 
including Joseph Bongiorno, John Rao, and Azzedine Layachi who encouraged my 
intellectual curiosity in the classroom and helped me to make the decision to continue my 
education at the graduate level. I am grateful for the administrators and deans who took 
an interest in my passions and encouraged me to study abroad in spring 2010. The 
experience of studying and traveling outside of the United States and to see the ways that 
other people value their past was another indicator that history was the path for me.  
Even though I was ready to begin my graduate student career at Florida 
International University (FIU), there was a steep learning curve to transition to graduate 
studies. Still, I am eternally grateful for the professors and classmates who encouraged 
me both in my studies and applying to doctoral programs. Bianca Premo, thank you for 
being patient with me and for meeting with me weekly during our first semester together. 
You saw something in me that I did not see in myself and continued to push me right up 
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to the very end. Sherry Johnson, who helped me during my time at FIU both as the 
director of Latin American and Caribbean Center and as my professor during our 
graduate seminar in the Caribbean. Thank you for always keeping an eye for me for 
research opportunities and for your advice and approaches for scholarship. Jenna Gibbs, 
who served as my professor and mentor for my early research on British abolitionism and 
encouraged me to present and publish it. I appreciated your advice on writing and 
research that helped both with that project and the dissertation. And to my former 
classmates and now colleagues who showed me the joys of being a part of a scholarly 
community, I thank you all sincerely.  
The University of South Carolina was the right fit for me and I could not have 
asked for a better committee. Matt Childs, more than your scholarship and skills as 
historian is your humility, generosity, good humor, and positive outlook that continue to 
have a lasting impact on me. Thank you for giving me a second chance and for finding 
the right balance between guiding me and allowing to grow and mature as a scholar and a 
person. May we share more desserts, coffee and good times so that Don Postre can live 
up to his name. Martine Jean, thank you for taking an interest in my work and my career 
as a junior scholar. Your timely feedback and advice has been important especially this 
past year. Gabi Kuenzli, thank you for being in my corner and for pushing me to think 
about my project more than just my immediate interests. Your mantra of giving 150% has 
stuck with me since our first seminar together and I hope that this dissertation reflects it. 
Anne Eller, thank you for taking an early interest in my work and for reading an early 
dissertation chapter. Your advice, feedback, and scholarly comradery that has made this 
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project and my focus that much better. Jorge Camacho, thank you serving on this 
committee and for sharing your interests in nineteenth-century Cuba.   
I have benefited from the advice, classes, and feedback on my project from 
various professors both within and outside of the History Department. A special thank 
you to Pat Sullivan, director of the History Center here at the university for allowing me 
to present a chapter of my dissertation. Don Doyle, who took an interest in my work as I 
was writing my proposal and offered me insightful feedback during our seminar together. 
I also appreciate the feedback both direct and indirect that I received from certain faculty 
on my research questions, presenting my work, and academia within the department such 
as Christine Ames, Carol Harrison, and Nicole Maskiel. And from those outside like 
Andrew Rajca, Kim Simmons, and Mercedes Lopez Rodriguez. 
Graduate school builds deep bonds linked by the shared experience of 
coursework, research, and looking for that elusive balance between work and leisure. I 
am grateful for the feedback and ideas I received on my research and as a historian. To 
our Atlantic Reading group, both old and new members, I am grateful to all of those who 
have read most if not all this dissertation and whose comments have made it that much 
stronger. Thank you to Caleb Wittum, Lewis Eliot, Pat O’Brien, Jill Found, Melissa 
DeVelvis, Nathalia Cocenza, Cane West, Erica Johnson, Neal Polhemus, Chaz Yingling, 
Andrew Kettler, Will Mundhenke, Robert Greene, Erin Holmes, Maurice Robinson, 
Tyler Parry, and Jacob Mach. Our dissertation reading group further strengthened our 
cohort bond and look forward to seeing your dissertations finished and projects develop. 
Thank you to Gary Sellick, Stephanie Gray, Sam King, and Carter Bruns, and Caleb for 
coming together during our monthly meetings and keep ourselves focused.  
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I have appreciated the internal and external funding that supported this project and 
the staff at the various archives I visited. I would like to thank the Conference on Latin 
History for the James R. Scobie Award; the Ceny Walker Fellowship from the Walker 
Institute and Area Studies at the University of South Carolina; the Vice President for 
Research at the University of South Carolina for the SPARC fellowship; and the Russell 
J. and Dorothy S. Bilinski Fellowship Completion fellowship. I am grateful to the staff at 
the Archivo de la Nación and the Archivo Histórico del Arzobispado de Santo Domingo 
in the Dominican Republic; the Archivo General de Indias and the Archivo Histórico 
Nacional in Spain; and the Nation Archive in the United Kingdom. And closer to home, I 
would like to thank the librarians and staff at Thomas Cooper Library here at the 
University whose work and positive attitudes made research and writing easier. I would 
be remised if I did not mention the various families who shared their homes with me in 
Santo Domingo, Seville, Madrid, and London. A special thank you to my tia Eliana in 
Santo Domingo who looked out for me especially during my bout with la chikunguña. 
And also to Eva, Curro, and Manuela in Seville who treated me like my family.  
My research and conference travels have exposed me to the larger scholarly 
community and I have benefited to their feedback, advice, and questions. Andrew Walker 
and Maria Cecilia Ulrickson who I shared an awesome panel on nineteenth-century 
Hispaniola. I am grateful to Bill Van Norman, Ana Maria Silva, and Cristina Soriano 
who took the time out of their research projects to give me tips and insight into the inner 
workings of the AGI and AHN in Seville, and Madrid. Julia Gaffield, thank you for 
answering my queries on nineteenth-century historiography on Church and State relations 
in Hispaniola. I also thank Micah Oelze for his insightful comments for Chapter Three of 
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the dissertation. And lastly, I am grateful to all the feedback I received at different 
conferences presenting this research.   
Little did I know that when I set foot in Green Library at FIU that the woman 
helping me at the front desk would become my future wife. Rachel Duval, who took time 
out of her own professional school to go to conferences, long distance phone calls and 
skype chats during research trips, and drives down to South Carolina to spend time 
together. You have even chosen to come to Columbia as I have finished my last year of 
dissertation writing. To my biggest fan, my best friend, y mi amor words cannot truly 
capture or express my gratitude, my love, and appreciation. Thank you for giving me 
hope, peace, and for giving me something to look forward to every time I step away from 
my work. I am glad you have been with me through this part of the journey and look 




 On 8 February 1822, Haitian President Jean-Pierre Boyer entered Santo Domingo 
and ended the short-lived experiment of a moderate republic and the triumph of a popular 
and radical vision of nationhood. For the next two decades, this unified Haitian Republic 
faced the scrutiny of Spanish, French, and British slave empires, fueled by the accounts 
and reports of those Dominicans who rejected this change in events. Using government 
correspondences, reports, pamphlets, and proclamations, this study argues that the 
Haitian Unification affected Dominican political allegiances and drove white elites to 
support Spanish monarchy in contrast to those in Santo Domingo who supported Haitian 
republicanism and emancipation. In doing so, this study brings together the different 
literatures in discussion with each other: race and nation in the Dominican Republic, 
Latin American independence and nationalism, and an Atlantic perspective of empires 
and nation-states.   
This study begins by examining the events leading up to the Haitian Unification 
and how Dominican and Spanish responses focused on its negative impact, calling for 
Spain to take back its former colony. Next, this analysis focuses on Haitian reforms in 
Santo Domingo such as land and Church as a part of the republic’s vision for 
transforming a former colonial society into an integral part of the Haitian nation. Finally, 
it investigates Haiti’s successful defense of its sovereignty in Santo Domingo in part 
because of its official recognition by the French. By 1833, white Dominican elites who 
witnessed the Haitian defense of sovereignty and Spanish retreat articulated a narrative 
 xi 
lauding their Hispanic ties and identity with Spain while associating blackness with Haiti 
and rejecting those who supported the republic’s rule. The genesis of this struggle over 
the role of race in Dominican nationalism and how it manifests itself in its relationship to 
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On 9 July 1824, former intendente or quartermaster Felipe Fernandez de Castro 
lamented to the Spanish Secretary of State about the loss of Santo Domingo to the 
Haitian Republic. In particular, Fernandez de Castro drew attention to the Dominican 
Creole José Nuñez de Cáceres and his supporters who declared independence from Spain 
in December 1821 with a list of grievances expressing their feelings of betrayal by the 
Spanish government.1 A royalist who fled Santo Domingo after the fall of the Spanish 
regime, Fernandez de Castro disputed the feelings of Dominicans of the loss of the 
former Spanish colony. He depicted Núñez de Cáceres as insecure and ambitious, 
accusing the Dominican Creole of holding a grudge because Spanish officials passed him 
over for a promotion in the colonial hierarchy. In comparison to Núñez de Cáceres and 
his supporters, Fernandez de Castro presented the rest of the Dominican population as 
loyal and victims of the Dominican Creole’s “monster” consuming their “innocence.”2 
According to Fernandez de Castro, once Dominicans realized the “insanity” and 
“ambition” driving Núñez de Cáceres’ desire for independence, they attempted to 
overthrow his rule but were unsuccessful. When Santo Domingo became a part of the 
                                                          
1 “Felipe Fernandez de Castro to Primer Secretario del Despacho de Estado,” Madrid, 9 July 1824, Archivo 
Historico Nacional Secretaría de Estado y del Despacho de Estado (hereafter cited as AHN-Estado) 3395 
Exp. 4, 2a; and José Núñez de Cáceres to Eusebio Bardají,” Santo Domingo, 12 December 1821, Archivo 
General de Indias Estado: Santo Domingo, Cuba, Puerto Rico, Luisiana y Florida (hereafter cited as AGI-
Estado) 17.79.  
2 “Felipe Fernandez de Castro to Primer Secretario del Despacho de Estado,” Madrid, 9 July 1824, AHN-
Estado Exp. 4, 2a.  
2 
Haitian Republic in 1822, Fernandez de Castro noted how Núñez de Cáceres fled to 
Caracas, Venezuela. The Dominican royalist Fernandez de Castro blamed Núñez de 
Cáceres for Spain’s loss of Santo Domingo and separating loyal Dominicans from the 
Spanish Crown. 
Fernandez de Castro’s account of Dominican loyalty conveniently obscures the 
fact that there were two independence movements against Spanish rule in Santo Domingo 
by 1821. While Núñez de Cáceres and his supporters wanted a moderate republic and 
federation with the independent states in South America, much of the Dominican 
population chose to ally with the Haitian Republic under the rule of President Jean-Pierre 
Boyer.3 My dissertation “A Divisive Community” analyzes the aftermath of the Haitian 
Unification in 1822 until its end in 1844.  This study charts the responses of these two 
groups existing in Santo Domingo during this period. Fernandez de Castro was one of 
several Dominicans who chose exile, repeating the same paths of French and Spanish 
planters during the Haitian Revolution who fled to places such as Cuba and Puerto Rico.4 
                                                          
3 Christina Violet Jones “Revolution and Reaction: Santo Domingo during the Haitian Revolution and 
Beyond, 1791-1844” (Ph.D. diss, Howard University, 2008; Anne Eller ““All would be equal in the effort”: 
Santo Domingo’s “Italian Revolution,” Independence, and Haiti, 1809-1822” Journal of Early American 
History 1 (2011), 105-141; and Charlton Yingling, “Colonialism Unraveling: Race, Religion, and National 
Belonging in Santo Domingo During the Age of Revolution (Ph.D. diss., University of South Carolina, 
2016).  
4 For more on Dominicans who fled during the Haitian Revolution see Carlos Esteban Deive, Las 
emigraciones Dominicanas a Cuba (1795-1808) (Santo Domingo: Fundación Cultural Dominicana); and 
José Morales “The Hispaniola Diaspora, 1791-1850: Puerto Rico, Cuba, Louisiana, and Other Host 
Societies” (Ph.D. diss., University of Connecticut, 1986). For a larger take on the flight of French refuges 
from Saint-Domingue during the Haitian Revolution see Alfred Hunt, Haiti’s Influnece on Antebellum 
America: Slumbering Volcano in the Caribbean (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1988); 
Carl A. Brasseaux and Glenn R. Conrad eds. The Road to Louisiana: The Saint-Domingue Refugees, 1792 
– 1809 (Lafayette: Center for Louisiana Studies, University of Southwestern Louisiana, 1992); Paul 
Lachance, “Repercussions of the Haitian Revolution in Louisiana,” in The Impact of the Haitian Revolution 
in the Atlantic World ed. by David P. Geggus (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2001), 209 – 
230; Nathalie Dessens, “From Saint-Domingue to Louisiana: West Indian Refugees in the Lower 
Mississippi Region,” in French Colonial Louisiana and the Atlantic World ed. by Bradley G. Bond (Baton 
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2005); Ashli White, Encountering Revolution: Haiti and the 
Making of the Early Republic (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010); Rebecca Scott & Jean 
3 
It was in these colonial possessions where a historical narrative idealizing Santo 
Domingo’s loyalty to the Spanish Crown and denigrating Haitian rule took form.5  By 
presenting the populace as loyal to the Spanish Crown, Dominican royalists encouraged 
Spain to take Santo Domingo from Haiti, ignoring the support for Boyer’s rule on the 
island. 
This dissertation examines the development of this Dominican royalist narrative 
development in relation to Spanish and Haitian negotiations for Santo Domingo. This 
study begins by asking how did the Dominicans respond to the Haitian Unification? Next, 
how did European and Caribbean officials argue that Haiti’s actions in Santo Domingo 
would bring about the end of slavery? And lastly, how did the Dominican royalist 
narrative develop in response to the Haitian Unification’s success? Rather than framing 
this period as one of a “Haitian Occupation,” my dissertation argues that elite 
Dominicans deployed a Hispanic and racist rhetoric to purposefully disrupt the Haitian 
government’s attempts to bring together both sides of the island and ignored the 
cooperation between Dominicans and Haitians during the island’s unification. 
 During this period race and ethnicity became a marker and divider among social 
groups because Dominican royalists kept them at the forefront of people’s minds. The 
Dominican Creole vision of an elite-led moderate republic gave way to a more egalitarian 
direction living under the rule of the Haitian Republic. Dominicans had options such as 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Herbard, Freedom Papers: An Atlantic Odyssey in the Age of Emancipation (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2012); and James Alexander Dun, Dangerous Neighbors: Making the Haitian Revolution 
in Early America (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2016).  
5 Colonial elites established invocations of Spanishness in their relationship to Spain and in history. For 
more on the different historical visions of colonial Santo Domingo see Pedro L. San Miguel, The Imagined 
Island: History, Identity, and Utopia in Hispaniola trans. by Jane Ramírez (Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 2005) esp. Ch. 1.  
4 
embracing Haiti or not employing racist rhetoric. Instead, these former separatists 
decided that Spanish colonial rule was better than living under Haitian rule. To convince 
the Spanish—and the world—of their aversion to President Boyer’s government, these 
Dominicans developed an account underlining the population’s affinity and fidelity to 
Spain and the monarch Fernando VII. This argument refashioned Dominicans as 
Hispanic royalists and looked past the fact that many of them had only recently rejected 
Spanish rule with Santo Domingo’s first independence. This new account marginalized 
the fact that Dominicans steered Santo Domingo to join the Haitian Republic and instead 
presented it as a foreign occupation. This limited vision left out other possible groups and 
peoples such as the former enslaved, cattle traders, and revolutionaries. This account 
gave the Spanish and others who were willing to listen look an opportunity to dismiss the 
Haitian Unification of the island, shaped by their own fears and prejudices as a legacy of 
the Haitian Revolution. Separatists explicitly used race and ethnicity to differentiate 
between Dominicans and Haitians that later separatists took for themselves to justify the 
end of their union with Haiti in 1844.   
HISTORIOGRAPHY 
Dominican royalists’ fashioning a Hispanic narrative provides one example of the 
ways in which historical actors defined themselves in opposition to Haiti. Recent scholars 
of nineteenth-century Dominican Republic have shown how continued relations with 
Haiti were not always contentious, with some Dominicans even considering a federation 
between both island nations.6 This pro-Haitian notion of nationhood clashed with the 
Dominican elite’s vision that focused on integrating white immigrants into the nation. 
                                                          
6 April J. Mayes, The Mulatto Republic: Class, Race, and Dominican National Identity (Gainesville: 
University of Florida Press, 2014); and Anne Eller, We Dream Together: Dominican Independence and the 
Fight for Caribbean Freedom (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2016).  
5 
While not explicitly anti-Haitian, these Dominican elites were like their counterparts in 
Latin America who looked down upon indigenous and African elements of society.7 It 
was within this context that Dominican historian José Gabriel García wrote his epic four-
volume history of the Dominican Republic, devoting several chapters to the Haitian 
Unification.8 Gabriel García’s preoccupation with Dominican nation-building shaped his 
interpretations as he looked to the historical past to offer lessons for his present. He 
negatively depicted the Haitian Unification because for him it stood as a barrier to 
Dominican independence and nation-building that emphasized progress.9 Nevertheless, 
his point of emphasis was not to focus on this period as the origin of Dominican identity. 
                                                          
7 Some examples include Nancy Appelbaum, Muddied Waters: Race, Region, and Local History in 
Colombia, 1846-1948 (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2003); Marisol de la Cadena, Indigenous 
Mestizos: The Politics of Race and Culture in Cuzco, Peru, 1919-1991 (Durham, NC: Duke University 
Press, 2003);  Rebecca Earle, The Return of the Native: Indians and Myth-Making in Spanish America, 
1810-1930; (Durham: NC, Duke University Press, 2007); Jeffrey Gould, To Die in this Way: Nicaraguan 
Indians and the Myth of Mestizaje, 1880-1965 (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1998); E. Gabrielle 
Kuenzli, Acting Inca: National Belonging in Twentieth-Century Bolivia; (Pittsburgh, PA: Pittsburgh 
University Press, 2013); Florencia Mallon, Peasant and Nation: The Making of Postcolonial Mexico and 
Peru (Berkley: University of California Press, 1995); Ada Ferrer, Insurgent Cuba: Race, Nation, and 
Revolution, 1868-1898 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003); James Sanders, 
Contentious Republicans: Popular Politics, Race, and Class in Nineteenth-Century Colombia (Durham, 
NC: Duke University Press, 2004); Aline Helg, Our Rightful Share: The Afro-Cuban Struggle for Equality, 
1886-1912; (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995); Marixa Lasso, Myths of Racial 
Harmony: Race and Republicanism during the Age of Revolution, Colombia, 1795-1831 (Pittsburgh, PA: 
University of Pittsburgh Press, 2007); Aline Helg, Liberty and Equality in Caribbean Colombia, 1770-1835 
(Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2004);  Lillian Guerra, The Myth of José Martí: 
Conflicting Nationalisms in Early Twentieth-Century Cuba (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press, 2005); Teresita Martinez-Vergne, Nation & Citizen in the Dominican Republic, 1880-1916 (Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2005); and Mayes, Mulatto Republic. 
8 José Gabriel García, Compendido de la historia de Santo Domingo 4 volumes (Santo Domingo: Imprenta 
García Hermanos, 1894). For the purposes of this study, I cite an abridged version containing the first two 
volumes of the collection.  
9 For instance, Gabriel García named the first book of his sixth part as the Haitian occupation period, José 
Gabriel García, Obras Completas Volumen 1. Compendido de la Historia de Santo Domingo Tomos I y II 
(Santo Domingo: Archivo General de la Nación Equipo Editorial, 2016). For more on his career as a 
historian and his relationship to Dominican historiography see Roberto Cassá, “Historiography of the 
Dominican Republic” in General History of the Caribbean 6 volumes (London: UNESCO Publishing, 
1999) Vol. 6, 388-416 ed. by B.W. Higman trans, by Annette Insanally and Andrew Hurley. For more 
Gabriel García’s historical work and its relation to Haitian and Dominican relations see Pedro L. San 
Miguel, The Imagined Island: History, Identity, and Utopia in Hispaniola translated by Jane Ramírez 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2005), 15 – 22. San Miguel notes how García’s 
interpretations influenced many Dominican historians. The Colección José Gabriel García which is now 
housed in the Archivo General de la Nación in Santo Domingo bears his name and is in part a collection of 
his personal papers that he used when wrote his 4 volume work on Dominican history. 
6 
The Dominican experience under the Unification did not figure as a prominent source of 
contention or identification for the literature compared to how it would function in the 
twentieth century. 
The anti-Haitian narrative in Dominican historical works became more 
pronounced in the scholarship produced under dictator Rafael Leónidas Trujillo Molina 
(1930 – 1961).  One of the things that made Trujillo’s regime notable was his populist 
tactics that incorporated the rural population within Dominican society by making the 
state responsible for their well-being. In addition, he embodied several cultural motifs 
such as a father figure, family man, and caudillo that entrenched his own form of 
populism.10 Trujillo’s dictatorship, however, is infamous for its state-sponsored anti-
Haitianism. Although initially inconsistent and ambiguous, Trujillo’s decision to order 
the Dominican army to kill Haitians living in the Dominican Republic’s northwestern 
frontier killing at least 15,000 ethnic Haitians and Dominicans of Haitian descent 
reflected an anti-Haitian discourse.11 With the help of selected intellectuals, Trujillo 
sponsored studies on Dominican history basing the nation on an idealized Hispanic 
heritage in stark contrast to Haiti. These scholars blamed Haiti for the Dominican 
nation’s past and present problems. It was under Trujillo’s rule that this dichotomy of 
associating Haiti with all things black and African and relating all Dominicans’ positive 
                                                          
10 Richard Lee Turits, Foundation of Despotism: Peasants, the Trujillo Regime, and Modernity in 
Dominican History (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003); and Lauren Derby, The Dictator’s 
Seduction: Politics and the Popular Imagination in the Era of Trujillo (Durham, NC: Duke University 
Press, 2009).  
11 Turits, Foundation of Despotism, 161-165; and Lauren Derby, “Haitians, Magic, and Money: Raza and 
Society in the Haitian-Dominican Borderlands, 1900 to 1937” in Comparative Studies in Society and 
History, Vol. 36, No. 3 (July 1994), 488 – 526.  
7 
traits as Hispanic and white reached its apogee.12 Since his death in 1961, Dominican 
scholarship has distanced itself from Trujillo’s anti-Haitian and pro-Hispanic discourse 
with studies that have reexamined this period from the perspective of labor, 
emancipation, slavery, and race.13 Scholarship in the United States has complemented 
this literature by offering new studies on the nineteenth-century informing historians’ 
understandings on the relationship between race and nation, slavery and emancipation, 
and the continued ties between Haitians and Dominicans.14 These studies have corrected 
much of the anti-Haitian bias from the Trujillo regime about the Dominican and Haitian 
past.  
“A Divisive Community” contributes a singular focus on this period by 
elaborating the elite discourses about these events with new archives and a bigger 
discussion.  By contrasting pro-Haitian Dominicans with their pro-Spanish counterparts, 
                                                          
12 Some of these works include Joaquín Balaguer, La isla al reves: Haiti y el destino dominicano  22 
edition (Santo Domingo: Fundación Joaquín Balaguer, 2013); Manuel A. Peña-Batlle, Ensayos históricos 
(Santo Domingo: Fundación Peña-Batlle, 1989); Emilio Rodríguez Demorizi, Santo Domingo y la Gran 
Colombia: Bolívar y Nuñez de Cáceres (Santo Domingo: Editora del Caribe, 1971); Emilio Rodríguez 
Demorizi, Invasiones haitanas de 1801, 1805 y 1822 ([Ciudad de Trujillo] Santo Domingo: Editor del 
Caribe, 1955); Victor Garrido, Antecedentes de la Invasión Haitiana de 1822 (Santo Domingo: Impresora 
Arte y Cine, 1972); and Manuel Jesús Troncoso de la Concha, La ocupación de Santo Domingo por Haiti 
(Santo Domingo: La Nación, 1942).  
13 Frank Moya Pons’ seminal work on this period focuses on Haitian rule’s impact in Santo Domingo and 
the failure of Boyer to takes into account the differences between Dominican and Haitian society. See La 
dominación haitiana 4 edition (Santo Domingo: Libería La Trinitaria, 2013). Other works tangentially 
cover this period within larger narrative focuses and themes. For instance, see Jean Price Mars, La republic 
de haiti y la republica dominicana: diversos aspectos de una problema historico, geografico y etnologico 
trans. Spanish (Santo Domingo: Sociedad Dominicana de Bibliófios, 2000); Juan Bosch, Composción 
social dominicana: Historia e interpretación (Santo Domingo: Editora Alfa & Omega, 1970); Carlos 
Esteban Deive, La esclavitud del negro en Santo Domingo, 1492-1844 2 volumes (Santo Domingo: Museo 
del Hombro, 1980); Quisqueya Lora Hugi, “El sonido de la libertad: 30 años de agitaciones y 
conspiraciones en Santo Domingo (1791-1821),” Clio Vol. 80 (182) January 2011, 109 – 140; and Franklin 
J. Franco, Blacks, Mulattos, and the Dominican Nation (New York: Routledge, 2015). An important 
exception is Quisqueya Lora Hugi, Transcición de la esclavitud al trabajo libre en Santo Domingo: El caso 
de Higüey (1822-1827) (Santo Domingo: Academia Dominicana de Historia, 2012).  
14 For works on the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries see Martinez-Vergne, Nation & Citizen; 
and Mayes, Mulatto Republic. For works covering the Haitian Revolution’s impact on Santo Domingo see 
Jones “Revolution and Reaction;” Graham T. Nessler, An Islandwide Struggle for Freedom: Revolution 
Emancipation, and Reenslavement in Hispaniola, 1789-1809 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press, 2016); and Yingling, “Colonialism Unraveling.”  For studies on the period leading up to the Haitian 
Unification and after see Eller ““All would be equal;” and We Dream Together especially Ch. 1.  
8 
this study reveals how the Haitian Unification hardened existing regional, ethnic, and 
class divisions within Santo Domingo’s society.15 This emphasis illustrates how the 
Unification’s success drove pro-Spanish Dominicans’ to increasingly reject Haitian rule 
and marginalizing the republic’s supporters through racial language. This anti-Haitian 
rhetoric underpinning expressions of Dominican identity and its impact in shaping 
present-day notions of blackness in the Dominican Republic has been the subject of many 
studies ranging from politics to ideas of beauty.16 My analysis focuses in part on 
Dominican identity by parsing it from notions of dominicanidad, or Dominicanness as 
some Dominicans presented themselves as Spanish subjects. When considering this 
period as a Haitian occupation from Dominican royalists’ perspectives, this study 
examines some of Santo Domingo’s conditions under Haitian rule to consider what 
contributed to its separation from Haiti in 1844. The Unification offers the opportunity to 
explore the existing fissures within Dominican society and its impact on how the 
historical actors depicted the Haitian regime in Santo Domingo.  
Nearly fifty years ago, scholarship on Latin America began looking at the causes 
of independence in the region and less the Spanish Empire’s dissolution from a top-down 
perspective. Earlier scholars focusing on texts such as John Lynch and Benedict 
Anderson examined the impact of print culture in creating a sense of community as the 
foundation for nineteenth-century nation states. It was from newspapers circulating 
                                                          
15 Scholars have eluded to Boyer drawing support from Dominicans closer to the Haitian and Dominican 
border. See Eugenio Matibag, Haitian-Dominican Counterpoint: Nation, State, and Race on Hispaniola 
(New York: Palgrave Macmillian, 2003); and Jones, “Revolution and Reaction.” For such examples of 
regional studies and focuses see Lora Hugi, Transción de la esclavitud; and Eller, We Dream Together.  
16 Ernesto Sagás, Race and Politics in the Dominican Republic (Gainesville, University of Florida Press, 
2000); David Howard, Coloring the Nation: Race and Ethnicity in the Dominican Republic (Boulder, 
Colo., Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001); Kimberly Simmons, Reconstructing Racial Identity and the 
African Past in the Dominican Republic; (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2009); and Ginetta 
Candelario, Black behind the Ears: Dominica Racial Identity from Museums to Beauty Shops (Durham, 
NC: Duke University Press, 2007).   
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among the Creole elites informing them of the events across the Americas combined with 
their local grievances that illustrated the different causes of independence in the region.17 
Historians have long since modified these early hypotheses with specific case studies 
offering examples of alternative ways that Latin American historical actors imagined 
themselves and others within emerging nation-states.18 Regional and specific case studies 
offer examples of Creoles using indigenous symbols, imagery, and history as the basis for 
their new nations as opposed to their European connections.19 The aftermath of 
independence resulted in nation-states where Creoles diverged from Spain rhetorically 
and not just politically.  
Historians have also inserted the contributions of subaltern groups to the larger 
independence and nation-building narratives. This direction in the scholarship 
complements existing work on Creole elites to illustrate how Africans, Amerindians, and 
their descendants became politicized but for different reasons. For example, case studies 
in the Andes show how different indigenous groups rebelled to transform if not fully 
overthrow the existing colonial order.20 In other instances, scholar have examined the 
New Granada viceroyalty looking at pardos or free people of color who fought against 
                                                          
17 John Lynch, The Spanish American Revolutions, 1808-1826 (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 
1973); and Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of 
Nationalism revised edition (New York: Verso, 2006) especially Ch. 4.  
18 For responses to Anderson’s thesis of imagined communities see Sara Castro-Klarén and John Charles 
Chasteen ed. Beyond Imagined Communities: Reading and Writing the Nation in Nineteenth-Century Latin 
America (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003); Claudio Lomnitz, “Nationalism as a 
Practical System: Benedict Anderson’s Theory of Nationalism from the Vantage Point of Spanish America 
in The Other Mirror: Grand Theory through the Lens of Latin America (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2000) ed. by Miguel Angel Centeno and Fernando Lopez-Alves; and Max Bergholtz, 
“Thinking the Nation,” American Historical Review Vol. 123 No. 2 (April 2018), 518 – 528. 
19 D.A. Brading, The First America: The Spanish Monarchy, Creole Patriots, and the Liberal State, 1492-
1867 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991); and Rebecca Earle, Return of the Native: Indians 
and Myth-Making in Spanish America, 1810-1937 (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2007).  
20 Sergio Serulnikov, Revolution in the Andes: The Age of Túpac Amaru trans. By David Frye (Durham, 
NC: Duke University Press, 2013); Charles Walker, The Tupac Amaru Rebellion (Cambridge, MA: 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2014); and Sinclair Thomson, “Sovereignty disavowed: the 
Tupac Amaru revolution in the Atlantic world” Atlantic Studies Vol. 13 No. 3 (2016), 407-431.  
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the Spanish for the idea of a nation-state free from racism and legal discrimination. New 
Granada’s coastal region’s connection to the Caribbean served as a reminder of the 
precariousness of cross-racial alliances in the aftermath of independence.21 The Haitian 
Revolution and its impact in the Atlantic world illustrate how the struggle against slavery 
could also be the impetus towards a fight against colonialism and freedom. Formerly 
enslaved persons turned citizens forced the French to grant them citizenship and held out 
in Saint-Domingue until Haitian independence and Guadeloupe until the return of 
slavery.22 Although it did not become independent until the late nineteenth century, Cuba 
was not immune from the independent fervor of the Age of Revolutions. The island 
experienced its own struggle against slavery and its first recorded declaration of 
independence from José Antonio Aponte, a free person of color.23 Because of this 
scholarship, blacks and indigenous political and social contributions to the process of 
independence during the Age of Revolutions have resulted in moving beyond a singular 
focus on creole elites to narrate the story of independence.  
By focusing on nineteenth-century Santo Domingo, this study brings together the 
literature of creole nationalism and popular participation among subalterns. Santo 
                                                          
21 Aline Helg, Liberty and Equality in Caribbean Colombia, 1770-1835 (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 2004); and Marixa Lasso, Myths of Racial Harmony: Race and Republicanism during the 
Age of Revolution, Colombia 1795-1831 (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2007). For a study 
that brings an Atlantic perspective to Colombia’s Caribbean coast see Ernesto Bassi, An Aqueous Territory: 
Sailor Geographies and New Granada’s Transimperial Greater Caribbean World (Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press, 2016). 
22 Laurent Dubois, Avengers of the New World: The Story of the Haitian Revolution (Cambridge, MA: 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2004); and A Colony of Citizens: Revolution and Slave 
Emancipation in the French Caribbean, 1784-1804 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
2004).  
23 For Cuba’s struggle against slavery and colonialism see Matt D. Childs, The 1812 Aponte Rebellion in 
Cuba and the Struggle against Atlantic Slavery (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006); 
and Ada Ferrer, Freedom’s Mirror: Cuba and Haiti in the Age of Revolution (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2014). For more on Cuban independence in the mid to late nineteenth century see Ada 
Ferrer, Insurgent Cuba: Race, Nation, and Revolution, 1868-1898 (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1999).  
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Domingo’s time as a Spanish colony ended with Dominican Creole Núñez de Cáceres 
declaring independence in 1821.  Many Dominicans, however, rejected this movement 
and made their sentiments clear when they enticed and supported Boyer’s entrance into 
Santo Domingo in 1822. Consequently, the Haitian Unification was less an act of 
aggression and more a path of independence for the former Spanish colony.24 Faced with 
this failure to strike out on their own, Dominican Creoles developed a royalist discourse 
articulating their continued loyalty to the Spanish Crown and emphasizing the Hispanic 
heritage of the entire population. Scholars have demonstrated how Creoles, Africans, and 
Amerindians found the choice of constitutional monarchy over a liberal republic as 
practical solution braiding together colonial political and legal institutions with an 
independent nation state.  Royalists understood that the Crown could grant privileges to 
assure its subjects, something that the new nations could not guarantee.25 With the 
dwindling Spanish interest in reclaiming their former colony and Haitian rule’s persisting 
in Santo Domingo, Dominican royalists entrenched themselves within their rhetoric of 
the past as they focused more on racial differences. Dominicans’ actions supported 
                                                          
24 Jones, “Revolution and Reaction,” 192-197; Eller, ““All woud be equal,” 140-141; and Yingling, 
“Colonialism Unraveling,” 637-639.  
25 A telling example of historical actors choosing monarchy were the black auxiliaries who fought for the 
Spanish Crown who associated emancipation with the monarchy during the Haitian Revolution. For more 
on this part of the Haitian Revolution see Jane Landers, Atlantic Creoles in the Age of Revolutions 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010). Other studies covering the role of the black auxiliaries 
and their interactions with the Spanish, Cubans, and Dominicans include Ferrer, Freedoms Mirror; Nessler, 
Islandwide Struggle for Freedom; and Yingling, “Colonialism Unraveling.” For more on Africans 
associating a king with obtaining freedom see Childs, Aponte Rebellion.  For monarchism among 
indigenous peoples see Eric Van Young, The Other Rebellion: Popular Violence, Ideology, and the 
Mexican Struggle for Independence, 1810-1821 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001). For more 
on royalism during the independence wars see Marcela Echeverri, Indian and Slave Revolts in the Age of 
Revolution: Reform, Revolution, and Royalism in the Northern Andes (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2016). Brazil offers a unique counterpoint as it became independent while maintaining a member of 
the Portuguese royal family, Kirsten Schultz, Tropical Versailles: Empire, Monarchy, and the Portuguese 
Royal Court in Rio de Janeiro, 1808-1821 (New York: Routledge, 2001).      
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independence with the Haitian Republic that drove the Hispanic royalist narrative that 
elites espoused.  
The Haitian Republic’s struggle for French recognition made scholars initially 
view foreign countries working in tandem to isolate Haiti tandem to defend their own 
slave regimes. From the metropole’s perspective, France had the complete advantage 
over Haiti and French recognition was a victory with Haiti signing the financial 
indemnity.26 In this interpretation, economic considerations are what ultimately drove 
France to negotiate with Haiti.27 Some scholars view Haitian President Jean-Pierre 
Boyer’s accepting French terms as an example of the republican government’s 
authoritarian nature. These academic explanations contribute to larger surveys discussing 
the Duvalier dictatorships’ rise to power. Specific political studies present this event as a 
part of larger Haitian political elites clashes or another example of the Haitian state and 
nation’s disconnect.28 What remains for scholars to examine is how the struggle against 
colonialism and slavery during the Haitian Revolution manifested in nineteenth-century 
Haitian diplomacy, particularly the republic’s union with Santo Domingo.  
This study situates Santo Domingo’s nineteenth-century history within multiple 
contexts. This work joins an emergent scholarship that has begun looking at Santo 
Domingo’s interconnectedness with Haiti, which highlights Dominicans’ affinity with 
                                                          
26 Robert Stein, “From Saint-Domingue to Haiti, 1804 – 1825,” Journal of Caribbean History Vol. 19, 
Issue 2 (Nov. 1984), 189 – 226.  
27 Robert K. LaCerte, “Xenophobia and Economic Decline: The Haitian Case, 1820 – 1843,” Americas Vol. 
37, no. 4 (1981), 499 – 515. 
28  Laurent Dubois, Haiti: The Aftershocks of History (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2012); David 
Nicholls, From Dessalines to Duvalier: Race, Colour, and National Independence in Haiti (New 
Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1996); and Michel-Rolph Trouillot, Haiti, State Against Nation: 
The Origins & Legacy of Duvalierism (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1990).  
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their island neighbors.29 This relationship includes extending the Revolutionary period to 
include nineteenth-century Haitian diplomacy and politics surrounding Haiti’s 
sovereignty and union with Santo Domingo.30 Haitian officials and intellectuals struggled 
against the Haitian Revolution negative view from foreign perspectives with their own 
counter-history that legitimized their struggle against France.31 Julia Gaffield has argued 
that the diverse foreign responses to Haiti’s independence undermined France’s attempts 
to isolate its former colony. These viewpoints limited France from waging war against its 
former colony as the Haitian Republic succeeded in consolidating its independence.32 In 
fact, European sympathies contributed to attacks on the French government’s own 
legitimacy. The French indemnity with Haiti was in part France conceding that it would 
never get their former colony back.33 This study presents Haitian diplomatic policy with 
the British and Spanish following France’s recognition as Haiti extending its earlier 
strategy against the French. By looking at Haiti and Santo Domingo from different 
perspectives, this analysis illustrates how Haitians and Dominicans defended their 
political gains to foreign nations watching these events.  
National and regional perspectives, however, often do not include states, people, 
and events outside of their linguistic, geographic, and cultural purview. Atlantic history 
allows scholars to encompass old fields and decenter traditional national and regional 
                                                          
29 Jones, “Revolution and Reaction; Eller, ““All would be equal;” Nessler, An Islandwide Struggle; 
Yingling, “Colonialism Unraveling;” and Eller, We Dream Together.  
30 Laurent Dubois, “Thinking Haiti’s Nineteenth Century,” Small Axe Vol. 18, no 2, July 2014 (No. 44), 72 
– 79.  
31 Erin Zavitz, “Revolutionary narrations: Early Haitian historiography and the challenge of writing 
counter-history,” Atlantic Studies, Vol. 14, no. 3, 336 – 353; and Marlene Daut, Baron de Vastey and the 
Origins of Black Atlantic Humanism (New York: Palgrave Macmillian, 2017).  
32 Julia Gaffield, Haitian Connections in the Atlantic World: Recognition after Revolution (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2015).  
33 Friedemann Pestel, “The Impossible Ancien Régime colonial: Postcolonial Haiti and the Perils of the 
French Revolution,” Journal of Modern European History Vol. 15 Issue 2 (2017), 261 – 279. 
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historiographies.34 Ernesto Bassi’s study on the earlier understudied connections in New 
Granada’s Caribbean region between New Granada and the Caribbean show how the city 
of Cartagena aimed for inclusion within the British Empire as Spanish forces drew in to 
defeat them. The city’s connection to the Caribbean offered it distinct possibilities that 
diverged from Creoles’ goals.35 The relationship between the Portuguese colonies of 
Angola and Brazil becomes more clear when Roquinaldo Ferreira considered a 
conspiracy from Benguela, a city in Angola, which sought to merge with the Brazilians 
after the latter’s independence from Portugal in 1824.36 Santo Domingo’s first and second 
independence represented alternative visions for a nation and belonging even as 
contemporaries commemorated the Creole-led one as opposed to its Haitian counterpart. 
The rival Haitian states and later unified republic served as inspiration for Dominican 
revolutionaries before Santo Domingo unified with its neighbor.37 Jeremey Adelman used 
the metaphor of a labyrinth to describe “the passages from empire to nationhood” and 
how it “forked in ways that required actors to make choices without knowing the 
certainty of the outcome.”38 By examining Santo Domingo within an Atlantic 
perspective, this study situates Dominicans’ different paths through the labyrinth of 
independence that did not predetermine a colony’s transition to a nation-state.  
                                                          
34 Philip D. Morgan and Jack P. Green, “Introduction: The Present State of Atlantic History” in Atlantic 
History: A Critical Appraisal (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 3 – 33 ed. by Jack P. Greene 
and Phillip D. Morgan; Nicholas Canny, “Writing Atlantic History: Or Reconfiguring the History of 
Colonial British America,” Journal of American History Vol. 86, no. 3 (1999), 1093 – 1114; and William 
O’Reilly, “Genealogies of Atlantic History,” Atlantic Studies Vol. 1, no. 1 (2004), 66 – 84.  
35 Bassi, An Aqueous Territory.  
36 Roquinaldo Ferreira, Cross-Cultural Exchange in the Atlantic World: Angola and Brazil during the Era 
of the Slave Trade (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), Ch. 6. Thank you to Matt Childs who 
reminded me of this example.  
37 Lora Hugi, “El sonido.”  
38 Jeremy Adelman, Sovereignty and Revolution in the Iberian Atlantic (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2006), 1.  
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An Atlantic perspective also helps imperial historians by enabling them to merge 
metropolitan and colonial perspectives on a common level. Although this scholarship has 
contributed to the growing field of Atlantic history, historians comment on its use of a 
European perspective in encompassing a “single imperial geography” such as the British 
Atlantic. 39 “A Divisive Community” incorporates the Haitian diplomatic negotiations 
between the British, French, and Spanish to illustrate the republic’s continued importance 
for slave-holding regimes in the Atlantic world. This study especially focuses on the 
Spanish and Haitian negotiations over Santo Domingo to illustrate how they served as 
proxies for opposing views in the former Spanish colony.40 Dominican royalists’ attempts 
to return the colony to Spanish rule appears as an anomaly when one considers the 
independence movements in the rest of Latin America and the first independence 
Dominican Creole Núñez de Cáceres declared.  Nevertheless, when scholars situate Santo 
Domingo within its different Latin American, Caribbean, and Atlantic contexts, some 
Dominicans’ attempts to stay with Spain resemble the same experiences of other 
Caribbean colonial elites who choose to continue as colonies as opposed to becoming 
independent.41 Through an Atlantic perspective, this study decentralizes the Spanish 
perspective within its own empire to merge other vantage points including Haiti’s.  
                                                          
39 Alison Games, “Atlantic History: Definitions, Challenges, and Opportunities,” American Historical 
Review Vol. 111, no. 3 (June 2006), 741-757; Ernesto Bassi, “Beyond Compartmentalized Atlantics: A 
Case for Embracing the Atlantic from Spanish American Shores” History Compass 12, no. 9 (2014), 704-
716; Jorge Cañizares-Esguerra and Benjamin Breen, “Hybrid Atlantics: Future Directions for the History of 
the Atlantic World” History Compass 11, no. 8 (2013). 597-609; and Eliga H. Gould, “Entangled Atlantic 
Histories: A Response from the Anglo-American Periphery” American Historical Review 112, no. 5 
(December 2007), 1415 – 1422.  
40 Gaffield, Haitian Connections.  
41 Some studies examining loyalty to European empires in the Caribbean include Andrew Jackson 
O’Shaughnessy, An Empire Divided: The American Revolution and the British Caribbean (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2000); and David Satorius, Ever Faithful: Race, Loyalty, and the Ends of 
Empire in Spanish Cuba (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2013).  
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SOURCES AND METHODS 
 By examining the anti-Haitian bias within Dominican royalist accounts, this 
dissertation investigates how Dominican elites discredited the republic’s rule to convince 
Spanish officials of Santo Domingo’s loyalty. Dominicans’ narratives distorted the events 
surrounding the Unification that illustrated pro-Haitian support in Santo Domingo and 
silenced alternative notions of belonging. The Dominican royalists used a selective 
interpretation of the past to invent traditions linking themselves and Santo Domingo to 
the Spanish Crown and nation.42 Sibylle Fischer’s concept of disavowal informs this 
analysis of some Dominicans’ loyalist rhetoric directed towards their Spanish audience. 
For Fischer, disavowal is “an attitude perspective towards the past and not the supposed 
characteristics of a particular moment, historical stage, or ethnic or cultural formation.”43 
Through analyzing official correspondences, petitions, and reports between Dominican 
royalists and Spanish officials, this study presents how Dominican royalists denied the 
Haitian government support in Santo Domingo during the Unification. These Dominicans 
and their supporters used their interpretations of the past to discredit the Haitian rule on 
the island and its success.  
This study uses the term Hispanism to define Dominican royalist arguments 
against the Haitian Unification and for Spanish support. By using this term, this analysis 
focuses on identity, ethnicity, and culture more broadly as opposed to just race to 
understand the divisions and forms of identification in Santo Domingo under Haitian 
                                                          
42 Anderson, Imagined Communites; and Eric Hobsbawm and Terrence Ranger ed. The Invention of 
Tradition (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992).  
43 Sibylle Fischer, Modernity Disavowed: Haiti and the Cultures of Slavery in the Age of Revolution 
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2004), 37 – 38.  
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rule.44 Throughout this analysis, the dissertation uses loyalist and royalist to denote 
Dominicans who expressed their allegiance to the Spanish Crown and Spanish nation.45 
Dominican royalists presented a narrative of fidelity that highlighted the Hispanic 
elements of their past and identity. They borrowed from Spaniards on both sides of the 
Atlantic who identified similarly during the Age of Revolutions. Dominicans’ petitions to 
the Crown and correspondences to Spanish officials illustrate how they used this tradition 
to illustrate to their Hispanic identity.46 This study analyzes these Dominican writings as 
the precursor to what literary scholar Lorgia García Peña refers to as the “Archive of 
Dominicanidad.” This metaphorical archive notes the role Haiti played in imagining and 
writing the terms of Dominican identity for those “who privileged [the] Spanish 
language, Hispanic culture, the traditions of Spain, and whiteness.”47 This analysis treats 
                                                          
44 Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper have challenged the study of Identity and its utility as a lens of 
analysis and offered alternatives that do the “work” of identity, Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper, 
“Beyond “identity”” in Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, History (Berkley: University of 
California Press, 2005) by Frederick Cooper.  Andrew B. Fisher and Matthew D. O’Hara inform my 
understanding of identity by thinking holistically about how outsides categorized Dominicans and 
especially how the royalists’ lived experience during the Unification as they experienced it. Andrew B. 
Fisher and Matthew D. O’Hara, “Introduction: Racial Identities and their Interpreters in Colonial Latin 
America” in Imperial Subjects: Race and Identity in Colonial Latin America (Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press, 2009), 1 – 37 ed. by Andrew B. Fischer and Matthew D. O’Hara.  
45 Satorius, Ever Faithful; and Echeverri, Indian and Slave Revolts. Scholars have explored the 
relationship between the Spanish king and his subject or vassals during the colonial era. These include 
Bianca Premo, Children of the Father King: Youth, Authority, and Legal Minority in Colonial Lima 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2005); Alejandro Cañeque, The King’s Living Image: The 
Culture and Politics of Viceregal Power in Colonial Mexico (New York: Routledge, 2004).  
46 For works that focus on the aspects of Hispanic identity in the Atlantic world and how they took on 
different life in the Americas see Scott Eastman, Preaching Spanish Nationalism Across the Hispanic 
Atlantic, 1759-1823 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2012) and Jaime E. Rodirguez O, 
“We Are Now the True Spaniards: Sovereignty, Revolution, Independence, and the Emergence of the 
Federal Republic of Mexico, 1808-1824 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2012). 
47 Lorgia García Peña, The Borders of Dominicanidad: Race, Nation and Archives of Contradiction 
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2016), 16, 25. For studies on the relationship of race and nation in 
the Dominican Republic and its iteration of anti-Haitian arguments see Mayes, Mulatto Republic; Franklin 
Franco Pichardo, Sobre racismo y antihaitianismo  (y otros ensayos) Santo Domingo: Impresora Librería 
Vidal, 1997); Sagás, Race and Politics; Howard, Coloring the Nation; and Simmons, Reconstructing 
Racial Identity.   
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Hispanism as an ethnic marker to trace Dominican royalist anti-Haitian arguments in and 
outside the island.  
Through an analysis of Haitian rhetoric underpinning state’s reforms, this study 
investigates Santo Domingo’s transformation from a Spanish colony to a part of the 
Haitian Republic. Phillip Abrams and his understanding of the state influence this reading 
of the Haitian government’s actions who proposed scholars should “abandon the state as 
a material object of study whether concrete or abstract while continuing to take the idea 
of the state extremely seriously.”48  By examining Haitian proclamations and Dominican 
royalist reports, “A Divisive Community” illustrates the Haitian government’s ideology 
and the impetus behind emancipation and secularization reforms in Santo Domingo. 
These laws impeded the Catholic Church’s autonomy in Santo Domingo and brought 
Boyer in conflict with the archbishop of Santo Domingo Pedro Varela y Jimenez. The 
Haitian government wanted to carry out what Emilio Betances refers to as a church 
subordination to the state model.49 The state intended to create a national Church to serve 
as an arm of the Haitian government. Through correspondences between Church 
officials, parishioner petitions, and priests’ records, this study highlights the unforeseen 
consequences of Boyer’s attempts to create a national Church. The Haitian Unification 
laws give the opportunity to look at the ideological tenets driving this state-building 
project.  
The Haitian government and its supporters contrasted Dominican Hispanic 
narratives with their own accounts erasing differences between Haitians and Dominicans. 
                                                          
48 Phillip Abrams, “Notes on the Difficulty of Studying the State (1977)” Journal of Historical Sociology 1, 
no. 1 (March 1988), 58 – 89. 
49 Emilio Betances, The Catholic Church and Power Politics in Latin America: The Dominican Case in 
Comparative Perspective (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007), 19 – 22.  
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For Haitian President Boyer, the experiences of racism and slavery that shaped the entire 
island’s shared identity. These connections offer one example of Paul Gilroy’s role of 
black intellectuals forging a common history across national boundaries in a “Black 
Atlantic.” Gilroy reformulates W.E.B. Dubois’s concept of “double consciousness” and 
analyzes the relationship between the “three modes of thinking, being, and seeing.”  They 
are “racially particularistic, the second nationalistic in that it derives from the nation state 
in which the ex-slaves but not-yet-citizens find themselves,” and “diasporic or 
hemispheric.”50This study uses this reformulated conceptualization of “double 
consciousness”  to frame the correspondences, pamphlets, and proclamations from 
Haitian officials and their supporters to illustrate how the republic simultaneously 
defended its sovereignty in Santo Domingo similar to other nations and empires while 
linking Haitians and Dominicans through their experiences as people of color living in a 
post-emancipation society. Despite not having formal recognition, the Haitian 
government defined itself as a sovereign nation and used it to their advantage when 
combatting Dominican royalist and Spanish officials’ arguments.51 While these 
Dominicans and Spaniards perceived it as an act of aggression, the Haitian nation-state 
felt as though it was in its legal right to act very much as their own empire of liberty in a 
world of slavery and racism.52 The Haitian government combated the Hispanic anti-
                                                          
50 Paul Gilroy, The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double Consciousness (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1993), 127.  
51 For more on the notion of sovereignty see Stephen Krasner ed. Problematic Sovereignty: Contested Rules 
and Political Possibilities (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001); and Daniel Philpott, Revolutions 
in Sovereignty: How Ideas Shaped Modern International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
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Haitian narrative with a nineteenth-century form of black nationalism linking both sides 
of the island.  
CHAPTER OUTLINE 
This dissertation has five chapters examining the events and context driving the 
Haitian Unification and the responses. Chapter One examines Santo Domingo as it 
returned to Spanish possession from the French in 1809. Social and political instability 
plagued the Spanish regime as Dominicans looked for alternatives to end colonialism. 
Their Haitian neighbors experienced their own struggles as two rival states in the north 
and south continued to vie for influence and power on the island. Dominicans’ actions 
coincided with both the larger independence movements in Spain’s remaining 
possessions and President Boyer unifying the northern and southern Haitian states.  
Spanish rule ended because of Dominican Creole Núñez de Cáceres’ independence 
movement in 1821 that pro-Haitian Dominicans solidified with their support of Boyer’s 
entrance to the east in 1822.  
Chapter Two investigates Santo Domingo during the early years of the Haitian 
Unification. After Boyer defeated a royalist conspiracy that sought to bring in the French 
or Spanish to invade, some Dominicans left Santo Domingo for nearby islands such as 
Puerto Rico and Cuba, even returning to Spain. Dominican loyalists’ reports and 
correspondence highlighted Santo Domingo’s fidelity as a reason for the Spanish to get 
involved. Dominican royalist reports, however, also illustrate Boyer’s success in gaining 
the support of many Dominicans by defending the new republic’s borders from outside 
invasion. Dominican royalists began to underscore their loyalty to the Spanish Crown and 
their Hispanic identity in opposition to the Haitian army, government, and their 
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supporters. Moreover, these Dominicans presented plans for the Spanish to acquire Santo 
Domingo from Haitian rule. The first years of Boyer’s rule in Santo Domingo met 
foreign challenges that drove Dominican royalist arguments.  
Chapter Three analyzes the Haitian Unification’s impact in Santo Domingo by 
examining the relationship between land and Church reform. Haitian secularism clashed 
with Dominican religiosity. Within the correspondence, arguments, and negotiations 
between Boyer and Catholic Church officials, the clergy and laity of Santo Domingo 
began adjusting to the Church’s institutional reform. While Boyer succeeded in asserting 
Haitian sovereignty over the Church, the inability to train and recruit its own priests 
forced him to seek a diplomatic solution with the Vatican. As the Haitian reforms 
impoverished the clergy, Dominican parishioners relied on both Church and state to seek 
redress from the loss of priests or their removal because of secularization. Through 
examining Church and state relations in Santo Domingo, this chapter illustrates how the 
weakening of the Church became a point of contention for some Dominicans against 
Boyer.  
Chapter Four expands the focus of analysis as it examines Santo Domingo’s role 
in Haitian negotiations with European empires. Boyer’s government sought alternative 
negotiations besides working out a financial settlement with France to receive recognition 
of its independence. The terms of French recognition resulted in a larger financial 
settlement, which eventually crippled the Haitian economy and eroded support for 
Boyer’s regime. Nevertheless, Haitian officials could now negotiate separately with the 
British and Spanish concerning their sovereignty and possession of Santo Domingo. The 
continued negotiations between British and Haitian diplomats highlighted the Republic’s 
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importance to Great Britain’s interests, especially as it moved towards emancipation in 
the Caribbean. French recognition of Haitian independence drove Spanish officials to cast 
aside any ideas of armed conflict and followed Dominican exile Felipe Fernandez de 
Castro’s suggestions to engage in diplomacy. The 1825 treaty and French recognition of 
Haitian sovereignty had the consequence of making it harder for Spain to plan and 
occupy the island.  
Chapter Five examines the aftermath of Haitian and Spanish negotiations in Santo 
Domingo in 1830. The Spanish threat of war drove the Haitian government to strengthen 
its defenses and give its justifications for its claims to Santo Domingo. For their efforts, 
Dominican royalist Fernandez de Castro and Spanish officials in the Caribbean continued 
to entice their superiors in Madrid to begin negotiations again and follow-up with armed 
forces. They argued that the Haitian government’s might and forces threatened Spanish 
slave interests in the Caribbean, especially in Cuba. Once it became clear the lengths 
Boyer and the Haitian state would go to defend its sovereignty of Santo Domingo and the 
exaggerations of an invasion on Cuban soil, Spanish officials preferred to continue 
watching from afar rather than conspiring from within, and retreated from negotiations. 
Dominican royalists who fled in the aftermath petitioned Spanish officials and the Crown 
to involve themselves in Santo Domingo. Consequently, Dominican royalists’ narrative 
became ever more racist in their arguments by espousing their loyalty to the Spanish 
while denigrating the Haitian Republic and its supporters.  
THE HISTORICAL LEGACY OF THE HAITIAN UNIFICATION 
Despite the end of the Unification in 1844, Dominican and Haitian relations were 
not always contentious during the course the nineteenth century. In fact, cooperation 
persisted in some areas especially as Haiti aided the Dominican Republic in its struggle 
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against Spain during the war of restoration (1863-1865). Dominican elites’ attempts to 
transform the Dominican Republic into a colony helped to insight a fear of reenslavement 
among the rest of the population, the same kind that helped to draw Dominicans to their 
neighbors in 1822.53 Although both nations remained separated, debates and ideas 
surrounding late nineteenth-century Dominican nation-building were not dismissive of 
ideas of federation with their western neighbor. Dominican elites’ disdain extended to 
black immigrants in general coming into the country during the rise of the Dominican 
Republic’s sugar industry.54 The specter of anti-Haitian arguments in Dominican politics 
and the rest of the population to hold during the Trujillo regime and continued to persist 
over the course of the twentieth century. Nevertheless, the end of the political union 
between Haiti and the Dominican Republic in 1844 did not automatically mean both 
places were to be antagonistic.   
The consequences of anti-Haitian rhetoric in the Dominican Republic are felt 
almost 200 years after Boyer united the island. On 23 September 2013, the Dominican 
Republic’s Constitutional Court effectively removed citizenship from those Dominicans 
whose parents were not legal residents at the time of their birth. This ruling overturned an 
earlier constitutional provision granting citizenship to those born in the Dominican 
Republic despite the foreign birth of their parents.55 This court ruling impacted Haitians 
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and Dominicans of Haitian ancestry living in the country and left many “stateless.” 
Despite the international outcry and protests from those inside and outside of the 
Dominican Republic, the Dominican government deported an estimated 14,000 people, 
while another 70,000 who “voluntarily” left.  The authorities have left other Dominicans 
and Haitians in limbo and living in makeshift camps, resulting in a humanitarian crisis.56  
This expulsion came at a particularly trying time given that the 2010 earthquake was still 
crippling Haiti in 2013. Dominicans and Haitians suffer the legacy of divisive racial 
politics played out in another form through immigration.  
Whether it is the 2013 ruling stripping Haitians of Dominican citizenship or the 
story of cooperation and conflict that this study analyzes in a “Divisive Community,” 
history connects the moral-ethical questions societies face concerning who belongs to a 
national community and the historical triumphs of the founding of a nation-state. As 
historian Pedro L. San Miguel noted, “The historiographies of the Dominican Republic 
and Haiti have been crucial to the construction of notions of identity.”57 If contemporaries 
continue to tie Dominican nationalism to an inherent struggle and conflict with Haiti, 
then both Dominicans and Haitians suffer the consequences. By not examining the 
Unification and the tenets driving Dominicans to join the Haitian Republic, and instead 
only concentrating on their desires for separation, then people will continue to 
marginalize the legacy of cooperation among two groups of people united by a shared 
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past and experiences of slavery and racial discrimination.  This study brings much needed 
attention and analysis to a formative period in both Dominican and Haitian history to 
offer a more inclusive vision for the future.  
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CHAPTER 1: “NOT AS A CONQUEROR, BUT CONSISTENT WITH THE LAWS OF 
THE STATE”: THE MANY INDEPENDENCES OF SANTO DOMINGO DURING 
THE AGE OF REVOLUTION, 1818 – 1822
 
On 29 December 1821, members of the Junta Central of the city of Santiago de 
los Caballeros sent a letter addressed to Haitian president Jean-Pierre Boyer in response 
to the independence that separatist declared.58 Some members of the junta protested 
Dominican Creoles led by José Núñez de Cáceres creating a new republic in the former 
Spanish colony of Santo Domingo. “Spanish Haiti,” as Núñez de Cáceres creatively 
called the new republic, did not have the widespread support of other inhabitants on the 
island. The indignant Dominicans of Santiago noted the new republic’s constitution 
“imprudently established distinctions between the citizen and the military, the poor and 
the rich, the different districts of this part, and maintained slavery as the basis for the 
foundation of this society.”59 Despite the rhetoric of Dominican revolutionaries, in Santo 
Domingo City those in the heartland of the former Spanish colony observed the 
disconnect between the discourse and actual practice of Núñez de Cáceres’ leadership. 
Rejecting Núñez de Cáceres’ proposed new government, Dominicans of Santiago did not 
just ask for Boyer to come make Santo Domingo a part of Haiti but sought to live “in 
union and fraternity” that brought with it the general end of slavery.60 This disconnect 
                                                          
58 “Junte Centrale de St Yague to Jean-Pierre Boyer,” Santiago de los Caballeros, 29 December 1821, 
printed in Thomas Maidou, Histoire d’Haiti, 8 Volumes (Port-au-Prince: Edition Deschamps, 1985), Vol. 
6, 269 – 270. 
59 “Junte Centrale de St. Yague to Jean Pierre Boyer,” Santiago de los Caballeros, 29 December 1821.  
60 “Junte Centrale de St. Yague to Jean Pierre Boyer,” Santiago de los Caballeros, 29 December 1821. 
27 
between those inhabitants of Santiago and Santo Domingo City reveals large factures 
within the former colony and alternative visions for its future during Latin American 
wars for independence.  
Núñez de Cáceres’ movement in many ways was preemptive to Dominican 
support for Boyer emerging in Santo Domingo in the early nineteenth century while 
under Spanish rule. Dominicans historians have labeled this period Labeled by 
Dominican historians as “España Boba” or foolish Spain, this tragic interpretation of 
Santo Domingo’s colonial history obscures the separate visions Dominicans considered 
as they realized their time with Spain might soon end.61 To the west, Haiti splintered into 
two factions with the Republic of Haiti led by Alexander Pétion in the south and the 
kingdom of Haiti ruled by Henry Christophe in the north. This division, however, did not 
stop the rival Haitian states from involving themselves in their neighbor’s affairs or being 
a source of inspiration for future conspirators. Both sides of the island celebrated Boyer 
uniting the north and south of Haiti as it anticipated a shift in the relationship between 
Haiti and Santo Domingo.62 Núñez de Cáceres intended to harness this feeling, even 
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calling the new republic Spanish Haiti recognizing Dominican support for Boyer and 
attempting in a limited fashion to emulate their neighbors.  
This chapter examines the Haitian government’s attempts and actions to set the 
stage for unification in conjunction with Santo Domingo’s competing independence 
movements from 1809 to 1822. It begins by asking first, how did instability on 
Hispaniola bring Santo Domingo and Haiti closer together? Next, how did Haitian 
propositions to Dominicans overlap with pro-Haitian support in Santo Domingo? Lastly, 
how did Dominicans split politically regarding the Santo Domingo’s future? This chapter 
argues that the 1822 Haitian unification was the result of Dominicans’ choices as well as 
the power of the Haitian Republic, not a simple Haitian occupation as often portrayed in 
nationalists and teleological frameworks focused on nation-building.  
SANTO DOMINGO AND HAITI DURING THE AGE OF REVOLUTIONS 
Instability in early nineteenth-century Santo Domingo was in part the result of a 
series of regime changes during the Haitian Revolution. Spain’s oldest colony in the 
Americas went from Spanish to French rule in 1795, then occupied by revolutionary 
Toussaint Louverture in 1801, and to return to French officers by 1804. Napoleon 
Bonaparte’s invasion of the Iberian Peninsula in 1808 and overthrowing of the Spanish 
monarch created an anti-French sentiment among Dominicans in Santo Domingo and the 
nearby islands of Spanish Puerto Rico and Cuba.63 Under the leadership of mulatto Juan 
Ramirez Sanchez, Dominicans received logistic support from the Spanish in Puerto Rico, 
British naval power in Jamaica, and Haitian munitions to take Santo Domingo back from 
the French in 1809. It was Dominicans, not Spaniards who returned the Spanish 
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metropole’s oldest possession in the Americas.64 The turmoil unleashed by French and 
Haitian clashes resulted in a colony wrought by the devastation, which Dominicans 
returned to face.   
 Elite Dominicans sought stability after the chaos of the revolutionary era, 
however, they faced a series of conspiracies that plagued Santo Domingo.65  The 
Dominican economy floundered as one traveler estimated Santo Domingo’s population at 
about 103, 900 people, down from its 152,640 before the Haitian Revolution.66 While 
some scholars connect the colony’s discontent to its economic situation, Spanish officials 
who arrested conspirators found other factors motivating them.67 Even with the multi-
racial and national cohort that overthrew the French, racism still informed the lives of 
Santo Domingo’s residents.68 Among the conspiracies taken against the Spanish, was the 
Italian Revolution of 1811 named for the Italian mercenaries stationed to defend Santo 
Domingo City, centered on a multi-national and multi-racial group who sought support 
and protection from Pétion and his state in the south.69 Free and enslaved people of color 
made up another conspiracy in 1812 in Santo Domingo city who sought to “kill all of the 
whites.”70 These conspiracies laid bare the inequalities of a society with slaves and the 
racial hierarchy of colonial rule as a source of the conspiracies.71 
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 Santo Domingo’s unstable political and economic environment status invited 
indirect involvement from one of its western neighbors. By 1820, Christophe, king of 
northern Haiti in the north was confident enough as to ask the Spanish about securing 
their eastern neighbor’s territory for themselves.72 On September 1820, a Parliament 
Member from the House of Commons contacted the Spanish ambassador to London as an 
intermediary for Christophe in Haiti. The “pretended king” of Haiti in the eyes of the 
Spanish, asserted through a Mr. Irving that the ruler of northern Haiti could pay whatever 
was necessary.73 Neither Christophe or Pétion in the southern part of Haiti had official 
diplomatic recognition to deal directly with foreign diplomats and heads of state because 
of their connection with slave insurrection. Still, both Haitian leaders used intermediaries 
to negotiate through back channels, such as with the Spanish in this instance.74 Spain’s 
continued possession of Hispaniola’s eastern part suggests the Spanish government did 
not seriously consider the offer, however, it indicates early ambitious plans to expand the 
Haitian state beyond its initial borders, taking advantage of Santo Domingo’s instability. 
Despite the rivalry between Christophe and Pétion, both states shared similarities 
with one another. One of the ways the separate regimes differentiated themselves was the 
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system and form of land tenure. As Christophe continued the plantation system in the 
north under military supervision to grow crops for export while Pétion enabled 
smallholding farmers who cultivated their land for themselves in the south without 
supervision. These two forms of farming: large property and smallholding cultivation 
offered two contrasting visions for the future of Haiti, however, both leaders sought to 
reinstitute the vital plantation economies.75 Another similarity was Pétion and 
Christophe’s firm commitment to defend their borders from slavery and the slave trade 
without directly interfering in the foreign affairs of other countries that continued to 
practice slavery.76 Even with the similarities shared by both rival states, as long as Haiti 
stayed divided, Santo Domingo would persist as a Spanish colony.  
After Pétion’s death in March of 1818, his secretary of state Jean-Pierre Boyer 
succeeded him as president and changed the fortunes of Haiti.77 One scholar describes 
Boyer as “a colored Machiavelli” who “would have been ready, willing and able to lead 
his country against the greatest obstacles any new nation faced in modern times”.78 
Christophe’s regime in the northern part of Haiti faced a new threat and rival from 
Boyer’s presidency. His government, however, did not begin its demise from an external 
enemy, but an internal illness. In August 1820, Christophe fell ill from a stroke while 
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attending a Catholic mass, resulting in the remaining members of his regime to withdraw 
their support.79 The prospect of facing several of his officers challenging his rule caused 
Christophe to tragically committed suicide rather than surrender to those who stood up 
against him.80  With the weakening of Christophe’s rule and subsequent death, Boyer 
took it upon himself to unify the Kingdom of Haiti in the north with the Republic of Haiti 
in the south. For the first time since the death of Dessalines, the ambitious Boyer 
succeeded in uniting Haiti under his rule, changing its fortunes.81 
When news of Boyer’s reunification of Haiti reached Santo Domingo, many 
celebrated and heralded the Haitian leader’s victory.82 The editors of El Duende noted the 
importance of Boyer’s reunification of Haiti and its potential results for Spanish 
possessions of the Caribbean. The writers complimented Boyer by linking him with his 
predecessor Pétion but noted he was more ambitious and decisive in his actions. Boyer’s 
past actions potentially alluded to even more such aspiring deeds in the future. The public 
well-being and freeing his people from tyranny were what motivated Boyer according to 
the publication. There was no malice or visions of grandeur from Boyer as he 
incorporated the former kingdom of Haiti after the death of Christophe. Dominicans 
considered Boyer’s future actions and their implications for the Spanish side of 
Hispaniola after he had united the northern and southern parts of Haiti. Boyer set about 
defending his territory as opposed to expanding emancipation to surrounding 
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colonies.83By presenting Boyer’s unification as beneficial to the Haitian people, the 
newspaper writers offered their support to the Haitian president.   
The return of Spanish rule to Santo Domingo in 1809 brought Dominicans 
dissatisfaction with the colonial regime. The lack of political and economic opportunities 
coupled with continued racial discrimination and slavery made Haiti an appealing 
alternative to Spain. Yet, it was not until Boyer’s unification of the rival Haitian states in 
1818 when Santo Domingo’s neighbor became a workable choice. Boyer’s victory over 
his former rival Christophe drew the support among Dominicans in the east. Pro-Haitian 
support among Dominicans could now be properly courted, which would present another 
challenge to Spain’s already tenuous control of its recently reacquired colony.  
HAITIAN INTRIGUE, DOMINICAN INTEREST 
 Spanish officials in Santo Domingo under the leadership of Captain-General 
Sebastían Kindelan positively (if not cautiously) met the news of Christophe’s death and 
Boyer’s reunification of Haiti. Haitian officers under Boyer reached out to Kindelan 
noting relations between both sides of the island would be friendly, if not frank. They 
planned to maintain trade relations between both sides of the island.84 Kindelan assured 
the Haitian officers of the continuing trade between Santo Domingo and the kingdom of 
Haiti in the north as long as both parties shared “true sentiments of sincere friendship, 
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good harmony, legal intelligence, and reciprocal frankness.”85 Kindelan’s diplomatic but 
firm response reflected his cautious approach. 
 Boyer looked to take advantage of this opening by asking for the Spanish to send 
priests to northern Haiti. Through allowing the archbishop of Santo Domingo Pedro 
Varela y Jimenez to send his general vicar and three other priests to Haiti, Boyer 
conceded the jurisdiction over the Haitian churches to the prelate.86 Kindélan considered 
this exchange to be to the Spanish’s advantage, observing how this “can contribute to 
strengthen the bonds of friendship and good intelligence by the great influence of 
professing the same religion.”87 The Captain-General sought to extend Spanish influence 
and secure Santo Domingo’s borders. Kindelan understood Haitian officers’ support in 
service to the archbishop as their recognition of the cleric’s spiritual authority over the 
western part of Hispaniola, and not just Santo Domingo.88 This opportunity, however, 
presented itself because of Boyer’s friendly request for clerics.  
 As Kindelan was seeking to preserve and strengthen Spanish influence on the 
island, he became aware of a Haitian commander named Dezir Dalmassi threatening 
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Santo Domingo’s frontier border.89  Dalmassi was a lieutenant colonel and former cattle 
rancher who along with other Haitians settled along the towns closest to the border. 
Dalmassi proposed to Haitians and Dominicans he found living along the border in the 
towns of Farfan de las Matas, San Juan de la Maguana, and Azua that they should 
mobilize to become a part of the Haitian state where they could receive material benefits 
under Boyer’s government.90 Dalmassi’s efforts threatened Spanish power and stability 
along the border between Santo Domingo and Haiti. 
 Kindelan decided to have Dalmassi watched for several reasons. The Captain-
General considered Christophe’s death and Boyer unifying the two Haitian regions of the 
north and south under his rule to be the cause of Dalmassi’s actions. Kindelan concluded 
Dalmassi’s inability to realize his ambitions in Haiti after the death of Christophe meant 
Santo Domingo was the next target to align himself with the Boyer regime. Caution 
dictated for Kindelan to order a Spanish officer to report anything out of the ordinary. 
Kindelan balanced Santo Domingo’s security with cordial diplomacy and building ties 
with the newly unified Haitian Republic after sending priests to Boyer. Kindelan’s earlier 
conversation with Boyer convinced the Captain-General of the Haitian President’s 
ignorance of Dalmassi’s actions in Santo Domingo.91 By relying on the reports from his 
Spanish officer and earlier discussions with Boyer, Kindelan decided Dalmassi was a 
rogue agent who they needed to monitor.   
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 Kindelan was unable to determine the information’s validity he received about 
Dalmassi. He learned that Dalmassi approached a Spanish administrator under the guise 
of representing Boyer’s commission to convince Dominicans to join Haiti. When 
questioned further by the officer, Dalmassi replied that he had to deliver “the [Haitian] 
constitution and five proclamations.” 92 The Spanish officer made no reference to 
attempting to detain Dalmassi, which makes one question whether Kindelan’s 
subordinate seriously considered the Haitian proposal. The Captain-General called the 
official back for further instruction perhaps suspicious of the lack of clarity.93Town 
officials in Neiba, a town in the western part of Santo Domingo also verified Dalmassi’s 
presence and mission in the region. Despite having a series of proclamations and the 
constitution, Dalmassi’s presence and actions disrupted the peace in Neiba. The city 
officials sent a copy of Dalmassi’s proclamation and other documents to Kindelan as 
evidence suggesting Haitian attempts to bring Santo Domingo over to Haiti.94 Still, 
without more information, Kindelan could only treat what he heard about Dalmassi as 
rumors.  
 Kindelan’s praised the Neiba city council’s efforts in keeping him abreast of 
events to keep them on his side. He expressed confidence that not only did Dominicans 
reject the attempts of Dalmassi but also, they would “defend their homes and country like 
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all times with the great glory that Dominican Spaniards had verified.”95 By referring to 
Dominicans’ actions in taking back Santo Domingo from and the French, Kindelan 
sought to motivate them to maintain their vigilance. These compliments, however, did 
not stop Kindelan from chiding the Ayuntamiento for not detaining and sending Dalmassi 
to Santo Domingo City for questioning.96 Kindelan’s response highlights two issues he 
faced with the Dalmassi actions. First, despite the reports he received about events to the 
west, Kindelan still could not discern the nature of the Haitian officer’s mission and its 
connection to Boyer’s government in Port-au-Prince. Second, whether true or false the 
nature of Dalmassi’s actions of attempting to sway Dominicans over to the Haitian side 
represented a threat and alternative to Spanish sovereignty on the island. As a result, 
Kindelan toggled between flattery and admonishment to keep the Neiba city council on 
his side. 
To take more control of the situation, Kindelan sent Captain Manuel Caravajal to 
the southern region of Santo Domingo. Caravajal’s service in the previous war of 
reconquest against the French and knowledge of the territory assured Kindelan of his 
competence. Kindelan noted Caravajal’s familiarity with the “temperament and nature of 
[Santo Domingo’s] inhabitants, willingly embracing that commission.”97 The Captain-
General could not confidently trust Dominicans’ to steer clear of Dalmassi and doubted 
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their loyalty to the Spanish regime in Santo Domingo.98 Several towns’ proximity to the 
Haitian border, the movement back and forth of Dominicans and Haitians, and 
Dominicans’ displeasure with Spanish rule meant that Kindelan needed to dispel the 
rumors that Dalmassi had spread. Kindelan called for the town council of Neiba to aid 
Caravajal with men and supplies.99 By sending an officer from Santo Domingo that he 
trusted, Kindelan asserted authority in the border region, away from the confines of the 
capital city.  
Kindelan ordered Caravajal to assess the situation and report back to have more 
reliable information and to assert a measure of control. The Captain-General noted the 
rumors had ceased in the towns of Farfan de las Matas, San Juan, and Neiba.100This slight 
change in affairs gave Kindelan confidence expressed in the population’s loyalty to the 
Spanish government, forged such during Spain’s conquest of Santo Domingo from the 
French in 1809.101 Kindelan used Dominicans’ past exploits of working together with the 
Spanish for a common cause to strengthened their relationship. Local officials assisted 
Caravajal in his mission within the southern part of Santo Domingo as Kindelan ordered 
him to defend Santo Domingo’s border, stamp out Dalmassi’s rumors or news, and to 
arrest the Haitian official to send him Santo Domingo City.102 Kindelan instructions to 
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Caravajal illustrated a level of trust and confidence in the officer, that the Captain-
General did not have with others in the area.  
Spanish officials’ inability to capture Dalmassi made Kindelan uneasy and 
resulted in scrutinizing Dominican administrators such as in Neiba.103 Although Kindelan 
did not question the loyalty of city officials, he found their lack of effort to dispel 
Dalmassi’s rumors surprising. It was from this silence and lack of intelligence, which 
brought Kindelan into action to send Caravajal to deal with the situation.104 Kindelan 
ordered the city council to report their discussion with Dalmassi and why they allowed 
for the Haitian officer to perpetuate disorder and disunity when someone should have 
been apprehended him and sent to Santo Domingo City.105 If the city officials did not 
accept these measures, Kindelan wanted to know what kind of measures they would take 
to “maintain the confidence of the inhabitants.”106 By critiquing the Neiba city council, 
Kindelan expressed his uncertainty and frustration with the situation by the border.  
The Neiba city council initially overlooked Dalmassi’s rumors because he spent 
time in Santo Domingo tending to his cattle ranching and other trade across the border.107 
Once he began spreading his rumors and attempts, Dalmassi did not specifically direct it 
at the city officials. Once they became aware of Dalmassi’s news, the city officials 
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observed how other Dominicans did not fall for the Haitian officer’s “falsehoods,” 
particularly his association with Boyer.108 Neiba’s town council felt these reasons 
justified responding quickly to Kindelan’s response.109 Dalmassi’s time and familiarity 
with Santo Domingo made him an ideal double agent to spread discord and offer 
Dominicans an alternative to Spanish rule with the Haitian Republic. Nevertheless, the 
Neiba city council’s response highlights that their oversight reflected their disinterest and 
not incompetence.  
According to San Juan de la Maguana’s city officials, Kindelan’s arrival to Santo 
Domingo to spread rumors conveniently coincided with the death of the city’s mayor. 
The simultaneous events brought about their own type of confusion.110 This instability 
and Dalmassi’s ambiguous intent hindered Dominican officials from acting decisively. 
“Having dispelled the news from other individuals of the same nation and officials that 
were arguing that everything was false,” the population of San Juan de la Maguana had 
nothing to fear.111 The town’s proximity to Haiti, as opposed to Santo Domingo City, 
meant news or rumor could travel faster from one side of the island to the other. Dalmassi 
intended for his proclamations to send a Haitian officer to Santo Domingo City to see if 
he could bring the Spanish colony under Boyer’s rule. There was no news of a Dalmassi 
being in or near the colony’s capital or of Caravajal’s arrival from Santo Domingo city.112 
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From their perspective, confusion prevented San Juan de la Maguana’s city officials from 
carrying out their duties at the same moment Dalmassi’s rumors spread to Santo 
Domingo’s interior.  
The situation forced Kindelan to acknowledge he had “various news and little 
agreement” about the conflicting reports.113 Kindelan and other officials in Santo 
Domingo City understood the seriousness of events in the various cities along the Haitian 
border as a threat to Spanish control. Kindelan warned their Haitian neighbors about 
going against the friendship they offered in good faith to disturb the peace within Santo 
Domingo.114 Still, Kindelan’s inability to even know the whereabouts of Caravajal, an 
official he sent from Santo Domingo City, made the Spanish Captain-General’s threat 
hollow. Even if Kindelan directed his point to those Haitians such as Dalmassi who lived 
within Santo Domingo conducting their business.115 Kindelan’s impotence in this 
situation reflected in his inability to assure what was true or rumor in the conflicting 
reports.  
Other Haitian officials followed Dalmassi’s lead and continued to entice those in 
Santo Domingo near the border to become a part of Haiti. For instance, one Haitian 
officer boldly tried to convince Azua’s mayor to recruit Dominicans to support Boyer.116 
The Haitian officer claimed how the Haitian army asked him to place the island under 
one government. He was not clear whether he was under Boyer’s orders or whether it was 
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part of a separate conspiracy.117 The Haitian officer claimed all who were in power would 
continue to rule, including those at the municipal level.118 There would be much for them 
to gain, such as trade, and the Haitian officer claimed Dominicans in Farfan de las Matas 
and San Juan de la Maguana readily supported Haitian rule.119 These inhabitants profited 
from the cattle trade between both sides of the island, existing since both were European 
colonies. Boyer would reward those Dominicans who submitted themselves to his rule.120 
The Haitian officer’s proposal illustrates that Dalmassi was not the only agent working at 
the border on Boyer’s behalf.  
The Haitian officer also tried to coax the lieutenant-general of the free battalion of 
color Pablo Ali. Born in West Africa and enslaved in Saint-Domingue, Ali fought with 
the Spanish as part of the black auxiliaries during the Haitian Revolution serving under 
Georges Biassou.121 Curiously, the officer told Ali that the Haitian army asked him to 
place the island under one government without any mention of Boyer.122 He argued Ali 
was already Haitian because of starting his military career in Saint-Domingue. By 
appealing to Ali’s past and remarking on the Haitian army, the official wanted to sway 
him to switch sides.123  
While Dalmassi and other Haitian officers continued to draw Dominicans closer 
to them, Kindelan received confirmation from Boyer about the rumors that reached Santo 
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Domingo city. Kindelan published this correspondence between himself and Boyer as a 
broadside to dispel the rumors of a possible Haitian invasion into Santo Domingo.124 The 
uncertainty surrounding Boyer’s attention and Kindelan’s inability to manage the 
situation warranted the Captain-General to publish these correspondences. By issuing 
these letters for the populace to read, Kindelan wanted to dissuade any malcontents of 
Haiti’s neutrality and assert Spanish control in Santo Domingo. 
Kindelan claimed how Dominicans’ security was one of his main priorities, and 
this issue hurt the relationship Haitian and Spanish officials since 1809. It was for these 
reasons Kindelan inquired to Boyer to keep the “good harmony and friendly relations that 
happily existed between one government and another.”125 Kindelan accused Dalmassi of 
targeting Dominicans to join the Haitian Republic before its forces invaded Haiti before it 
invaded Santo Domingo. Interestingly, Kindelan claimed this mission did not target 
Spanish officials for their loyalty to the Spanish king Fernando VII.126 It may be that 
Kindelan witnessed enough to doubt Dominicans’ fidelity to the Spanish regime in the 
face of the rumors. Dalmassi did not target them because he wanted to speak with 
Dominicans living in the south as opposed to the Spanish. By couching his 
correspondence in terms of security, Kindelan could challenge Boyer to see if the Haitian 
leader was personally involved in this subversion of Spanish rule.   
Kindelan cautiously avoided accusing Boyer of inciting unrest in Santo Domingo. 
He carefully presented his belief of Dalmassi and other Haitians working for their own 
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private gain and not in the name of Boyer.127 Kindelan, however, intended to address the 
threats to the “positive and safe union and harmony between neighbors.”128 By presenting 
Haitian and Spanish relations as being on good and mutual understanding, Kindelan 
tested Boyer to see if the Haitian president was willing to maintain the status quo. If so, 
then in good faith, Boyer would explain Dalmassi’s actions in Santo Domingo.129 Boyer’s 
response would help to shore up Spanish colonial rule while discrediting the rumors of a 
Haitian invasion. Given the power Boyer had, Kindelan could not explicitly hurl 
accusations at the Haitian President but provided him the opportunity to explain such 
rumors as false.   
Kindelan’s surprised Boyer who responded, “I am a faithful man to honor and to 
the laws of my country.”130 Article 5 of the 1816 Haitian constitution was that the Haitian 
Republic would not turn its sights to conquer another colony or regime and get involved 
in another country’s affairs. This article was a staple of Haiti’s early constitutions and 
assured foreign nations of the island nation’s neutrality concerning slavery in their 
territories.131 If Boyer admitted to sending Dalmassi to entice Dominicans to leave the 
Spanish it would be tantamount to a blatant involvement in the affairs of another 
country’s affairs. By insinuating that Boyer violated his own laws, Kindelan’s inquiries 
forced the Haitian president to claim fidelity to the republic’s constitution.  
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Boyer astutely commented on Santo Domingo’s affairs by drawing parallels with 
nineteenth-century independence movements. With liberal revolutions and 
communication between “anxious nations” people did not need governments to seduce 
them.132 Boyer insinuated Dominicans interested in joining the Haitian Republic would 
not need Dalmassi or others to entice them. The Haitian president was aware of the 
rumors plaguing Santo Domingo and subverting Spanish rule. He noted if he gave “ears 
to deaf insinuations” from those asking from Santo Domingo he would have led an 
expedition to reclaim the eastern side of the island a long time ago.133 In Boyer’s 
experience, those in Santo Domingo were like those in other parts of the world who 
wanted liberty in a world still dominated by monarchy and slavery.134 Undeterred by the 
calls of pro-Haitian supporters and conspirators, Boyer wanted no other title than that of 
“consolidator and peace of people”.135  Boyer’s astute comparison of Santo Domingo to 
other nineteenth-century independence movements suggested an inevitable fate for the 
Spanish colony to follow the path of Haiti and other new nations in the Americas.  
 Kindelan’s cautious but conciliatory response to Boyer’s unification did not 
prepare the Captain-General for the subversion that followed. From Kindelan’s 
perspective, Dalmassi and other Haitian officers’ proposals disrupted Spanish rule and 
placed the colonial system in jeopardy. Dominicans’ sustained effort to capture Dalmassi 
and aid the Spanish suggests sympathy for the Haitian rule if not disloyalty. The Haitian 
overtures continued in the face of Kindelan’s protests and plans because Dominicans in 
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the border towns were willing to listen. Haitian propositions to Dominicans overlapped 
with pro-Haitian support in Santo Domingo by beginning to create the necessary 
conditions for a separatist movement intent on joining the Haitian Republic. Yet, they 
would not go unchallenged as both Spanish officials and Dominicans creoles countered 
Boyer’s black republic extending its influence into Santo Domingo. 
ONE GOAL, TWO INDEPENDENCES 
Boyer’s response to Kindelan did not alleviate the Captain-General’s suspicions 
of a Haitian plot against Santo Domingo. Left with few options, Kindelan contacted 
Spanish officials in Cuba for more troops in case of a Haitian invasion.136 He had 
previously served as the governor of the province of Santiago in the eastern part of the 
island, making it natural for Kindelan to reach out to officials in Cuba. Kindelan claimed 
the Spanish government’s inability to capture Dalmassi and period it took to verify the 
rumors did not inspire confidence among Dominicans. Even after speaking with Boyer 
and dispelling the Dalmassi’s stories, the Haitian government knew Santo Domingo’s 
borders were vulnerable.137 Spanish support from Cuba would help to maintain 
possession of Santo Domingo in the face of a Haitian threat.  By reaching out to officials 
in Cuba, Kindelan could mitigate a Haitian plot possibly taking over Santo Domingo. 
Kindelan perceptively linked the “security and conservation” defense of Santo 
Domingo as a common cause for all the Spanish possessions that had slavery.138 The fall 
of Santo Domingo, a colony with slaves to the black republic of Haiti would have 
ramifications for Spain’s other possessions in the Caribbean such as Cuba and Puerto 
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Rico. As a former governor of Cuba, Kindelan’s experience during the Haitian 
Revolution would reinforce this point. Cuba particularly profited from plantation 
slavery’s destruction in Saint-Domingue because of the Haitian Revolution. Spain sent 
peninsular and creole troops from Cuba and nearby colonies to fight in Saint-Domingue 
during the Haitian Revolution and experienced first-hand the potential for destruction for 
building a plantation society.139 Kindelan wrote, “here is the focal point, here is the 
remedy, and here spread where there would be the same combustible material.”140 
Preventing Haiti from subverting or taking over Santo Domingo would be to contain the 
threat faced by Spain’s remaining slave societies. Not helping Santo Domingo Kindelan 
wrote would be “to leave the contagion to spread without hindering the healthy parts.”141 
He argued Santo Domingo’s defense was crucial to slavery and holding on to what 
remained of the Spanish Empire in the Caribbean.  
Because of the increase of slavery in scope and importance in Cuba, Kindelan felt 
Cuban and Spanish officials would be more than interested in providing Santo Domingo 
with arms and munitions.142 The proximity of the island of Hispaniola to Spain’s other 
possessions in the Caribbean meant with the control over the island, Haiti would be 
closer to the other islands and possessions of Spain to launch an attack.143 The fear and 
specter of Haiti for security was one, which Kindelan used to obtain support for Santo 
Domingo in the face of danger. Security in Santo Domingo and the Spanish empire from 
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the Haitian Republic tied slave interests in Cuba to their counterparts in Santo Domingo 
and called for their help.  
 By May 1821, Spanish officials replaced Kindelan with Pascual Real who was not 
fully prepared for the continued instability and loss of control he would face. He sought 
to stay in power and was aware of the series of conspiracies plotted against him and the 
Spanish regime. Ever vigilant against such plots, Real decided to observe and make note 
of them before they came to fruition.144 Among them were pro-Haitian supporters’ who 
attempted to entice Boyer as their displeasure continued to grow. For example, Diego 
Polanco, commander of San Fernando de Montecristi, sent a message to a Haitian officer 
offering their support to the Haitian Republic.145 At the same moment, Andres 
Amarantes, from Dajabon, pledged the town’s support for the Haitian Republic who took 
the initiative to raise the Haitian flag in support of Boyer.146 The previous examples 
illustrated that Captain-General Real had no control over events from Santo Domingo 
City as instability morphed into full-blown treachery.  
When Boyer received news about the events he alerted his commanders the time 
had arrived for them to act. He sent three envoys to speak with Captain-General Real 
about the complaints from those specifically on the border and the situation more 
broadly.147 Despite evidence of pro-Haitian support, at this point, only two towns in 
Santo Domingo had declared their allegiance to Haiti.148 Boyer could not be sure how 
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much of the colony would still support the Spanish. Likewise, Boyer repeated his earlier 
statements that he would not violate the laws of his republic to invade Santo Domingo. 
Moreover, the Haitian President needed Dominicans’ full support in case of a takeover. 
Boyer’s actions of sending representatives to speak to Real in Santo Domingo City 
illustrates that the conditions warranted more direct action by the Haitian President.  
As pro Haitian-supporters gathered steam in the towns of Dajabon and 
Montecristi, a separate conspiracy formed under the leadership of José Nuñez de Cáceres. 
Trained as a lawyer from Santo Domingo City, Nuñez de Cáceres had been involved in 
the colonial Spanish government under different capacities. Despite years of service, 
Spanish officials demoted Nuñez de Cáceres within the colonial hierarchy.149 The 
marginalized Dominican bureaucrat joined with other Dominican creoles such as Manuel 
Caravajal and Andres López de Medrano who resented their minor positions within the 
colonial bureaucracy and felt abandoned by Spain.150 The opportunistic Nuñez de 
Cáceres became aware of what occurred in Montecristi and Dajabon and feared that pro-
Haitian supporters would declare independence from the Spanish. One scholar suggests 
Nuñez de Cáceres movement was a preemptive coup meant to prevent the freeing of 
enslaved peoples and any instability to follow.151 He and his supporters desired 
independence from Spain with a federation with Gran Colombia, the newly independent 
former Spanish colonies of in South America.152 The Dominican Creole movement in 
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Santo Domingo City formed in response to pro-Haitian support in Dajabon and 
Montecristi.  
Nuñez de Cáceres put his plans into action gaining the support of Pablo Ali and 
the free colored battalion in Santo Domingo City. Despite Ali’s prestige and military 
service to the Spanish regime, he was unable to obtain Spanish citizenship because of his 
former enslaved status and birth outside of the Empire.153 Nuñez de Cáceres won Ali over 
with the promise of citizenship in the new republic and therefore, he supported the 
independence movement. Nuñez de Cáceres and his cadre took Captain-General Real by 
surprise and overthrew the Spanish government declaring independence as the new state 
of Spanish Haiti.154 By obtaining the support of the free colored battalion, Nuñez de 
Cáceres and his supporters realized their goals and vision for independence.  
In their declaration of independence, Nuñez de Cáceres presented Dominicans as 
having had “a fanatic loyalty to the kings of Spain” with nothing to show for it. Spanish 
rule in Santo Domingo only served the interest of Spain at the expense of Dominican 
Creoles living on the island.155 The focus on loyalty to the Spanish stressed the frustration 
by members of the Dominican Creole conspiracy against the colonial regime. The 
Spanish could not even defend its oldest possession in the Americas as Nuñez de Cáceres 
made references to the Dutch and other European attacks on Santo Domingo over its long 
history. He referenced the 1809 conquest from the French by its own inhabitants as an 
example of Dominican loyalty to the Spanish monarchy.156  In the eyes of Nuñez de 
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Cáceres and his movement, Dominicans proved their loyalty and their declaration of 
independence underpinning the proclamation was in response to Spanish betrayal.  
By linking themselves with other former Spanish colonies, Nuñez de Cáceres and 
his supporters sought to legitimize their grievances and independence movement. They 
argued that they removed Spanish rule while upholding the honor of their ancestors who 
came to the Americas.157 This Creole movement shared a similar discourse and 
justification with other independence movements across the continent who fought against 
the Spanish.158 They proclaimed, “we are fully convinced to gain it and to augment it, 
there is no other path but independence.” 159 The Dominican Creoles argued for political 
freedom that also addressed a list of grievances against Spain.  
With Spanish colonial rule behind them, Nuñez de Cáceres and the Creole faction 
drafted a constitution illustrating their vision for the future republic. In a self-fashioning 
of their neighbor, “Spanish Haiti” would not discriminate towards the new nation’s 
inhabitants regardless of color or religion. Nonetheless, unlike the Haitian Republic, this 
new nation did not end slavery or extend its rights to enslaved people even though Nuñez 
de Cáceres emancipated his own enslaved people.160 Within the liberal Spanish vision, 
the citizens’ constitutional rights and condemning of the slave trade could simultaneously 
exist with slavery’s persistence. This notion of nationhood clashed with the liberty from 
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slavery offered by its neighbor that in the past warranted conflict.161 Dominican Creole’s 
vision of national belonging did not include enslaved people even as it played lip service 
to racial discrimination.  
Given how their movements to overthrow the Spanish and draft a Constitution 
occurred largely on their own, Nuñez de Cáceres called to Dominicans living in the new 
Spanish Haiti to win their support. Speaking of the “ancient slavery” under Spanish 
tyranny, Dominicans living in Spanish Haiti founded a republic “based in liberty.” Nuñez 
de Cáceres’ contradiction to compare Dominicans’ condition living under Spanish rule to 
slavery while a republic kept the institution may not have been lost on his 
contemporaries.162 He called on Dominicans to reject the Spanish who like other despots 
used violence and force to stay in power. Instead, Nuñez de Cáceres looked to their 
neighbors to the north in the United States as a model for a republic for them to follow.163  
His rejection of monarchy and embracing a republic with slavery served as the blueprint 
for Spanish Haiti’s development. The Creole leader linked Spanish Haiti’s independence 
movement with the other movements that emerged throughout the Americas. His rhetoric 
feint was even more prevalent given Nuñez de Cáceres’ affiliation with Simon Bolivar’s 
Gran Colombia.164 Offering Dominicans a model after rejecting the Spanish regime was 
also Nuñez de Cáceres’ way of reassuring and galvanizing Dominicans to support the 
new republic.  
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Núñez de Cáceres’ especially sought those who were pro-Haitian for their support 
of his new regime. He expressed hope that Dominicans in Santiago, Puerto Plata, Beler, 
and even Montecristi who supported Boyer would extend their backing to Spanish Haiti. 
Núñez de Cáceres looked favorably upon their neighbors to the west and wisely called for 
a treaty of commerce and defense with Haiti while maintaining their own sovereignty in 
the east.165 By offering an alliance treaty to the Haitian Republic, Núñez de Cáceres 
wanted to appease both his western neighbor and those Dominicans he had yet to win 
over. He recognized their past and present connected both island nations and tacitly 
acknowledged the support and positive esteem that Dominicans held of Boyer. The 
Creole leader turned his attention to those living in Spanish Haiti whether American or 
European, calling them “brothers, friends, and parents. We are compatriots, sons of a 
common mother.”166 Núñez de Cáceres sought to create a sense of community among 
different people with a connection to establish support for the new republic.  
Núñez de Cáceres did not galvanize the support he sought for the nascent 
Republic of Spanish Haiti or from Simon Bolivar in Gran Colombia who could not offer 
money or troops to support this flailing republic.167 Dominicans in places such as 
Santiago de los Caballeros made their decision to diverge from Núñez de Cáceres. 
Located in the heart of Santo Domingo’s Cibao region, Santiago’s tobacco cultivation 
kept it distinct from Santo Domingo City both in interests and politics.168 The Santiago 
Junta expressed their “universal discontent” at Santo Domingo’s proclamation under 
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Núñez de Cáceres, choosing to live under Haitian laws and constitution.169 By petitioning 
Boyer, Dominicans in Santiago chose the Haitian vision of a nation free of legal racial 
discrimination and slavery and illustrated Dominican Creoles’ failure to consolidate their 
regime.  
News of Spanish Haiti’s independence under Núñez de Cáceres and its rejection 
by Dominicans in Santiago spread to other parts of Santo Domingo and Haiti. Puerto 
Plata, La Vega, Cotuí, and San Francisco de Macoris were some examples who rejected 
independence in Santo Domingo City and declared solidarity with the Haitian 
Republic.170 Meanwhile, Boyer’s commission arrived in Santo Domingo City, expecting 
to speak with the former Spanish Captain-General Real. Arriving to see a change in the 
government under Núñez de Cáceres, the commissioners convinced the Dominican leader 
to believe Boyer would support the new regime.171 Correspondences from Dominican 
towns and the reports of the Haitian officers brought the news to Boyer of Spanish Haiti’s 
independence.  
On 25 December 1821, Boyer addressed the Haitian Senate about the events that 
occurred to the east in Santo Domingo, focusing on article 40 of the Haitian Constitution, 
which placed Haitian territory the entire island.172 This article provided a means of 
Haitian legal justification for the government’s claims to Santo Domingo. Now that 
Boyer and his troops pacified and united the kingdom of the North it was time to reach 
out to their brothers in the east to “give to them the natural direction that they should 
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have in the name of the nation.”173 Boyer understood incorporating Santo Domingo as 
part of his larger project of reunifying the republic that began with the death of 
Christophe. Their “brothers of the East” sought to live under the Haitian constitution and 
the advantages it brought to them.174 This law included the end of slavery that the regime 
of Spanish Haiti condoned. By referencing article 40 of the Haitian Constitution, Boyer 
provided the legal justification for Santo Domingo as a part of the republic.      
The right moment was at hand for Boyer to realize his goal to unify both sides of 
the island under the Haitian Republic. Boyer argued that Spanish Haiti’s independence 
and the Constitution that its supporters ratified was not in the best interest of the people 
of the entire island.175 He linked the fates of both sides of the island together even as 
Dominicans expressed their dissatisfaction with the new regime of Spanish Haiti. Boyer 
saw Núñez de Cáceres’ regime as dangerous to the island’s security and that it was his 
responsibility as president to protect the “public peace of the state.”176 The unpopular 
regime’s presence challenged Haitian sovereignty and could invite further trouble. Boyer 
directed his speech directly to the Senate because of their responsibility to uphold the 
laws of the Constitution.177 By presenting a series of rhetorical questions, Boyer aimed to 
appeal to the Haitian Senators to sanction a decision he already made. They asked could a 
separate state form in their territory in contrast to article 40 of the Constitution? Whether 
the inhabitants of the East support or not Núñez de Cáceres’ regime?  And could the 
Senate allow for this regime to exist in direct violation of the Constitution?178 Their 
                                                          
173 “Jean Pierre Boyer to Sénat d’Haiti,” Port-au-Prince, 25 December 1821. 
174 “Jean Pierre Boyer to Sénat d’Haiti,” Port-au-Prince, 25 December 1821. 
175 “Jean Pierre Boyer to Sénat d’Haiti,” Port-au-Prince, 25 December 1821. 
176 “Jean Pierre Boyer to Sénat d’Haiti,” Port-au-Prince, 25 December 1821. 
177 “Jean Pierre Boyer to Sénat d’Haiti,” Port-au-Prince, 25 December 1821. 
178 “Jean Pierre Boyer to Sénat d’Haiti,” Port-au-Prince, 25 December 1821. 
56 
answers to these questions would help to sanction Boyer’s ambition of bringing both 
sides of the island together.  
The Senate responded in the affirmation that a separate republic could not exist in 
Haitian territory and that Haitians needed to uphold the Constitution.179 Boyer had both 
the blessings of the Haitian Senate and the popular support of Dominicans. As one later 
traveler to the island noted, Santo Domingo’s people of color “preferred rather to submit 
themselves to his [Boyer] power than to undergo the trouble of erecting a new 
government of their own, or to throw themselves into the arms of the South American 
patriots, whose friendships they more than doubted.”180 As Haitian forces gathered to go 
into the eastern part of Hispaniola Boyer wrote to Núñez de Cáceres in an attempt to win 
the Dominican leader over.181 Boyer sought a peaceful transfer of power, consistent with 
his previous messages to the Spanish. For Boyer, his actions constituted a “regeneration” 
of the eastern part of the island, which the Haitian constitution sanctioned.182 The 
Senate’s support affirmed Dominicans’ desires and the Haitian Constitution’s backing to 
justify Boyer’s actions needed to absorb Santo Domingo into the republic.  
Boyer shared with Núñez de Cáceres of his reluctance to help pro-Haitian 
Dominicans in Santo Domingo until the time was right to “operate a total moral 
revolution there.”183 The Haitian president was not clear what this revolution in Santo 
Domingo would involve, but Boyer previously hinted these changes had something to do 
with bringing in Santo Domingo under the Haitian Republic’s laws. This notion included 
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the end of slavery and defending the island’s borders from pro-slave powers. Boyer 
revealed he wanted to carry out this act peacefully, noting the partisans he had from 
various towns in Santo Domingo including the capital city.184 By alluding to the support 
in different parts of Santo Domingo, Boyer aimed to convince Núñez de Cáceres of his 
isolation. Boyer concerned himself with his public image and the Haitian Republic both 
to Dominicans and to the outside world. He was already on record telling he would not 
violate Haitian laws, which included the clause in the Constitution preventing the 
republic involving itself in other country’s affairs.185 This clause was what fed Boyer’s 
reluctance to directly involve the Haitian Republic in Santo Domingo.  
To justify his future actions in Santo Domingo, Boyer relied on two distinct but 
connected arguments. He believed two separate republics on Hispaniola was just not 
possible. Boyer used article 40 of the Haitian Constitution to prove the republic’s 
sovereignty over the entire island of Hispaniola.186 Nevertheless, the Constitution 
prevented Boyer from involving himself in the affairs of other nations as specified in 
article 15. To find a loophole and justify a unification, Boyer noted how Spanish Haiti’s 
creation did not have Dominicans’ support. They protested to Boyer, who believed the 
end of Spanish rule would have brought Santo Domingo together with Haiti.187 For 
Boyer, those “interested for the prosperity of this Island must admit this truth; for to be 
effectually independent, it should possess within itself the means of securing its 
Independence.”188 Observers could not expect a republic without the support of its 
inhabitants to remain standing especially when those same people clearly made it known 
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their affinity for another republic such as Haiti. Boyer ordered Dominicans to await his 
troops’ entrance into Santo Domingo. Boyer intended to enter “not as a conqueror, (God 
forbid that I should ever entertain such a thought,) but consistent with the Laws of the 
State, as the Pacificator and Conciliator of the interests of all.”189 By using the 
Constitution and popular sovereignty, Boyer justified his change in policy to unite the 
island of under Haitian rule.  
By early 1822, it was clear Santo Domingo would neither be a Spanish colony or 
a Creole led republic. Earlier, Kindelan wanted for Spanish Caribbean officials to aid his 
quest to defend Santo Domingo from this exact situation. His pro-slavery argument for 
Haitian containment did not result in Spanish help. By the end of 1821, Dominicans had 
two alternative visions for Santo Domingo’s future. Led by Núñez de Cáceres, 
Dominican Creoles located in and around Santo Domingo City sought independence 
from Spain through a federation with Gran Colombia. Even with the change in name and 
political leaders, this first independence movement largely maintained the status quo 
which notably included slavery’s persistence. Núñez de Cáceres could not draw more 
support for the rest of Santo Domingo as several towns declared their allegiance to Boyer 
and the Haitian Republic. These Dominicans by the Haitian-Dominican frontier and other 
towns sought an independence and nation founded on racial equality, closer economic 
ties, and the end of the former colonial system. Their actions and allegiance to Boyer 
were clear to the Haitian president and contemporaries of Dominicans’ choice to join the 
Haitian Republic.  
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CONCLUSION 
Núñez de Cáceres published Boyer’s correspondence along with a proclamation, 
justifying Dominican creoles’ actions in overthrowing the Spanish. He upheld his 
intention to continue the previous independence declarations from Dajabon, Beler, and 
Montecristi.190 Núñez de Cáceres called for Dominicans to stay peaceful before Boyer’s 
arrival who the Dominican leader referred to as the “harbinger of peace.” He remarked 
how Dominicans would show “the political world the example of a people, experienced 
in the vicissitudes and changes of government, who know how to conform to the 
necessary modifications.”191 Boyer’s accomplishments amazed observers as he brought 
Santo Doming peacefully under the Haitian Republic with one traveler reflecting how it 
“seems more like the effect of magic than the results of the efforts of a man.”192 
Dominicans from the border to as far as Higüey in eastern Santo Domingo prepared for 
Boyer’s entrance in 1822, putting up the Haitian flag in honor of their new 
independence.193 Núñez de Cáceres and his cadre finally honored Dominicans’ requests 
as they stepped aside for Boyer.  
This chapter has argued that Boyer and the Haitian state were successful in 
bringing Santo Domingo under their control because of the divisions among the 
Dominican population who supported and identified with their western neighbor. Both 
independence movements formed with grievances against the Spanish. Haiti’s 
reunification under Boyer’s rule made it easier for conspirators on both sides of the island 
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to work together to subvert the Spanish regime. Still, its constitution prevented the 
Haitian Republic from outwardly involving itself in another nation or empire’s affairs. 
Undeterred by Dominican Creoles’ expulsing the Spanish, other inhabitants outside of 
Santo Domingo City rejected Núñez de Cáceres’ vision of national belonging in favor of 
Boyer’s. Therefore, the Haitian President realized his larger goal of uniting the island of 
Hispaniola for the first time since Toussaint Louverture and the Haitian Revolution from 
1809 to 1822 with the popular backing of Dominicans. For these Dominicans, Boyer’s 
entrance into Santo Domingo was not an act of foreign aggression, but their decision to 
chart the island’s future by aligning with the Haitian Republic.  
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CHAPTER 2: “…ANIMATED BY THE SAME SPIRIT OF OPPOSITION”: SPANISH 
SUBVERSION IN SANTO DOMINGO, 1822 – 1824 
 
On 7 March 1822, Spanish and French naval vessels arrived in the Bay of Samaná 
in the northern part of Santo Domingo. The governors of Martinique and Puerto Rico had 
received distress calls from former French and Spanish subjects asking them to take 
possession of the former Spanish colony Santo Domingo from under Haitian control. 
Martinique’s governor Count Donzelot later wrote to his Spanish counterpart Miguel de 
la Torre in Puerto Rico predicting, “counterrevolution” back to the Spanish Crown would 
not be difficult “because the independence declaration had only been done by [José] 
Núñez de Cáceres and his partisans.”194 An unknown number of white Dominicans 
sought relief from what they perceived as “general inequality” among the inhabitants. 
Because of the Haitians’ successful military mobilization, these royalists coalesced 
around the Samaná Peninsula as a refugee point for the incoming French squadron to 
transport them away. They flew the Spanish flag in support of reclaiming Santo Domingo 
and as a show of defiance to the Haitian Unification initiated one month prior.195 When 
French forces arrived they found Haitian President Jean-Pierre Boyer’s forces occupied 
the nearby towns of Samaná and Savana-la-Mar where royalist individuals had 
congregated. Counting on the support of Dominicans at their arrival, the French squadron 
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left with some royalists for Puerto Rico as they had orders to not engage directly with 
Boyer. Their arrival marked the first but certainly not the last challenge to Haitian rule in 
Santo Domingo.196  
The Haitian Unification represented a more inclusive vision of the nation-state, 
symbolized with the tree of liberty, and a direct challenge to slaveholding regimes. Some 
contemporaries and later Dominican scholars have interpreted this moment as a low point 
in Santo Domingo and part of a larger tradition of unwarranted Haitian aggression.197 
Subsequent studies from historians have moderated this interpretation arguing that 
Boyer’s regime brought positive gains to the population and Dominicans celebrated his 
rule. They question the extent of Haiti’s oppressive rule.198 Despite many Dominicans 
supporting Haitian rule, Boyer faced a larger challenge of integrating his eastern neighbor 
with a different set of customs, traditions, and expectations centuries of Spanish rule 
shaped. There were also some Dominicans who choose a return to monarchy and 
articulated their loyalty to the old regime over Boyer’s brand of republicanism.199 A 
unified island of Hispaniola under Haitian rule was that supported emancipation clearly 
threatened the nearby slave empires in the Caribbean.  
                                                          
196 “Ministero de la Guerra to Gobernación de Ultramar,” 23 January 1823, Madrid, AGI-SD 970. 
197 Gabriel García, Obras Completas; Joaquin Balaguer, La Isla al Reves 22º edición (Santo Domingo: 
Fundación Joaquin Balaguer, 2013); and Emilio Rodriguez Demorizi ed. Invasiones Haitianas de 1801, 
1805 y 1822 (Ciudad de Trujillo [Santo Domingo]: Editor de Caribe, 1955).  
198 Quisqueya Lora Hugi, Transcición de la esclavitud al trabajo libre en Santo Domingo: El caso de 
Higüey (1822-1827) Santo Domingo:  Academia Dominicana de Historia, 2012); and Anne Eller, We 
Dream Together: Dominican Independence and the Fight for Caribbean Freedom (Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press, 2016). 
199 For more on the racial divides that separated pro-Haitian Dominican support see Franklin J. Franco, 
Blacks, Mulattos, and the Dominican Nation translated by Patricia Mason (New York: Routledge, 2015). 
For studies in Latin America considering loyalty from different segments of the population during moments 
of crisis see Marcela Echeverri, Indian and Slave Royalists in the Age of Revolution: Reform, Revolution, 
and Royalism in Northern Andes (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016). For consideration of 
loyalty from the perspective of Cuba see David Satorius, Ever Faithful: Race, Loyalty, and the Ends of 
Empire in Spanish Cuba (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2013).  
63 
This chapter examines the first years of this Haitian unification from 1822 – 1824 
with the reactions and responses by the Spanish and Dominicans to the loss of Santo 
Domingo. First, it asks, how did the Haitian state seek to merge Santo Domingo into the 
larger republic in the face of royalist opposition? Next, how did the Dominican royalist 
and Spanish officials depict Santo Domingo and its population during the first years of 
Haitian Unification? Finally, how did the different segments of the Dominican population 
respond to Haitian rule? This chapter argues that Dominican royalists formulated a 
discourse depicting Santo Domingo’s population as loyal to the Spanish in response to 
the Haitian Unification.  
AN AUTOCRATIC REPUBLIC 
Before Haitian President Boyer made his entrance into Santo Domingo on 9 
February 1822, he wrote to Dominican Creole Núñez de Cáceres to “be cheerful and full 
of confidence.” By stepping aside to let Boyer consolidate independence in Santo 
Domingo, Núñez de Cáceres would gain “inestimable repute” among the rest of the 
Dominican population.200 Despite Boyer’s cheerful words and reassurances of a peaceful 
entrance to the island, the Haitian President entered Santo Domingo from the west with 
an army of 12,000 men. Even with the support of Dominicans in towns such as Dajabon, 
Montecristi, and Azua located near the border, Boyer knew there were at least two 
factions of Dominicans who could oppose him: those who supported the current 
government of Núñez de Cáceres and those who wanted a return to the previous Spanish 
regime. What pro-Haitian Dominicans perceived as Boyer’s peaceful entrance was an 
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invasion for Dominican royalists.201 Boyer split his forces into two groups leading one 
body in the south and delegating the other in the north to a Haitian officer. Previous 
Haitian entrances had not proceeded as peacefully, even destroying the city of Santiago 
de los Caballeros under leader Jean-Jacques Dessalines in 1805.202 Boyer’s letter to 
Núñez de Cáceres illustrated the Haitian President sought a peaceful and different 
approach from his predecessors.  
Núñez de Cáceres gave a speech to Santo Domingo’s City council preparing them 
for the regime change. He noted how Boyer “has not entered as a conqueror, but more as 
a father, brother, and friend.” Núñez de Cáceres optimistically reassured those 
Dominicans with apprehensions of the change to come.203 He was among the Dominicans 
who met Boyer at the gates of Santo Domingo City to give the Haitian president its keys 
but by different accounts Boyer refused them. The Haitian President entered Santo 
Domingo’s cathedral for a religious ceremony to solidify his rule and served as a tacit 
acceptance to his eastern neighbors’ piety and now political citizens.204 Boyer’s entrance 
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met no resistance reflecting his and Núñez and Cáceres’ efforts to facilitate a smooth 
political transition. 
Soon after his entrance into Santo Domingo, Boyer addressed the Dominican 
population in 1822 addressing his justifications for the island’s unification. He noted, 
“there are no more slaves, and we do not form anything but one family.”205 His use of 
familial ties was Boyer’s way of connecting Haitians and Dominicans. He combined his 
paternal discourse with legal justification invoking the articles under the Haitian 
Constitution justifying Boyer’s actions in Santo Domingo. Under Article 1 slavery could 
not exist in the territory of the Haitian Republic. Articles 40 and 41 presented Haitian 
sovereignty as extending into Santo Domingo. 206 Boyer’s proclamation did not only 
justify the Unification based on the ties between Haitians and Dominicans, but the legal 
precedent within the Haitian Constitution defended the republic’s sovereignty in Santo 
Domingo.  
As “sons of Haiti,” Boyer expected Dominicans to learn from previous 
experiences and be good citizens and patriots by obeying the Haitian Republic’s laws.207 
He focused on Haitians being an “agricultural and warrior people” as their role as citizens 
of the republic.208 For Dominicans now living under Haitian rule, Boyer expected former 
enslaved and free people in Santo Domingo to do their part in cultivating crops for the 
republic and to defend the black republic as warriors or soldiers.209 One scholar has noted 
that the Haitian government defined citizenship based on what citizens owed the state 
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versus “the rights-based element of what the state owed to its citizens.” These 
expectations included duty, obedience, and obligations to the government.210 Boyer saw 
Dominicans as free citizens and expected them to defend the republic sovereignty and 
borders, and taking advantage of land to cultivate.  
Boyer’s role decree as embodied the Haitian state’s political practice and is an 
example of what one scholar referred to as “an exercise in legitimation.”211 By circulating 
his decree among Haitian troops for Santo Domingo’s inhabitants Boyer projected his 
vision for Dominicans now serving the Haitian state. What is implicit in Boyer’s 
paternalistic language is his vision for Dominicans to serve as cultivators and soldiers. As 
citizens, Dominicans would be beholden to the Haitian state. The Haitian Unification 
process of legitimation began in part through Boyer’s proclamation telling his outlook for 
Santo Domingo’s inhabitants.  
Following Boyer’s entrance, the Haitian state organized Santo Domingo into a 
system of military and financial districts, relying on local officials. Still, a Haitian general 
governed each district and exercised both military and civil authority and served as a link 
between Boyer’s government and the local authorities within the district.212 The Haitian 
government integrated the areas of Azua, Santo Domingo, San Juan, Montecristi, Puerto 
Plata, Tiburon and La Vega within this system of government. General Jérôme 
Maximilien Borgella ruled the former Spanish colony for the Haitian Republic 
representing Boyer’s interests.213 Haitian rule’s extent differed by region and scholars are 
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beginning to explore those nuances during the Unification’s early years. For example, in 
Higüey, Santo Domingo’s most eastern province, one scholar found that outside of a 
ceremonial planting of “the tree of liberty,” Haitian officers were no longer in the 
province.214 This example illustrates Boyer relied on local officials as he sought to 
organize Santo Domingo into the existing Haitian system suggesting Dominican 
cooperation with the new regime. 
The Haitian Unification brought some opportunities to the populace of the eastern 
side of the island to take part in the government. Dominicans played a crucial role in the 
functions and maintenance of Haitian rule over the Spanish side of the island, especially 
as representatives to the Camara—the legislature of the Haitian state—in Port-of-
Prince.215 Despite the opportunities the Haitian government provided for representation 
and political participation within the regime, the ceiling Boyer placed on their 
advancement excluded Dominicans from the upper strata of the government.   
Contemporaries who traveled to the island gave their observations on the matter 
of the Haitian government’s structure, commenting on its brand of republicanism.  One 
referred to the Haitian political system as “a republican monarchy sustained by bayonette 
[sic],” while another referred to Haitian President Boyer as “sovereign in all but the 
name.”216 Both depictions illustrate the larger amount of power that Boyer and his army 
wielded in the republic. The Haitian Constitution concentrated sovereignty in Boyer who 
also served as head of the Church, general over the armed forces of the island, and had 
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the authority to initiate laws. Boyer also had the power to select those who served in the 
Senate as an advisory board for nine years.217 The Constitution granted Boyer major 
control of the Haitian state government with considerable power emanating from him. 
The lower house or Camara was the part of the legislature where elections from the 
people decided the delegates. Boyer could expel members at will if they did not follow 
his wishes.218 Foreigner accounts convey Boyer’s executive power was expansive with no 
checks or balances to stop him.  
Charles Mackenzie, the British consul in Haiti observed how Boyer could wield 
influence even within the republic’s judiciary.219 According to Mackenzie, Boyer took 
liberties in involving himself in proceedings of the court, suspending trials based on his 
whim. The consul noted how in one instance, “the President in consequence of some low 
intrigue of the American agent, ordered proceedings to be suspended.” Mackenzie 
involved himself in this situation, writing “and it was only in consequence of a very 
strong remonstrance that I made, that the affair was allowed to proceed in its regular 
course.”220 Although Mackenzie pointed to no checks and balances against Boyer’s 
wishes with its strong executive, this example also illustrates the Haitian President’s 
intervening on behalf of a request. By Mackenzie’s count, there were five other cases 
involving British subjects in which Boyer stopped the judicial process.221 The Haitian 
President used his influence and power to even impact judiciary cases involving foreign 
diplomats.  
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The onset of Haitian rule released a panic through the anti-Haitian part of the 
population in Santo Domingo resulting in French intervention on the eastern part of the 
island. Dominican and French settlers sent a message of help to Martinique asking for 
France’s protection who sent ships to explore the issue.222 By not committing an armed 
force for invasion, the French were treading cautiously toward an area that had been 
Spanish only a few months prior. Boyer and Haitian officials learned of the French 
squadron’s approach to Santo Domingo but were unsure of its intentions. Amidst the 
uncertainty, Boyer issued an embargo on foreign ships coming to Haiti. He also sent 
troops to Savana la Mar and the Samaná Peninsula in the northern part of Santo Domingo 
to await the French squadron’s arrival.223 By strengthening his defenses in Santo 
Domingo and closing his ports, Boyer prepared the Haitian Republic as a nation at war. 
Requests from anti-Haitian Dominicans had drew France, threatening the Unification 
from its onset.  
The governor of Martinique ordered French squadron Captain Julies de Martinieu 
to aid Dominican royalist against the Haitians if Santo Domingo was a Spanish 
possession.224 Because of Dominican Creole Núñez de Cáceres had declared Santo 
Domingo independent from Spain, the French commander was under orders to not get 
involved in the affairs of the new republic, suggesting France saw it as something beyond 
their authority. Nonetheless, Martinieu’s superiors commanded him to engage if he saw 
the Spanish flag flying as a sign of help illustrating Santo Domingo was a Spanish 
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territory, which Dominican royalist astutely did to entice the French squadron to help 
them.225 Haitian President Boyer militarizing Santo Domingo’s northern border was in 
response to this flying of the Spanish flag and Dominican royalist attempting to bring the 
French in. Captain Martinieu’s refused to engage directly with Boyer’s troops, leaving 
those Dominicans in a precarious position.226 The President’s defense of the Unification 
of a potential foreign attack illustrated that Santo Domingo was no longer a Spanish 
colony but a part of the Haitian Republic. Therefore, Captain Martinieu would not offer 
aid to Dominican royalist as a part of his mission from the French.  
This attempt to reverse Haitian sovereignty had failed and most importantly did 
not galvanize the populace to rise against Boyer.  The royalists who invited Spanish and 
French forces to the island boarded Martinieu’s squadron and he dropped them off in 
Aguadilla, Puerto Rico located on the western side of the island. The Puerto Rican 
Captain-General granted them asylum and appointed an acting Captain General of Santo 
Domingo, which served to not recognize Haitian claims and sovereignty in Santo 
Domingo until the Spanish could get involved.227 This Dominican royalist failure 
illustrated to remove the Haitians from Santo Domingo suggests that Boyer had the 
support of much of Santo Domingo’s population, who requested to be a part of the 
republic.  
Dominican royalist arrived with their accounts of the early years of the 
Unification and its policies. Francisco Brenes, a former Dominican official, noted how 
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one of the first things Boyer did to garner support was to call for “the equality of all 
class[es] of people on the island.”228 By ending slavery in Santo Domingo shortly after 
his arrival, Boyer was putting his rhetoric into practice. Consequently, Boyer wanted 
stability, to maintain support among Dominicans, and did not want any ill will between 
any of the different racial groups in Santo Domingo. He sought to employ all people of 
color.229 Through combining reform with moderate calls for inclusion, Boyer intended to 
ease the transition for Dominicans from a Spanish colony society to a Haitian republican 
one. Even after leaving this new society behind, Brenes noted how Boyer had continued 
his efforts at peace through proclamations offering land, commerce, and political liberties 
to Santo Domingo’s inhabitants.230 Despite not offering specific examples of what these 
liberties entailed, Brenes’s report does highlight generally how the Haitian government 
aimed to win support among all Dominicans. Haitian policies intended to gain cross-
racial and ethnic support for the Haitian Unification among the different segments of the 
Dominican population.  
Still, Brenes intended to discredit the Haitian Unification by pointing to inherent 
differences between Haitians and Dominicans. He contended that Boyer’s legal changes 
and sensitive approach could not mask perceived the dissimilarities among the Haitian 
troops and Dominicans, even at one point referring to himself and others as Dominican-
Spaniards. Brenes claimed there was a sense of disgust among Santo Domingo’s 
inhabitants with the Haitian army and criticized “the Haitian troops’ licentiousness that 
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they used against a religious people.”231 By presenting the Haitian army as immoral 
versus the religious Dominicans, Brenes set up an inherent ethnic division between Santo 
Domingo and Haiti from the Unification’s very beginning. He further emphasized this 
point with his label of Dominican-Spaniards that created an ethnic difference between 
Dominicans of all colors and Haitians through their cultural connection to Spain. Brenes 
placed doubt in Haitian emancipation with a conversation he had with a Haitian aid of 
camp known simply as Alejandro. The Haitian officer remarked “we have been fooled 
because it is necessary to see it to believe it that in Santo Domingo there is not a mulatto 
or a black that was wanted to be [Haitian] and their glory was in being slaves and 
Spaniards.”232 By presenting Spanish slavery as better than Haitian liberty, Brenes 
insinuated that not even Dominicans of color would choose to support the new Haitian 
regime over the former Spanish one. The Dominican royalist’s observations suggested 
that religion and the experiences of the Spanish colonial society’s benefits divided 
Dominicans from Haitians and discrediting the Unification in Santo Domingo.   
On 2 January 1824, A couple of years later the Captain-General of Puerto Rico 
Miguel de la Torre sent the first of a series of letters to the Spanish Secretary of State to 
advocate for Spain to retake Santo Domingo.  De la Torre noted the “blacks of Santo 
Domingo” united forces in the east under the command of Haitian general Borgella to 
invade Puerto Rico and Cuba.233 By mentioning the threat of an invasion to Spain’s 
remaining possessions in the Caribbean, the Captain-General sought to convince his 
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superiors to involve the empire in Santo Domingo. According to de la Torre, Dominican 
royalist who fled Santo Domingo presented as representatives of Santo Domingo who 
sought help to rid themselves of the “foreign yoke and to reestablish the suspended rule 
of the Catholic Majesty.234” By claiming to speak for all of Santo Domingo and its 
inhabitants, Dominican royalist aimed to sway Spanish officials both in the Caribbean 
and in Madrid of their loyalty and depict the Unification as an unwanted foreign 
occupation. For his efforts, de la Torre served as their spokesperson to Spanish officials 
in Madrid as he saw the dangers for Puerto Rico and Cuba from this larger Haitian 
Republic.  
Several months later, de la Torre took it upon himself to convince the Spanish 
government to get involved in the Unification by pointing to the likelihood of success.235 
He emphasized the relationship between Dominicans and the Spanish king Fernando VI 
by referring to them as the king’s vassals. De la Torre also considered potential allies in 
Spain’s quest to reclaim its former possession in the Caribbean suggesting Spain combine 
forces with the French forces in Martinique in their mission of conquest.236 With this 
suggestion and early focus on Dominicans’ fidelity, de la Torre sought to show the 
Spanish the potential support both within and outside of the island. The unified Haitian 
Republic’s proximity to the Spanish colony threatened slavery in Puerto Rico. Boyer 
could use this pretext to aid enslaved and free people of color on the island.237 Like 
Dominican royalists Brenes and Fernandez de Castro, de la Torre used the Spanish 
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empire’s commitment to slavery to spur officials to involve themselves in Santo 
Domingo. For his last argument, the Captain-General mentioned his ability to send men 
in secret from Puerto Rico to Santo Domingo to combat the Haitians.238 De la Torre used 
loyalty, safety, and a potential slave power alliance to convince Spanish officials to get 
involved in Santo Domingo.  
Previously, an unknown number of Dominican royalists reached out to de la Torre 
by emphasizing their connection to Spain. By referring to themselves as the “true 
Spaniards of this disgraced land,” these Dominicans expressed their affinity for the 
Spanish claiming it never wavered even after the independence launched by Dominican 
Creole Núñez de Cáceres.239 Instead they distanced themselves from Santo Domingo’s 
first independence movement, placing the blame on Núñez de Cáceres for the Haitians 
taking over the colony. The Dominican royalist presented themselves as innocent in these 
matters who had demonstrated their loyalty to the Spanish Crown in the past and 
continued to do so.240 By claiming fidelity to Spain and the monarchy, Dominican 
royalist aimed to convince de la Torre and other Spanish officials that they were worth 
saving, but at the expense of playing down the support Núñez de Cáceres had for Santo 
Domingo’s first independence. Still, it was through identifying as Spaniards and loyalty 
that these Dominicans underlined their relationship to Spain.  
To convince the Spanish to retake Santo Domingo, the Dominican royalists gave 
him a report of Boyer’s troops in the eastern part of the island. They claimed Boyer’s 
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troops mostly returned to the western side of Hispaniola leaving Santo Domingo 
vulnerable to an attack.241 The Dominican royalists desired men and munitions from 
Spain to defend Santo Domingo in the case of another Haitian invasion.242 This request 
implied a sense of confidence in their ability to push back the remaining Haitian forces in 
Santo Domingo. They sought a chance to prove themselves to the Spanish. The 
Dominican royalists wrote, “our desires animate us and of our interests of which we do, 
there is no other way to see us free from them, and under the protection of our Spain.”243 
Providing details of the Haitian military force and its weaknesses was another way these 
Dominicans sought to appeal to Spain for help against the Haitian Republic.  
The Haitian state sought to merge Santo Domingo into the larger republic by 
transforming it into other provinces of the nation-state. Boyer considered Dominicans as 
Haitian citizens who he expected to serve the republic either in agricultural cultivation or 
in its military defense. The Haitian government provided Dominicans with political 
opportunities to serve in its legislature, but not at the expense of diminishing Boyer’s 
power. From Dominican royalist accounts, one learns the material and political gains 
brought by emancipation ensured Boyer had the support of this part of the Dominican 
population during the early months of 1822. Dominicans of color serving Boyer suggests 
the Haitian regime successfully ended legal racial discrimination and material benefits 
that drove segments of the Dominican population to support the Unification. The Haitian 
government’s reliance on local troops after defending its gains from a potential French 
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invasion suggests they were successful in their endeavors. The early Dominican royalists’ 
and Spanish officials’ reports illustrated the tension between a new society of 
emancipation and racial equality with the former colonial hierarchy with slavery. In the 
face of this opposition and protest, Boyer displayed his confidence with these troops by 
retreating his larger army to the western part of the island. The Haitian government 
changed Santo Domingo from a Spanish colony to an integral part of the republic.  
A PLAN OF ACTION 
Dominican royalist Brenes negatively depicted the Haitian Unification and the 
events leading up to it to accentuate his account of Dominican loyalty to Spain. He 
rhetorically questioned how could Dominicans accept the changes brought by Haitian 
rule positively and calmly when “they [Dominicans] are watching their lands defenseless, 
their estates took down, their urban possessions sequestered, their religion offended, and 
the libertos united with Haitian troops insulting them at every moment.”244 By presenting 
the Unification as a foreign occupation, Brenes made Dominicans the victims and 
absolved them of any role in Boyer’s entrance to Santo Domingo. His report also 
suggests that former enslaved Dominicans supported Haitian rule, disrupting the 
royalist’s perspective of Santo Domingo being loyal. Brenes also discredited Núñez de 
Cáceres and his supporters calling them “bums, drunks, and lost men.”245 Instead, the 
result of Haitian rule disappointed Núñez de Cáceres and his faction because they lost.246 
Given the exit of many Dominican royalists after Santo Domingo’s first independence in 
1821, one must consider whether Brenes was among Núñez de Cáceres’ supporters and 
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that he like others were disillusioned with the final results of independence. Nevertheless, 
Brenes argued that Dominicans did not support the first independence from Spain in 1821 
nor the current Haitian regime. By downplaying and denigrating Dominican support for 
independence and the Unification, Brenes alleged that Dominicans had an unwavering 
loyalty for Spain.   
Illustrating Dominican loyalty was a part of Brenes’ argument to sway Spanish 
officials of the ease they could retake Santo Domingo. For Brenes, it was untenable for 
the Haitians to continue to stay in Santo Domingo because of their unpopularity 
Dominicans.247 Yet, comparing his current observation with his earlier points of 
Dominicans of color serving the armed forces illustrates that Boyer’s unpopularity 
probably was not among all Dominicans. Still, he wanted to show Spanish officials that 
Dominicans committed themselves to overthrowing the Haitian regime. Brenes indicated 
that there were secret agents in Santo Domingo and in Havana, working to help Spain 
regain its former colonial possession. Exiles who fled to St. Thomas and Curaçao were 
ready to fight to retake Santo Domingo.248    Brenes wanted to convince Spanish officials 
in Puerto Rico and perhaps back in Madrid of the support awaiting them if they sought to 
come and retake the island. He even estimated between 6,000-8,000 men would take up 
arms and support Spain retaking the colony.249 For Brenes, Spanish involvement in Santo 
Domingo was less a calculated risk and more an imminent victory. 
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Despite their affinity for Haitian rule, Brenes sought to convince the Spanish that 
former enslaved and free people of color would rally to the Spanish cause. He listed 
Haitian troops strength of consisted of a total of 1,700 troops, which included libertos and 
Dominicans of color spread out across different locales in Santo Domingo.250 Brenes’ 
estimate suggested the potential force of anti-Haitian forces would be greater than the 
pro-Haitian forces. Still, Brenes was confident that if the Spanish were to get involved, 
the Black Spaniards would turn against the Haitians to fight with the Spanish.251 Once 
again, Brenes presented an ethnic distinction between Dominicans of color with cultural 
ties to Spain and Haitians coming from the west into Santo Domingo. By making these 
divisions, Brenes argued to sway Spanish officials of people of color support.  
As Brenes and other Dominicans fled to nearby islands in the Caribbean, 
Dominican royalist Felipe Fernandez de Castro a former intendente or quartermaster 
from Santo Domingo made his way to Spain to report on the Haitian Unification. 
Fernandez de Castro had fled along with his immediate family once Dominican Creole 
Núñez de Cáceres established control in December 1821. Because of the changes in 
regimes in Santo Domingo and the Haitian unification, Fernandez de Castro estimated to 
have lost 400,000 pesos worth of property and inheritance.252 His motives differed from 
Brenes in Fernandez de Castro’s report to Spanish officials in Madrid, and had material 
incentives for the Spanish to get involved. To convince the Spanish of the need to disrupt 
Haitian rule in Santo Domingo, Fernandez de Castro’s report summarized the events 
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leading up to Boyer’s entrance in 1822.253 Fernandez de Castro’s report sought Spanish 
officials to understand what motivated Boyer’s actions in Santo Domingo. 
According to Fernandez de Castro, Boyer initially did not show any interest in 
unifying Santo Domingo with the Haitian Republic, making the Unification harder to 
explain. Boyer recognized Dominican Creole Núñez de Cáceres’ regime, and the Haitian 
President previously had respected Spanish sovereignty in Santo Domingo.254 Through 
citing Boyer’s past deference to both Spanish and the former Dominican regime, 
Fernandez de Castro presented the 1822 Haitian Unification appear surprising and 
unjustified. Instead, Fernandez de Castro concluded that it was Article 40 of the Haitian 
Constitution justifying Haitian sovereignty over the entire island as the reason Boyer 
entered Santo Domingo.255 With no other reason to point to, Fernandez de Castro 
deduced the Haitian leader’s ambitions and interests to rule over the island explained why 
Boyer sought to unify the entire island.256  
Fernandez de Castro knew of pro-Haitian arguments for slavery to justify the 
Unification and focused on this institution in Santo Domingo to discredit the Haitian 
regime. For Dominicans, outside of Santo Domingo city, one reason that they choose the 
Haitian Republic over Núñez de Cáceres was because he did not end slavery.257 
Fernandez de Castro argued that in the past enslaved people from Saint-Domingue had 
gone over to the Spanish side including former black auxiliaries such as Jean-François. 
According to the Dominican royalist, Spanish slave laws in Santo Domingo “have always 
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been so moderate.”258 Fernandez de Castro claim over slavery’s restrained nature in 
Santo Domingo discredited Boyer’s desire to spread emancipation in the eyes of the 
Spanish. Even after the Haitian state’s emancipation in Santo Domingo, Fernandez de 
Castro affirmed that former slaves did not mistreat their former masters.259 The 
Dominican loyalist did not explain why this treatment occurred, but Fernandez de Castro 
likely offered this anecdote to prove his point of slavery’s moderation in Santo Domingo. 
Historians have offered contrasting evidence to Fernandez de Castro’s account, and they 
illustrate Dominican elites’ attempts to create plantation slave system in Santo 
Domingo.260 By presenting a different interpretation of Santo Domingo’s colonial past, 
Fernandez de Castro’s aimed to discredit the Haitian Unification and the resulting 
emancipation.  
Despite Boyer’s calls for leniency and for appeasing all segments of the 
population, Fernandez de Castro asserted the Haitian regime lacked support among 
Dominicans. He noted Boyer’s entrance into Santo Domingo resulted in a “prodigious 
emigration” off the island. Preferring exile to Haitian rule, Fernandez de Castro and other 
Dominican royalists were unable and unwilling to endure the changes and consequences 
of living in an emancipated society.261 For Fernandez de Castro the act of voluntary exile 
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demonstrated their loyalty and the Spanish government should provide Dominican 
royalists with compensation for loss of property especially because Spain extended this 
measure to other Spanish subjects who fled their former colonies in the Americas.262 
Fernandez de Castro blamed Núñez de Cáceres for the current situation and not the rest 
of the Dominican population.263 Nonetheless, Fernandez de Castro was silent on 
Dominicans’ proclamations in late 1821 and early 1822 calling for Boyer to enter Santo 
Domingo probably because it did not fit within a Dominican royalist narrative of loyalty.  
By ignoring pro-Haitian sentiment among Dominicans and villainizing Núñez de 
Cáceres, Fernandez de Castro could argue for Dominican opposition to Haitian rule.  
Fernandez de Castro’s report shifted focus by illustrating the consequences of the 
Haitian Unification for Spain’s empire in the Caribbean. He asked, “what would you say, 
and what must you do to see Santo Domingo dominated by another foreign government 
and opposite color.”264 Fernandez de Castro presented this role reversal under Boyer as 
unimaginable where now people of color ruled over those of European descent. 
Nonetheless, Juan Sanchez Ramirez who led Dominicans to overthrow French rule in 
1809 and ruled in the name of the Spanish was a mulatto; however, he maintained his 
loyalty to Spain and allowed for slavery to persist in the colony.265 Fernandez de Castro’s 
observation presents the Haitians as foreign and opposite continuing to create a binary 
between them and Dominicans in Santo Domingo. In this nation, according to Fernandez 
de Castro, laws prevented whites from owning property, however, the literature has 
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suggested otherwise. Haitian law made discrimination illegal, possibly creating a generic 
racial category for Haitian citizens. Since Boyer recognized white Dominicans as Haitian 
nationals it is unlikely the republic prevented them from owning land.266 Fernandez de 
Castro further argued that what Boyer did to Santo Domingo he would soon attempt to 
accomplish in Puerto Rico and Cuba.267 Haiti’s empire of liberty threatened Spain’s 
imperial commitment to slavery.  
Fernandez de Castro alluded to precautions that Spain would now have to take in 
defense of its remaining possessions observing that “what Spain has to spend to in the 
conserve of the Spanish part of Santo Domingo” would be nothing in comparison to the 
costs” to defend the other islands.268 By mentioning the fate of the other colonies, 
Fernandez de Castro intended to situate the issue of Santo Domingo into the broader 
empire’s fate. Fernandez de Castro used the specter of Haiti to mobilize the Spanish 
government into action. Pro-slavery forces in the British empire used Fernandez de 
Castro’s tactic during the Haitian Revolution to argue for slavery’s defense against the 
attacks of abolitionists.269 Where Fernandez de Castro differed was for how he sought to 
convince the Spanish to act against the Haitian Republic.  
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Fernandez de Castro offered an alternative plan in contrast to Dominican royalist 
Brenes’ military solution. First, he suggested Spain enlist the help of a foreign nation.270  
If Spain was unable to obtain such services, Fernandez de Castro recommended the 
Spanish government to focus on regaining the property for Dominican exiles and those 
who would want to leave. He stood as much to gain as other Dominican loyalists who 
abandoned their possessions after the Haitian Unification.271 Fernandez de Castro 
suggested sending a commission of one or two people to negotiate with Boyer who the 
Spanish would assign to  discuss their claims to Santo Domingo, to ensure the good 
treatment of Spanish subjects living in Haiti, and to force Boyer to guarantee the safety of 
the property of those exiles and the safety of others who sought to leave.272 Fernandez de 
Castro’s plan would use diplomacy as opposed to Brenes’ military resolution.  
Fernandez de Castro foresaw potential obstacles that would hinder future 
negotiations between Haiti and Spain. Most notably was the issue of slavery and 
Fernandez de Castro noted how Haitians had fought strongly for their freedom against the 
French. Boyer could perceive a return to Spanish rule as a turn back to slavery, which 
would threaten Haitian freedom. The Dominican loyalist noted how Boyer could “do the 
most absolute resistance to those who revoked what he proclaimed for the slaves from the 
Spanish part [Santo Domingo].”273 By acknowledging the Haitian state’s commitment to 
freedom over slavery and their successes in defending this emancipation since 1804, 
Fernandez de Castro sought to avoid armed conflict especially without the backing of 
another foreign power. If negotiations for Santo Domingo failed, he suggested 
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emancipated slaves be assigned to their former masters to work under new labor 
relations.274 Fernandez de Castro’s alternative maintained a labor-client relationship 
between libertos and their former masters in exchange for a fourth of their production.275 
Through presenting his plan in the event the Spanish and Haitians could not resolve the 
issue of slavery, Fernandez de Castro considered the future obstacles that could put these 
talks in jeopardy.  
Fernandez de Castro had broader plans regarding the Spanish empire’s interest 
and its commitment to slavery in the Caribbean. He did not think Spain’s recognition of 
the emancipated slaves in Santo Domingo would harm the interests of its possession, 
particularly Cuba whose commitment to expand slavery on the island had already been 
underway.276 Fernandez de Castro reasoned to Spanish officials how they would not want 
to face the same fate of France during the Haitian Revolution noting, “if France has not 
found measures or forces to prevent [emancipation] in that island. How will Spain 
prevent it?”277 He stressed again the Haitian Republic’s success in defending their 
emancipation and sovereignty against the French and foreign attacks. He did not think the 
Spanish would be successful either. By recognizing emancipation in Santo Domingo, 
Fernandez de Castro believed it would guarantee slavery’s safety in Cuba and Puerto 
Rico, which was in the Spanish empire’s best interest.  
Fernandez de Castro traveled to the eastern side of the island several years later, 
writing another report to convince Spain to involve itself in Santo Domingo. He lauded 
libertos actions who by his accounts retained their former customs of the old regime and 
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treated their former masters well.278 His observation implied Dominicans of color 
retained their cultural attributes that made them closer to being Spanish than Haitian. 
Fernandez de Castro focused on those free Dominicans of color whom the Haitians 
enlisted to serve in the armed forces who he said the government offered meager pay and 
labor from the officers. He claimed that two years after the Haitian Unification, the same 
troops Boyer used to defend Santo Domingo were also disgruntled with his policies.279 
By suggesting Dominicans of color still retained their Spanish culture and were 
dissatisfied with Boyer’s rule, Fernandez de Castro tried to convince his superiors in 
Madrid that Haiti could be overthrown with their help.   
Resistance to Haitian rule was a key element in Fernandez de Castro’s report. He 
highlighted how opposition crossed racial lines in Dominican society. Even a small 
number of veteran troops have risen, “animated by the same spirit of opposition.”280 
According to Fernandez de Castro, the immigration of whites was “prodigious” while 
Haitians did not allow people of color to leave. He implied if Boyer allowed all 
Dominicans to leave it would represent the Haitian Unification as a failure especially if 
they were people of color. A likely reason for the lack of Afro-Dominican immigration 
would be they simply experienced Haitian rule as more beneficial than Spanish rule. 
Nonetheless, for Fernandez de Castro, the migration’s consequence was Dominicans 
abandoning land in Santo Domingo. He stressed how Dominicans lived impoverished 
under Haitian rule. Even the police force left in place by the Haitians faced total ruin 
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according to Fernandez de Castro.281 For Fernandez de Castro, the Haitian Unification 
resulted in resistance within and outside Santo Domingo.  
Fernandez de Castro saw a Dominican population with distinct characteristics 
from the Haitians who were in Santo Domingo. He wrote, “the old customs and primary 
national character had been conserved.”282 For Fernandez de Castro, Dominican still held 
on to their traditions from living under Spanish rule. Santo Domingo and its people 
remained unchanged in character, making his argument for Dominican preference for 
Spanish rule more salient. Fernandez de Castro compared this occupation with the period 
of French rule 20 years prior to underscore Dominican fidelity and differentiate royalists 
with Republican supporters.283 Fernandez de Castro’s nostalgic depiction of Dominicans 
was static and unchanged over the last two decades since Spain took back Santo 
Domingo, distinct from the Haitians.   
Dominican royalists Brenes and Fernandez de Castro built upon budding 
discontent and fear of the Haitian Unification by emphasizing Santo Domingo’s loyalty 
to Spain. Their accounts discredited Boyer’s reforms in Santo Domingo and Dominican 
support for Haitian rule. Brenes sought a military solution and argued for the ease of 
Spanish success against Haitian troops. The Dominican loyalist rhetoric served Brenes to 
sway Spanish officials to invade Santo Domingo. Fernandez de Castro diverged from the 
former’s account through discrediting the earlier reasons for independence. He 
marginalized Dominican creole Núñez de Cáceres’ independence movement while being 
dismissive of Boyer’s motives outside of security. Fernandez de Castro aimed for a 
diplomatic resolution for Santo Domingo’s return. Both Dominican royalists present the 
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Haitian Unification as a foreign occupation threatening slavery and Spain’s remaining 
possession in the Caribbean. Furthermore, they emphasized cultural differences between 
Haitians and Dominicans with Spanish affinity crossing racial lines. Dominican loyalist 
rhetoric used opposition and the threat of emancipation to make a claim to Spanish 
cultural affinity from Santo Domingo’s populace.  
THE LIMITS OF ACCOMODATION 
Captain General de la Torre position in Puerto Rico put him in an ideal position to 
deal with the Haitian Unification. Consequently, Martinique governor Count Donzelot 
relayed information to de la Torre that he learned from the French squadron returning 
from Santo Domingo. According to Donzelot, “the blacks of Santo Domingo occupied 
themselves in realizing the known project of inciting rebellion of the slaves of the 
Spanish government’s island.284” The earlier threat to Puerto Rico de la Torre warned of 
came to fruition in Santo Domingo under the Haitian Unification. Donzelot received 
information stating how General Borgella, the leading Haitian officer in Santo Domingo, 
was gathering forces in Samaná to invade the island of Puerto Rico.285 The French 
governor was silent on his squadron’s act of aggression triggering the Haitian response to 
fortify their defenses. Neither the French nor the Spanish in the Caribbean had orders 
from their European superiors to attack. All Donzelot could do was to have French ships 
patrol the waters around Santo Domingo.286 Because of Puerto Rico’s proximity, 
Donzelot could relay more detailed information to de la Torre with the belief the Captain-
General was in a better position to deal with the events on Santo Domingo.  
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On 2 December 1823, Donzelot received his response from Spanish officials 
calling for cooperation and peace between both slave empires.287 As a sign of this 
potential alliance, Donzelot learned of Spanish preparations to send agents into Santo 
Domingo. By speaking to Dominican loyalist supporters on the island, the Spanish hoped 
to receive information regarding troops, supplies, and ships.288 Despite the assumptions 
of a Haitian threat, neither the French nor Spanish side could claim with confidence they 
knew Boyer’s true intentions especially after the skirmish in Samaná. Spanish officials 
sent ships to patrol the Mona Chanel, the body of water between Santo Domingo and 
Puerto Rico as they built up their defenses in Aguadilla and other areas on the western 
side of Puerto Rico in preparation for an attack.289 They suspected the Haitians may have 
been simply building up their defenses and consolidating their gains in Santo Domingo; 
however, the fear of retribution and its consequences was too great a risk for the Spanish 
to not prepare for the worse possible scenario and ally with the French.  
Several days later the Spanish sent a former military captain of Santo Domingo 
Diego Lira to their former colony as a way to entice the French to their side. Lira sought 
to return to his former home to reach out to contacts over any news about the faithful and 
loyal Dominicans who still were there in Santo Domingo. He was from Savana-la-Mar, a 
town in the north that had been involved in making overtures to the French and Spanish 
to retake Santo Domingo and likely personally knew members of the opposition to the 
Haitian Unification.290 Captain General de la Torre kept close contact with his 
counterpart in Martinique while he awaited news of Lira’s mission in Santo Domingo. 
                                                          
287 “Pedro Tomas de Cordova to Count Donzelot,” Puerto Rico, 2 December 1823, AGI-Estado 19.85, 4.  
288 “Pedro Tomas de Cordova to Count Donzelot,” Puerto Rico, 2 December 1823, AGI-Estado 19.85, 4. 
289 “Pedro Tomas de Cordova to Count Donzelot,” Puerto Rico, 2 December 1823, AGI-Estado 19.85, 4. 
290 “José Rivera to Western military commander,” Puerto Rico, 8 December 1823, AGI-Estado 19.85, 6.  
89 
Donzelot warned de la Torre he did not see it in France’s best interests to involve 
themselves in Santo Domingo at that very moment.291 He saw the potential danger if the 
Spanish could not supply Dominican royalists with weapons to fight against Haitian 
forces; it would put them and their properties in danger.292 Donzelot counseled de la 
Torre to await orders from Paris and Madrid. He considered it more prudent to observe 
the state of affairs in Santo Domingo.293 Despite, personally involving themselves more 
in Santo Domingo, Donzelot took away a potential ally for the Spanish.  
As a former Dominican official and royalist, Lira was an ideal candidate to send 
to Santo Domingo. He had existing contacts, which in theory, would make Lira’s job 
easier in assessing the strength of Haitian forces.294 By using Lira to report on the 
Unification, the Spanish illustrated their reliance on Dominican royalists’ earlier 
experiences in Santo Domingo. Arriving to Santo Domingo from Mayaguez in Puerto 
Rico, Lira was unable to contact any Dominican royalist until he came across a Julian de 
la Cruz, someone who was possibly a mahogany cutter. According to Lira, his informant 
told him that the Dominican population had become agitated with Boyer’s troops. Lira 
reported on each region’s troop strength manning the island’s defenses. The make-up of 
these armed forces included Haitians, libertos, and “Spaniards.”295 By offering these 
numbers for defense, Lira sought to convince his superiors of a potential Spanish victory. 
Still, the composition of the troops in Santo Domingo suggests Boyer trusted Dominicans 
to uphold Haitian sovereignty on the island. Lira’s efforts, however, were the result of his 
experiences serving the Spanish and living in Santo Domingo.   
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Lira’s report offered more information of the Haitian military in Santo Domingo 
that aimed to convince the Spanish to invade the island. Haitian troops in the interior 
towns such as Puerto Plata and La Vega had gone back to the western part of the island 
towards Port-au-Prince leaving Santo Domingo sparsely defended.296 This observation 
disproved the theory of a possible Haitian invasion of Spanish Caribbean islands. Lira 
revealed a garrison of troops in Santo Domingo city supported by Haitians, libertos, 
Dominican creoles, and “naturalized” Spaniards. This inspection indicates Haitian 
support was strongest in the areas of the west where pro-Haitian Dominicans had called 
for Boyer to enter. Santo Domingo City, as the former capital and stronghold of 
Dominican Creole Núñez de Cáceres’s independence movement, needed more forces. 
Lira perceived this reliance on Dominicans to defend Santo Domingo as Boyer’s 
potential weakness. The Dominican royalist officer saw others like him who would 
provide the support needed to defeat the Haitian forces who remained.297 Lira underlined 
the great desire Dominican royalist had to overthrow Haitian rule. They would need extra 
Spanish troops for support and safety in case of another Haitian invasion.298 By 
presenting Santo Domingo as vulnerable because of the weak Haitian defenses, Lira 
intended to get the Spanish involved to push the Haitians back west.  
Lira’s observations of the Haitian military revealed a multi-racial force Boyer 
entrusted to defend the newly unified Haitian Republic on its eastern border. While the 
Haitian state weathered setbacks in the forms of insurrection, foreign spies, and foreign 
squadrons patrolling their waters, it also had several successes. Haitian forces mobilized 
quickly towards the foreign threat, contained signs of insurrection, and had a military 
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force Boyer theoretically trusted multi-racial force to ensure Haitian rule in Santo 
Domingo. The Haitian Republic had also succeeded in ending slavery and mediating 
most retribution between former slaves and masters.  
De la Torre’s letter foreshadowed resistance from Dominican royalist on the 
island. What followed was a pro-Spanish Church inspired plot that sought to overthrow 
Haitian rule.299 In February 1824 Baltazar de Nova and cleric Pedro Gonzalez held one of 
a series of meetings in the town of Los Alcarrizos close to Santo Domingo City. It had 
the aim of overthrowing Boyer and the Haitian state’s rule in Santo Domingo. Pro-
Haitian supporters revealed the plot’s the existence to overthrow Haitian rule and General 
Borgella, the leading Haitian officer in Santo Domingo.300 Haitian forces arrested Nova, 
Gonzalez, and others that they implicated as a part of this conspiracy. The Haitian 
government empaneled a court of Dominicans to put on trial this group of conspirators.  
Haitian authorities created a tribunal headed by Dominicans from a variety of professions 
such as lawyers, priests, and national guard members.301 The tribunal exiled some, jailed 
others, but saved the worse punishment for de Nova and Gonzalez. The Haitian state 
sentenced de Nova and Gonzalez to death for their role in the Alcarrizos conspiracy.302 
Dominican royalist resistance provided evidence for de la Torre’s previous claims to 
Spanish officials.  
Boyer followed these executions with several other laws that had the goal of 
integrating Santo Domingo within the Haitian Republic and strengthening its 
government. The Alcarrizos conspiracy could have inspired Boyer of the necessity to 
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strengthen Haitian rule in Santo Domingo. These decrees included drafting young men 
sixteen to twenty-five in the gendarmerie or military police force and the prohibition of 
writing laws in Spanish.303 Dominican royalists now found themselves in a precarious 
situation, as pro-Haitian supporters of the unification became a part of the force used to 
keep Santo Domingo under Boyer’s rule. Despite the internal and external threats, the 
Haitian government continued integrating Santo Domingo and consolidating its rule 
under a single republic.  
Several months after these events, Captain-General de la Torre found himself in 
Spain reporting on events in Santo Domingo to personally convince French and Spanish 
officials to help reclaim the former colony. While overseas, he corresponded with the 
French ambassador to Spain, seeking to convince France to offer its support in the 
Caribbean. De la Torre indicated Dominican royalists needed officers and a small number 
of troops in their struggle against the Haitian Republic. He underscored the Spanish 
would use the military support to push the Haitians back west, which was advantageous 
for the Spanish in the Caribbean.304By specifying what Dominican royalist needed from 
the French and implying Spanish government support, de la Torre sought to convince the 
French ambassador to reach out to his government in Paris. De la Torre mentioned how 
he received news of Haitians and Dominicans arming themselves in Santo Domingo to 
take over the other islands in the Caribbean. He used this angle of fear to push the French 
ambassador to consider the threat to France’s possessions in the Caribbean.305De la Torre 
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used his time in Spain to try to sway both Spanish and French officials to combat the 
Haitian Unification.  
The French ambassador response to de la Torre’s request was similar to Count 
Donzelot’s in declining the Captain General. The ambassador had communicated with 
Donzelot prior. The governor of Martinique assured the ambassador of the expediency of 
this endeavor to convince him of the need to act soon.306 By agreeing with de la Torre 
Bon the danger of the Haitian Unification for colonial regimes in the Caribbean, Donzelot 
illustrated his perspective as a colonial official. Nonetheless, the French ambassador was 
only willing to take this news into consideration when relaying it to France. He was non-
committal regarding French support to retake Santo Domingo from Boyer perhaps 
because of France’s separate negotiations with Haiti covered later in the dissertation.307 
Captain General de la Torre’s effort did not convince the French of the urgency of 
weakening Haitian power and influence in the Caribbean as the ambassador declined 
him.  
Dominican loyalist Fernandez de Castro traveled to the island of Hispaniola under 
the pretense of regaining properties he left in Santo Domingo. On 5 January 1824, he 
traveled to Cap-Haitien and made his way to Port-au-Prince to speak with Boyer.308 
Fernandez de Castro’s presence in Haiti was as much an opportunity for Haitian officials 
as it was for the Dominican royalist to obtain more information. For instance, a 
suspicious Haitian officer questioned Fernandez de Castro about a possible French and 
Spanish alliance to attack the island. The Dominican royalist wisely feigned ignorance of 
this plan, perhaps not familiar with de la Torre’s communication with the French. 
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Fernandez de Castro’s visit to Port-au-Prince surprised Boyer who assumed he had fled 
permanently with other Spanish officials after Dominican Creole Núñez de Cáceres 
declared independence. It appears Santo Domingo’s former leader informed Boyer of 
those who fled previously.309 Fernandez de Castro’s return to Hispaniola to try and 
reclaim his property in Santo Domingo was a pretense to report more on events.  
Boyer used this meeting as an opportunity to justify the Haitian Unification. The 
Haitian President explained his actions were in the best interests of all inhabitants and to 
secure his borders. Núñez de Cáceres’ regime threatened the peace of their “siblings of 
the same soil.”310 Boyer gave the impression he was thinking of the larger interests of 
those on the entire island. The regime he extinguished invited anarchy and had the 
potential to bring an unwanted foreign power. Boyer would have respected Spanish 
sovereignty in Santo Domingo and not entered east.311 The President presented his 
actions as a defense of Haitian sovereignty while wisely respecting Spain’s previous rule. 
There was no mention of pro-Haitian support among Dominicans or Núñez de Cáceres’s 
regime. By highlighting the Haitian government’s right to defend its sovereignty, Boyer 
offered a validation for the Unification.  
Boyer gave Fernandez de Castro permission to seek out his former properties and 
keep them, likely suspected the Dominican royalist would report his findings back to his 
superiors. He prepared the Dominican royalist for some of the things he would see on his 
arrival to Santo Domingo by revealing the dissatisfaction among many “Spaniards” to 
which he had no control over. Boyer had to engage in certain measures in response to 
anti-Haitian sentiment. An example of these measures was the beheading of four 
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Dominican royalists implicated in the Alcarrizos conspiracy. Boyer’s comment implied 
his concern with the foreign perception of his government and their treatment of 
Dominicans.312 Fernandez de Castro concluded these examples as the reasons for 
Dominican discontent under Haitian rule. This restlessness extended to the upper 
echelons of the Catholic Church as Haitian officials implicated archbishop Varela’s 
involvement in the earlier conspiracy. The spirit of unrest wrote Fernandez de Castro, 
“has penetrated the republic” and “animates the Spanish” as they sought to return under 
Fernando VII’s rule.313 Fernandez de Castro profited from Boyer’s benevolence by 
reporting his perspective of the Unification in Santo Domingo.  
Fernandez de Castro spent time observing discussed Boyer’s troops’ while not 
necessarily on the Dominicans who supported them. He did not think it was sensible to 
disarm the Dominican population over such a vast amount of territory especially when 
considering the Haitian troops who were left to defend Santo Domingo.314 The Haitian 
military’s presence implied Santo Domingo was an occupied territory as opposed to one 
integrated with the Haitian state. The only troops the Haitians could deploy would be 
those coordinated towards Santo Domingo’s center in case of a foreign attack, forcing 
them to retreat.315 Despite the larger number of troops Boyer brought with him during his 
initial entrance into Santo Domingo, he left a smaller number of troops left to defend it. 
The public plan for the defense of a foreign invasion involved a retreat into the mountains 
where troops would fortify themselves. A first look at this discrepancy in the number of 
forces suggests Boyer’s rhetoric for wanting to defend Santo Domingo from anarchy and 
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a foreign invasion did not reflect in practice, however, the presence of local troops in 
Santo Domingo also hints at the Haitian President’s confidence of Dominican support.316 
Fernandez de Castro’s observation offered information on Haitian troops but 
underestimated Dominican support.  
Fernandez de Castro’s detailed examination included his speculations of the cost 
of having Haitian troops in Santo Domingo and its impact on Dominicans. With estimates 
at 10,000 – 12,000 pesos monthly, he found that it would be harder to justify such a cost 
if Santo Domingo was not contributing money to the Haitian treasury and land remained 
uncultivated.317 Without foreign recognition of Haitian independence and the threat of 
invasion, all the republic’s resources needed to be devoted to its defenses. On top of these 
costs, Fernandez de Castro noted Haitian officers charging up to a third more in taxes to 
the population and remained unpopular among Dominicans.318 For Fernandez de Castro, 
the Haitian army alienated Dominicans and creating more enemies of Boyer’s regime 
who continued to respect the officers even with some of their excesses. Although 
Fernandez de Castro devoted considerable attention in his reports to Haitian military 
strength, he was unable to provide the number of troops available to Boyer. The Haitian 
President wisely did not make those figures available to Fernandez de Castro especially 
given the ease the Dominican royalist could infiltrate Santo Domingo and take notes on 
the political state of the island.319 Fernandez de Castro found vulnerabilities within the 
Haitian military by noting the army size declined since 1822 from death and desertion.320 
                                                          
316 “Felipe Fernandez de Castro to Overseas Ministry,” Madrid, 6 July 1824, AGI-Estado 4.7.   
317 “Felipe Fernandez de Castro to Overseas Ministry,” Madrid, 6 July 1824, AGI-Estado 4.7.   
318 “Felipe Fernandez de Castro to Overseas Ministry,” Madrid, 6 July 1824, AGI-Estado 4.7.   
319 “Felipe Fernandez de Castro to Overseas Ministry,” Madrid, 6 July 1824, AGI-Estado 4.7.   
320 Felipe Fernandez de Castro to Overseas Ministry,” Madrid, 6 July 1824, AGI-Estado 4.7.   
97 
His estimates provided Spanish officials with an idea of the costs and how it negatively 
impacted Santo Domingo.  
Fernandez de Castro tried to balance what he observed versus what Boyer told 
him to uncover the Haitian President’s motives. The Dominican royalist concluded Boyer 
only fought to sustain Haitian independence and freedom something Fernandez de Castro 
claimed the Spanish never tried to go against with Haitians.321 Boyer’s reasoning for the 
Haitian Unification did not convince Fernandez de Castro and suggests he saw Haitian 
claims to Santo Domingo as invalid. The Spanish, wrote Fernandez de Castro, were “a 
nation of frank and religious character” with their dealings with Boyer. These were not in 
the same vein as the French where they had direct conflict with the Haitian Republic.322 
Fernandez de Castro’s attempt to toggle between two conflicting versions had him 
conclude the Spanish were right while the Haitians were wrong.  
Fernandez de Castro’s report on emancipation offered his assessment of its impact 
in Santo Domingo. In his earlier report, he believed Boyer would fight hard to defend 
emancipation in Santo Domingo. After traveling to Santo Domingo, Fernandez de Castro 
wrote, “truthfully it is not the personal liberty between them that is the subject of the 
question but general liberty or independence.”323 He found the Haitian government more 
concerned with preserving its right to sovereignty and autonomy over the personal 
liberties of its citizens. According to Fernandez de Castro, Boyer was losing money and 
resources in keeping Santo Domingo under his rule. For example, the Haitian state could 
not collect rent from land uninhabited or uncultivated. Fernandez de Castro believed 
Boyer could issue a claim towards Santo Domingo because of the resources that would be 
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provided for the state.324 The Dominican royalist considered Boyer could possibly 
negotiate a return of Santo Domingo as long as Spain would not give their colony to a 
foreign power.325 Fernandez de Castro’s report concluded the Haitian government’s 
commitment to emancipation was not as strong as he initially thought.  
Fernandez de Castro believed Boyer could possibly regard holding on to Santo 
Domingo as a political liability. For the Dominican royalist, the Haitian Unification 
drained resources from the state and alienated the Dominican population. Even the 
properties Boyer sequestered required him to pay his military officers and others in Santo 
Domingo to keep control.326 Fernandez de Castro remarked, “even up until my exit on 15 
April he [Boyer] has not reinforced [Santo Domingo] to defend it from outsiders.” The 
Dominican royalist report suggested to Spanish officials Santo Domingo was vulnerable 
and an ideal time to launch an attack.327 These events convinced Fernandez de Castro the 
Haitian state was willing to consider returning Santo Domingo to the Spanish without the 
need for hostilities. He suggests that Boyer realized he could defend Haitian sovereignty 
from its former borders in the west if the Spanish held possession of Santo Domingo.328 
Fernandez de Castro was convinced that if Boyer saw Santo Domingo as a liability then it 
was likely for Spain to reobtain its former possession.  
Spanish and French officials in the Caribbean enmeshed themselves within the 
Haitian Unification through reports they received from royalist agents.  Dominican 
royalists sought a return to Spanish rule by presenting Santo Domingo as loyal to the 
Spanish Crown. While Donzelot could argue for prudence and observation, Puerto Rico’s 
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proximity to Santo Domingo combined with royalist reports of Santo Domingo informed 
de la Torre’s decision to aid Dominican royalists to overthrow Haitian rule in Santo 
Domingo. Fernandez de Castro traveled to Santo Domingo and used his report in making 
a larger argument for Spanish intervention in Santo Domingo. What differed from his 
earlier report was the data he gathered from his own first-hand account which bolstered 
some of his claims while dismissing others. His report gave insight into conditions in 
Santo Domingo following the Alcarrizos conspiracy which highlighted Dominicans’ 
loyalty to the Spanish. By complementing this account with numbers and descriptions of 
Haitian forces in Santo Domingo, he sought to entice the Spanish towards the likelihood 
of success if officials in Madrid were to get involved and retake Santo Domingo. The 
Dominican royalist agenda to overthrow Haitian rule in Santo Domingo influenced 
Spanish and French Caribbean officials to focus their attention more on the Haitian 
Unification.  
CONCLUSION 
Writing about Dominican responses to Haitian justification for unification in 
1826, the British Consul Charles Mackenzie noted “this view, however, is not adopted by 
the Spanish Haitians—all that could migrate, have done so—those that remained 
considered themselves whether white, brown, or black as effectively Spaniards, and the 
occupation of their territory as an act accomplished by fraud and violence.”329 His words 
offered a powerful rebuff to the Haitian Unification. This account along with other 
Anglo-American and Spanish reports and publications offer a clear narrative of 
difference between Haitians and Dominicans. Yet, these accounts do not discuss the 
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Haitian Unification’s success despite differences between Haitian and Dominican society 
brought about in part by divergences in development and colonial rule.  
This chapter has argued that Dominican royalists presented Santo Domingo and 
its inhabitants as loyal to the Spanish because of the Haitian Unification’s first success. 
The royalist rhetoric of fidelity and Hispanic ties influenced Spanish and French officials 
in the Caribbean who sought to retake Santo Domingo from Haiti. Men such as Francisco 
Brenes and Felipe Fernandez de Castro combined their arguments of adhesion and 
Spanish ties with fear and warning for Spain’s commitment to slavery on its near-by 
islands. This view of Santo Domingo incorporated different racial groups of the 
Dominican population who had cultural affinities with the Spanish as opposed to the 
Haitians. This Dominica royalist rhetoric obscured the support Haitian rule had fostered 
and marginalized the earlier Spanish discontent contributing to Dominican Creole Núñez 
de Cáceres’ independence in 1821. Dominicans’ success in choosing the Haitian 
Republic as their form of independence resulted in this backlash.  
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CHAPTER 3: “THERE IS ALMOST NO PORTION OF THE SPIRITUAL EDIFICE 
THAT DOES NOT REPRESENT RUBBISH AND RUIN”: HAITI AND THE 
CATHOLIC CHURCH IN SANTO DOMINGO, 1823 – 1833
 
On 28 June 1823, Bernardo Correa y Cidrón wrote to Santo Domingo Archbishop 
Pedro Varela y Jimenez about his mission to Port-au-Prince. Varela y Jimenez appointed 
Correa y Cidrón as his general vicar to the Artibonite department in the northwestern 
Haiti. He arrived the previous month in Port-au-Prince, the capital, noting how his 
voyage, “went well with my health, and it has in no way altered at this present time, 
thanks to God.”330 Varela y Jimenez previously sent clerics at the request of Haitian 
President Jean-Pierre Boyer before the Haitian Unification brought Haiti and Santo 
Domingo together in 1822. By sending priests to another part of the island, Varela y 
Jimenez asserted his spiritual authority over the island. He vested this authority in his 
representative, the vicar general. Correa y Cidrón’s arrival in Port-au-Prince may have 
been a formality for Boyer to acknowledge an earlier custom.331 After the cleric presented 
himself to Boyer, the Haitian President refused to acknowledge Correa y Cidrón’s 
appointment because the archbishop did not consider himself a Haitian citizen.332 By not 
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taking charge of his position, as the vicar general, Correa y Cidrón failed his mission as 
Boyer asserted his authority over Varela y Jimenez.  
Beginning in 1822, Boyer and the Haitian state embarked on a series of reforms 
targeting institutions of Spanish colonial society including the Catholic Church. This 
secularization was part of a larger trend within the revolutionary Atlantic world where the 
state increasingly took control of the Church’s former responsibilities. The shift reflected 
the changes in sovereignty from empires to nation-states and obscures how Spanish and 
French governments previously started curtailing the Church’s influence in their 
colonies.333 For Dominican loyalists, a commitment to Catholicism became a cultural 
identity marker, contrasting sharply with Haitian secularism. This inheritance reflected 
Catholicism’s centrality to Hispanic culture taking shape during the Age of Revolutions. 
Later scholars have pointed to the relationship between the Church and Dominican 
national identity as a foundational element eventually resulting in Dominican 
independence from Haiti in 1844.334 The Haitian Republic’s Church reform also targeted 
ecclesiastical properties Boyer sought to redistribute to libertos or newly emancipated 
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slaves. The Haitian government targeted the Church to transform it from a colonial to a 
national institution to suit its political needs.   
This chapter examines the Haitian Church and land reform in Santo Domingo 
from 1822 – 1830. The study begins by asking how did Haitian reform impact the state’s 
relations with the Church in Santo Domingo? Next, how did Haitian state practices 
transform the relationship between the Dominican clergy and the government? Lastly, 
how did Haitian secularization impact Dominican parishioners in Santo Domingo? This 
chapter argues that Boyer’s land and secularization policies created an uneven power 
dynamic between the Haitian state, the Church, and local communities creating discord 
among all three groups, which served to undermine the Haitian Unification.   
CHURCH AGAINST STATE 
Varela y Jimenez had previously sent priests to serve in the western side of 
Hispaniola while Santo Domingo was still a Spanish colony. Haitian officials requested 
Varela y Jimenez send over priests after Boyer united the northern and southern parts of 
Haiti in 1820.335 After consulting with the Captain-General of Santo Domingo Sebastian 
Kindelan, Varela y Jimenez sent four priests to serve in Haiti. Kindelan later noted it, 
“was very convenient to reestablish the friendship and good harmony between the two 
governments.”336 Among the four priests was Juan Pichardo, an archdeacon, to serve as 
the vicar general. Varela y Jimenez’s initiative followed Boyer’s separate request to the 
Vatican for a bishop to serve in Haiti. Boyer would continue to allow the four priests to 
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serve in Haiti, but Pichardo could not serve as the vicar general.337 By honoring Boyer’s 
request to send priests, Varela y Jimenez took the initiative as archbishop to serve the 
Haitian president.  
In this instance, Boyer’s logic followed the chain of command instituted by the 
Vatican. He claimed to have reached out to the papacy to send a bishop to take charge of 
Haiti’s religious affairs. While undoubtedly surprised, even annoyed, Varela y Jimenez 
would not overstep his authority. The four clerics were to serve under the current vicar 
general of Haiti who Correa y Cidrón later noted, “was an intrusive priest.” The vicar 
general had previously worked with Boyer and could guarantee he would control the 
Spanish priests. This situation did not stop Pichardo from trying to claim his position as 
the vicar general.338 Pichardo ignored the reports and Varela y Jimenez’s orders to recall 
him to Santo Domingo. Varela y Jimenez saw Pichardo’s claim of Boyer sending a 
military party to arrest the archdeacon for his actions as a ruse to buy more time in Haiti. 
The archbishop bided his time until he gave Pichardo a final ultimatum: return to Santo 
Domingo or face suspension.339 By partially working within the system and dealing with 
the Vatican directly, Boyer asserted control of religious affairs to obtain more priests in 
Haiti.  
The fallout from this incident resulted in a publicized attack on Varela y 
Jimenez’s character and intentions. Correa y Cidrón defended the archbishop, claiming 
he looked out for the Haitian people’s spiritual well-being. He noted how, “[Varela y 
Jimenez] had no other purpose than Christian Charity, and the desire to develop 
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increasingly the friendship of the two governments.”340 Even though his actions were in 
direct contrast to the Vatican’s, Varela y Jimenez still intended to reign in the obstinate 
Pichardo. Correa y Cidrón’s writings reveal more about the vicar general’s responsibility 
and offer an explanation behind Pichardo’s refusal to return. According to Correa y 
Cidrón, the vicar general was not just in charge of ministering to their church area but the 
entire district it encompassed. As the archbishop’s representative, Pichardo would assert 
Varela y Jimenez’s influence in Haiti. This position was one Pichardo would not be so 
keen to give up or Boyer to be so willing to allow.341 The Dominican public’s attack on 
Varela y Jimenez’s actions stemmed from their belief that the archbishop’s schemed to 
strengthen his own influence over the good of the larger religious community.  
Two years later, Correa y Cidrón found himself in a similar situation as to 
Pichardo. What was different was that the deposed vicar general found himself caught 
between Boyer and Varela y Jimenez’s larger struggle. Correa y Cidrón believed the 
disagreement stemmed from contrasting interpretations of the archbishop’s role in the 
Haitian Republic. When he asked Boyer, what was impeding him from taking the vicar 
general title, the Haitian President responded, “the archbishop is archbishop of [the island 
of] Santo Domingo[;] Santo Domingo has been united and integrated with the republic of 
Haiti[;] then the archbishop is archbishop and [a] citizen of Haiti.”342 Boyer insisted 
Varela y Jimenez was a Haitian citizen and, as a result, under his authority as the Haitian 
President. Boyer continued, “if he [Varela y Jimenez] is not archbishop and citizen of 
Haiti, then under no circumstances can the archbishop pretend that the president of Haiti 
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recognizes his delegates and vicars when he does not recognize himself as a member of 
this state.”343 If Varela y Jimenez would not recognize Boyer’s authority over Santo 
Domingo and its inhabitants, then the Haitian leader would not recognize the 
archbishop’s authority within the republic. The clashing interests trapped Correa y Cidrón 
between the premier secular and religious powers on the island.  
From the defiant Varela y Jimenez’s point of view, he was still the Spanish king’s 
subject and the Pope’s. Varela y Jimenez previously offered his loyalty to Fernando VII, 
the Spanish king, since Santo Domingo’s first independence under José Núñez de 
Cáceres in December 1821. The archbishop would not submit himself to Boyer’s 
authority despite his rule over the entire island.344 Varela y Jimenez claimed ill-health to 
justify his inability to serve as Boyer’s archbishop and awaited a message from Rome to 
confirm both his resignation from his title and the news of his replacement. The 
archbishop used his resignation as a pretext to refuse a Haitian government salary noting 
it would be “indecent for a bishop who had renounced his bishopric to receive a 
salary.”345 Varela y Jimenez persisted in his stance to serve the papacy and not Boyer. 
But using illness to explain his resignation, the archbishop implicitly acknowledged 
Boyer’s sovereignty as President. Correa y Cidrón made no mention of Varela y Jimenez 
challenging Boyer’s right to offer clerics salaries. It implies Varela y Jimenez took 
Boyer’s claims seriously even if the archbishop still identified as a Spanish subject and 
under the Pope’s authority.  
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Boyer questioned Varela y Jimenez’s stance and attacked his inconsistency, using 
the archbishop’s appointment of Correa y Cidrón as vicar general as an example of 
Varela y Jimenez acting in his role. Boyer noted how Varela y Jimenez addressed his 
letter accompanying Correa y Cidrón as the “pastoral leader of the Haitian country, 
naming himself his pastor and prelude.”346 From previous experience requesting priests 
from Varela y Jimenez, Boyer understood the archbishop’s actions to be an attack on the 
Haitian President’s sovereignty and authority. Even Correa y Cidrón was skeptical of the 
archbishop’s intentions and argument, openly questioning what would prevent Varela y 
Jimenez from accepting his role as the Haitian Republic’s archbishop.347 If he was Santo 
Domingo’s archbishop, which was a part of the Haitian Republic, then Varela y Jimenez 
was by default Haiti’s archbishop. Correa y Cidrón agreement with Boyer’s stance 
suggests the cleric engaged with republican politics and indirectly accepted the Haitian 
President’s sovereignty over the Church in Santo Domingo. Perhaps Correa y Cidrón 
sought accommodation with Boyer as the best way to hold on to his position just as 
Pichardo did two years prior. By questioning Varela y Jimenez’s stance, Boyer and 
Correa y Cidrón illustrate the archbishop’s consistency from the state’s perspective and 
how Church and state relations in Santo Domingo were more divisive.  
Correa y Cidrón astutely couched his stance as for the Haitian Church’s benefit. 
According to Correa y Cidrón, the friction between the Haitian state’s premier political 
and spiritual powers disrupted the Church in Santo Domingo. He noted, “there is almost 
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no portion of the spiritual edifice that does not represent rubbish and ruin.”348 Varela y 
Jimenez and Boyer’s struggles of sovereignty weakened the Church. Correa y Cidrón 
chastised Varela y Jimenez for his refusal to accept a salary under the Haitian 
government. Varela y Jimenez’s stance and the Church’s ineffectiveness left it 
susceptible to the threats of “false and heretical” ministries.349  This quarrel impeded the 
two-premier secular and religious powers from uniting, and hindered the Haitian 
Church’s potential.  
Correa y Cidrón’s loyalty to Boyer and the Haitian state over Varela y Jimenez 
had other causes besides the Haitian Church’s benefit. The cleric had previously 
experienced attacks on his integrity when Santo Domingo was a Spanish colony. 
Dominicans of this era questioned Correa y Cidrón’s loyalty and character to Santo 
Domingo’s Church when the colony was under French rule. Known by Dominicans for 
their secularism in comparison to the Spanish’s religiosity, Correa y Cidrón cooperated 
with the French. Consequently, he published a pamphlet in his defense, to tell his version 
of the truth to Dominicans.350Haitian rule mirrored the previous French regime in that it 
forced Dominicans to choose sides that were not as dichotomous as religious and secular. 
Correa y Cidron’s backing of Boyer reflected this reality as he considered other factors 
including his own.   
 Correa y Cidrón perceived this conflict as a power struggle between Varela y 
Jimenez and Boyer. The archbishop attempted to preserve his autonomy against the 
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Haitian President’s right to regulate the Church within the republic’s borders. A papal 
bull appointed the archbishop to his station intending for Varela y Jimenez to serve the 
inhabitants of his particular authority. The pope’s right to appoint the bishop to his post 
was something Correa y Cidrón admitted not even Boyer could dispute. While Santo 
Domingo City was the seat of the archbishop, Haitian sovereignty determined Varela y 
Jimenez’s responsibility to serve the citizens of the entire island.351 The inhabitants of 
both sides of the island—whether Dominican or Haitians—were citizens of the Republic. 
In other words, Varela y Jimenez as a native and inhabitant of Santo Domingo was, in 
fact a Haitian citizen. The conflicting religious and secular authority shaped and limited 
the contours of Varela y Jimenez’s defense of autonomy and Boyer’s assertion of his 
rights.  
 The Haitian Unification changed Varela y Jimenez’s political reality and shaped 
his responses to Boyer. Varela y Jimenez understood himself to be under the Church’s 
and Spanish king’s sovereignty. The archbishop used his position to resist what he 
considered Boyer’s encroachment on his rights. For the defiant Varela y Jimenez, there 
was no accommodation or reconciliation between the two secular and religious powers on 
the island. This context also points to larger concerns over legitimacy, citizenship, and 
authority. Correa y Cidrón’s observations illustrate how Varela y Jimenez used his 
notions of loyalty, identity, and sovereignty to resist allegiance to Haitian rule and to 
protest Boyer’s regime. Haitian rule in Santo Domingo drew Varela y Jimenez closer to 
Church doctrine while defending the institution’s religious autonomy in the face of 
Boyer.  
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Varela y Jimenez continued in his position to serve as Haiti’s archbishop but 
without a permanent solution. The archbishop appointed José Salgado as the vicar 
general, which Boyer approved. Salgado’s control covered Port-au-Prince and the 
southern part of Haiti, suggesting Boyer did not perceive the new vicar general as a threat 
or Varela y Jimenez’s ally.352 Boyer’s gesture likely attempted to mend his relationship 
with Varela y Jimenez. Nonetheless, the archbishop left the other position of general 
vicar to serve in the northern part of Haiti vacant after Correa y Cidrón’s rejection. In 
response, Haitian Secretary-General Joseph Balthazar Inginac sent a priest first to 
London and then Rome to communicate with the papacy to reach a solution suitable to 
both parties.  Both sides recognized the need for a solution.353 Varela y Jimenez could not 
continue as the archbishop with the situation as it was.  
On 17 October 1824, Julio Maria de Somaglio, a Vatican representative, reached 
out to Boyer in attempts at a reconciliation. Speaking on the Vatican’s behalf, Maria de 
Somaglio noted how the Pope expressed “sweet satisfaction” to know Boyer’s 
“passionate and burning desire” for their “holy religion in the middle of the numerous 
faithful that compose the island of Haiti.”354  Maria de Somaglio presented the Pope and 
Boyer’s desires as the same: restoration of religion for Hispaniola’s inhabitants. The 
Church official used this mutual point of interest to stress the importance to Boyer of 
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restoring communication between the Vatican and Varela y Jimenez.355 This was the first 
step in Maria de Somaglio’s bid for peace between Boyer and the Church.   
 One part of this solution required the Church reign in Varela y Jimenez if he 
would not follow Boyer. Maria de Somaglio sought to limit the archbishop’s authority 
over the entire island by using the pretext of Varela y Jimenez’s inability to serve its 
inhabitants when in reality it was because of a disagreement over the archbishop’s 
responsibilities. This ploy also enabled Maria de Somaglio to ask Boyer to allow for 
more priests to minister to the island. He noted, how “the [western] part of Haiti that had 
been kept in private from legitimate ministers” to attend to what was necessary for the 
religion.356 The new priests would aid with evangelizing the island and instruct Haitians 
and Dominicans on their religion. With the Church’s presence in the Haitian Republic, 
the “numerous faithful” of the island would be adequately served and instructed in their 
faith.357 This move also served as a way for the Vatican to lessen Varela y Jimenez’s 
influence as it attempted to reconcile with the Haitian government. 
María de Somaglio and the Church continued appealing for Boyer’s favor by 
emphasizing that none of the missions would be successful without his “pious efforts.” 
Through the avenue of religion, order and peace among families and the government 
would be at hand under the spiritual leadership of the church in the Haitian Republic.358 
For Boyer, this correspondence signaled a victory over Varela y Jimenez. By publishing 
this account in the Haitian newspaper Le Telegraphe, the Haitian government conveyed 
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papal support of its rule in Santo Domingo. It also suggested a dual effort to curb Varela 
y Jimenez’s influence on the island.359 The Vatican’s overtures represented a formal 
gesture on the pope’s behalf; it did not, however, result in a new diplomatic relationship 
between the papacy and Haitian government. By 1830, Varela y Jimenez fled Santo 
Domingo for Cuba, claiming the Haitian government plot to end his life.360 Maria de 
Somaglio’s attempts to entice Boyer highlights how the Haitian President’s cooperation 
would determine the Church’s success on the island.  
 The earlier dealings between Varela y Jimenez and Boyer informed their 
understandings of their roles as Archbishop and President. Varela y Jimenez would not 
directly overstep a decision or action decided by the Vatican, but would assert his 
sovereignty and interpretations of his position as archbishop. Boyer sought to curb 
clerics’ influences in Haiti who he could not control, especially if the Church stationed 
them so close to Port-au-Prince. Haitian reform created what one scholar refers to as a 
“church subordination to the state model.” Boyer asserted his sovereignty in the Haitian 
Republic at the expense of marginalizing Varela y Jimenez and the church like other 
nation-states did in Latin America.361 By acknowledging Boyer’s stance and importance 
to the future of the Church in the Haitian Republic, Correa y Cidrón and Maria de 
Somaglio engaged in republican politics to curry the Haitian leader’s favor.  Haitian rule 
impacted the state’s relationship with the Church by forcing religious officials to accept 
Boyer’s rule as the final authority on the island, attacking their religious autonomy.  
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CLERICAL OBSERATIONS OF REFORM 
As Boyer dealt with Varela y Jimenez and the Vatican, he commissioned a study 
into which land the Haitian state could redistribute to libertos or the newly emancipated 
enslaved people. This committee included General Jérôme Maximilien Borgella, the 
leading Haitian officer in Santo Domingo, six Dominicans, and an invited group of 
administrators from various towns on the western side of the island.362 Several months 
later the committee recommended for the Haitian government to sequester property 
within these criteria: Property belonging to the former Spanish and French governments; 
ecclesiastical lands such as convents, Dominican loyalists’ properties who immigrated; 
the capellanías or chantries that had fallen into the power of the archbishop that he and 
the clergy now abused; and mortgages that were in the Santo Domingo Cathedral’s 
favor.363 It was telling that a committee made up of Dominicans concluded these were the 
best properties for Boyer to redistribute to Santo Domingo’s newly emancipated. 
Dominicans of European descent worried about the consequences of Haitian land 
reform in Santo Domingo. Article 12 of the 1816 Haitian Constitution prevented whites 
from owning property in the Haitian Republic leaving Santo Domingo’s property-owning 
elite vulnerable to possible land expropriation.364 Boyer quelled their concerns, assuring 
them the Haitian state recognized them as citizens. They would not have to worry about 
the state appropriating their property. Boyer noted, “I have declared from my 
proclamation on the 9 February 1822, that the Haitian citizens formed the same family 
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and the same government.”365  Boyer’s paternally looked at Dominicans as Haitians and 
members of the same family. Contrary to the reports of Dominican royalists, Haitian 
citizenship extended protection to Dominicans. Boyer wrote to a Haitian official in the 
Dominican city Puerto Plata to reassure him Dominicans in the vicinity would have their 
property protected as well.366 For Boyer, Dominicans need not worry about retaining or 
purchasing land as Haitian land reforms would not target them because they were citizens 
of the republic.  
Before the unification, the Church was one of the largest landowners in the former 
Spanish colony. One of the most effective ways the Church obtained its property was 
through the process of capellanías. A capellanía or chantry was a contract stipulating the 
terms of an ecclesiastical endowment between Spanish families and the Church.367 These 
contracts called for people to commit their properties to specific parishes and priests. In 
return for this donation, the Church agreed to perform religious services and funerals for 
the souls of the families and descendants. Dominicans assigned these properties to a 
family member who managed the assets while the priest who performed mass as a 
personal chaplain to the family of the land in question.368 If all the descendants passed 
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away then the archbishop of Santo Domingo would obtain the land. Over time this 
method enabled the Church in Santo Domingo, now under Varela y Jimenez, to obtain 
significant holdings, however, the total amount held is uncertain. The committee noted 
the capellanías “from their great age or prescription had fallen into the power and gain of 
the archbishop and had been donated for the use of the rent of priests who had died or 
were absent.”369 The capellanía system and land under the Church’s control made the 
institution a target for Boyer’s reforms.  
The situation in Santo Domingo was untenable for the Haitian Unification’s 
success. Besides the Church, Dominican and Spanish elites had also obtained land 
through the informal practice of communeros de terenos. This custom entailed 
Dominicans who claimed ownership of the land through their presence and cultivation as 
opposed to land titles that did not necessarily correlate with the person inhabiting the 
land.370 One scholar estimates 5% of the Dominican population owned most of the land 
in Santo Domingo.371  So while Boyer could reassure the Dominican landowning elite of 
their right to hold land, nothing could prevent him from limiting the land size and 
obtaining more. The Haitian state also had to consider the consequences for obtaining 
Church property. Varela y Jimenez proved to be a staunch critic of the regime and 
Dominican official Felipe Fernandez de Castro noted in his travels to the island Haitian 
officials implicated the archbishop in the Alcarrizos conspiracy discussed earlier.372 The 
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current land tenure system benefited Dominican elites but prevented the Haitian state 
from carrying out reform it had already put into place on the Haitian side of the island.  
On 8 July 1824, the Haitian state passed a law to move forward with larger land 
reform in Santo Domingo in the spirit of the committee’s recommendation. The law was 
consistent with Boyer’s understanding of nationhood where “for the Haitian social pact, 
the property law was inseparable from the quality of citizen.” The new law entitled all 
Dominicans to ownership of land with a set minimum of 15.5 acres.373 The Haitian 
government rewarded libertos and other pro-Haitian supporters. This new law also came 
with a series of stipulations meant to coerce Dominicans to work and to assure proper 
landownership in Santo Domingo. First, the law required those with ownership of land to 
assure its cultivation to keep Dominicans within a similar land-tenure system as on the 
western side of the island. Next, the Haitian state called for land owners to provide proof 
of ownership to their property to obtain a title given by the government.374 The informal 
land tenure system in Santo Domingo enabled Dominicans to obtain ownership of land 
through cultivation and without the need for former land titles. The 1824 law prevented 
Dominicans without proof of ownership from keeping the land, which in theory they 
cultivated prior. Dominican historians differ in their assessment of land reform and labor 
codes during the Unification. Scholars differ on the law’s impact with one highlights how 
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the law alienated different segments of the population, alienating them. Still, a reginal 
study of emancipation in the eastern province in Higüey points to the state’s absence in 
which libertos continued to work the land.375 The 1824 law was an important step for 
Boyer to realize his vision for the newly emancipated in Santo Domingo.  
The Haitian state now could begin in earnest to appropriate land from the Church 
in Santo Domingo. The Haitian government targeted religious convents, monastery 
hospitals, and properties from other ecclesiastical organizations. The Haitian state felt 
justified in seizing land it associated with belonging to the former Spanish and French 
regimes. These properties legally became a part of the Haitian government.376 Even if 
Church officials could find a way around this interpretation, they still had to face the 
possibility of not having the proper land titles to demonstrate ownership for the Haitian 
state. Boyer recognized clerics could perceive the 1824 law as an attack on the Church 
and its spiritual functions. The Haitian President assured Dominicans he would respect 
the clergy’s spiritual place in society and their ministry they conducted in Santo 
Domingo. The Church under Boyer’s rule received preference over other denominations. 
This denomination was one of many religions within the island nation competing with 
Protestantism, vodu, and fraternal organizations such as freemasonry for influence. The 
Church had preferential treatment within the 1816 Haitian Constitution and Boyer sought 
to maintain its position within the Haitian Republic.377 Under the 1824 law, the Haitian 
state was to provide monthly salaries for priests making them the government’s 
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dependents. This act asserted Boyer’s supremacy as the head of the Church in the Haitian 
Republic justifying his ownership of its land resources in Santo Domingo.378  
Because of the 1824 law, Santo Domingo’s Church and clergy would no longer 
rely on the property they appropriated or count on support from the Vatican in Rome. The 
Haitian nationalization of the Church placed clerics’ salaries under state authority.379 One 
scholar notes how early Haitian rulers inherited an anti-clerical position from the French 
Revolution while the Republic was a French colony. By the time of Boyer’s presidency 
in 1816, the Church had official state protection but with limited authority and control 
over its operations.380 Without more direct evidence it is likely other influences shaped 
Boyer’s perspective. The Church in the eastern part of the island now mirrored its 
counterpart in the west but, some Catholic Dominicans regarded the reforms and changes 
as a foreign imposition.  
The Church drew their numbers for secular priests from the Spanish families 
living in the colonies with one scholar concluding by 1827 the number of the clergy 
found in Santo Domingo was 67, more than half born in Santo Domingo. These figures 
suggest many priests affected by the Haitian state’s secularization reform had local 
ties.381 Among the secular priests found in Latin America were the secular clergy known 
as the vicarios. They were assistant pastors to the parish priests who the Spanish Crown 
appointed to meet the growing need of understaffed parishes in the Americas. Because 
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conditions kept vicarios within a specific parish, their observations and collections of 
documents serve as a lens to analyze the Haitian reforms’ impact on the Dominican 
clergy.382 By examining the impact of the 1824 law through priest correspondences, one 
can measure the effect of Haitian Church reform within the context and history shaping 
Santo Domingo’s priests.  
José Eugenio Espinosa, a vicario, provides one example of how clerics had to 
adapt to the new Haitian reforms. On 16 March 1826, Espinosa wrote to the 
archbishopric office regarding a property donation no longer assuming the Church would 
automatically inherit this land.383 José Joaquin Delmonte y Maldonado, a member of the 
former land commission appointed by Boyer, granted the Church a part of his estate as a 
donation.384 Espinosa did not reveal the size or the value of Delmonte y Maldonado’s 
land grant to the Church. The vicarío worked with the parish’s fiscal or lay assistant who 
together figured out the donation would not be enough to support the Church in the city 
of Santiago de los Caballeros. Espinosa observed the church and parish would need “no 
more than 5,000 pesos.”385 The vicarío’s assessment of the donation concerning the 
Church’s function and survival offered a new reality he confronted.  
Further reports from Espinosa to Varela y Jimenez convey examples of this law in 
practice. In this instance, the Haitian state was successful in limiting the size of land 
                                                          
382 For more on the profile of vicarios see William Taylor, Magistrates of the Sacred: Priests and 
Parishioners in Eighteenth-Century Mexico (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1996), pp. 79 – 80, 
and 118 – 119. 
383 “José Eugenio Espinosa to Pedro Varela y Jimenez,” Santiago de los Caballeros, 16 March 1826, 
Archivo Historico del Arzobispado de Santo Domingo-Vicaria del Clero (hereafter cited as AHASD-
Vicaria del Clero), Estante 1 Anaquel 79 Caja 1 No 19.   
384 “José Eugenio Espinosa to Pedro Varela y Jimenez,” Santiago de los Caballeros, 16 March 1826,” 
AHASD-Vicarío del Clero Estante 1 Anaquel 79 Caja 1 No 19; and “Actos del Gobierno Haitiano,” 309. 
385  The fiscal served the parish priest as his constable who made sure that the laity fulfilled their religious 
obligations and paid their clerical fees, Taylor, Magistrates of the Sacred, 325. “José Eugenio Espinosa to 
Pedro Varela y Jimenez,” Santiago de los Caballeros, 16 March 1826,” AHASD-Vicarío del Clero Estante 
1 Anaquel 79 Caja 1 No 19. 
120 
donations the Church abused previously. Espinosa revealed the need for all mortgages 
and land transactions to have the proper land titles for the Haitian government to confirm 
the new transactions.386 Other historians have questioned the extent of the Haitian state 
reforms in a direct challenge to older scholarly interpretations, overstating the Haitian 
laws’ impact.387 Espinosa’s letter suggests some semblance of the Haitian government’s 
presence in Santiago to regulate land transactions. Espinosa also highlights that the 
proper land titles entitled priest to lifelong salaries living on the land. In theory, Boyer 
lived up to his declaration within the law where he did not seek to disrupt the spiritual 
works of priests by continuing to provide them an income. It implies a nuanced view of 
the Haitian President’s anti-cleric bent, that was more politically consistent and 
institutional than religious.388  
This system of land tenure came with stipulations meant to regulate the clergy 
living on the land. Espinosa explained how Delmonte y Maldonado would be both the 
administrator of the land grant to the Church and the one to manage priests’ salaries 
living on the property. By delegating this responsibility to Delmonte y Maldonado, the 
Haitian government shifted the responsibility to implement this law to local officials.389 If 
Delmonte y Maldonado died, the priests living on the land would continue to receive 
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their salaries and remain on the property. The Haitian state effectively made the clerics its 
dependents and legally assured their protection.390 Espinosa noted how the Haitian state’s 
salaries came to “those of the capacity to engage with the land” and to maximize the 
output. The Haitian government expected its citizens to serve as soldiers and cultivators; 
they did not exempt the clergy from such expectations. Espinosa pleaded with Varela y 
Jimenez to help him obtain titles to the estates under their control to help the other clerics 
in Santiago.391 Without the titles, the priests would not meet the requirements to remain 
on the property under the new land tenure system.  
José Salgado communicated with Varela y Jimenez regarding the Haitian 
Church’s need for priests. Boyer wrote to Varela y Jimenez and others religious officials 
regarding “three youths who aspired to the priesthood.” The Haitian President was 
interested in the clergy keeping him informed of any aspirants to the priesthood.392 
Salgado noted how Boyer wanted Varela y Jimenez to use his influence and the appeal of 
the state stipends to attract more candidates. “[Boyer] had found that the assignment of 
the stipend that he wants to give was not against any of the laws of the republic.” The 
Haitian President’s response alluded to the law change and suggested the disagreement 
between Boyer and Varela y Jimenez persisted. As Haitian sovereign and head of the 
Church in Haiti, Boyer provided the clergy with salaries; however, he needed Varela y 
Jimenez’s help to recruit more priests.  To convince Varela y Jimenez, Boyer suggested it 
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was not a problem for Protestants to accept the state-sponsored salary.393 Given the 
earlier disagreement between the two parties, it is likely Varela y Jimenez was not 
helping Boyer to seek new priests. The earlier impasse between Boyer and Varela y 
Jimenez persisted in such a way that it affected the recruitment of priests to serve in the 
Haitian Republic.  
Boyer’s sought to enlist the support of the Dominican clergy because they 
oversaw “the direction of spiritual exercises” for the new clergy. Negotiations between 
the Vatican and Haitian state stalled, preventing Boyer from obtaining new clerics. The 
new priests were to not only to learn the ceremonies of the mass but also “secret prayers” 
that went along with them. The experienced priests accompanied new clerics to celebrate 
mass for the first eight days before they could serve on their own. The Haitian state could 
not train its own priests and therefore needed the support of the existing clergy.394 There 
were limits to Boyer’s power and he needed the existing clergy to recruit and train new 
priests.  
For practical reasons, Boyer needed the priests to serve in the “empty churches of 
the republic.” The President intended for the Haitian Church to train native and foreign 
applicants to the clergy. He hinted at wanting these priests to serve in Port-au-Prince.395 
Boyer wanted new clergy to replace the existing ones on the western side of the island 
who led “scandalous” lives and found it necessary for the Church as “the religion of the 
faithful.” Without a fresh clergy to replace the old, the Church in the Haitian Republic 
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would go into further disarray.396 A traveler to the island commenting on the state of the 
Church and priesthood noting how the training of an effective native priesthood would 
“give moral and intellectual elevation to the national character, and secure a permanence 
and solidity to the institutions of the government.”397 Perhaps this observation was not 
lost on Boyer whose larger state project included a stable Church within his borders. This 
national church could not be accomplished without the help of the existing clergy. For 
different reasons Boyer needed well-trained and moral priests serving for the Haitian 
Church.  
Two years later, Silvestre Nuñez Fernández sought financial support from Varela 
y Jimenez and the archbishopric office. Nuñez Fernández noted how it was “impossible 
for the ordained [priest] to obtain their benefits simply from capellanías.” His 
observation suggests Boyer’s land reforms were successful in La Vega’s parish and 
eliminated priests’ previous arrangements.398 Nuñez Fernández needed support for the 
other religious orders referring to “four minor orders and three larger ones.” 
Unfortunately, he offers no further information about the specific orders or the amount of 
property the Dominican clergy had in La Vega. Nuñez Fernández’s comments suggest La 
Vega’s parish’s material conditions could not support the priests.399 Instead he reports on 
the new capellanías’ inadequacy. Priests living on capellanías celebrated mass and 
especially anniversary services for the deceased. The restrictions on land titles the 1824 
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law imposed would make it more difficult for several priests to continue living on 
capellanías, which is why Nuñez Fernández requested help from Varela y Jimenez.400  
The Church and clergy of Santo Domingo became more tied financially to the 
Haitian government. Espinosa and Nuñez Fernández’s correspondences outline how 
clerics adjusted to Haitian land reform. Espinosa and other priests were accustomed to a 
certain life style, supported by the capellanías. After the 1824 law went into effect the 
secular clergy could no longer be self-sufficient. Boyer’s requirement for proper land 
titles targeted the Church’s practice of collecting expired capellanías. In its place was a 
salary the Haitian state provided to compensate for the loss of ecclesiastical properties. 
Priests’ involvement in land cultivation illustrated to one of Boyer’s requirements for 
citizenship. Nuñez Fernández’s pleas for help highlights the negative impact of the 1824 
law on the Church in Santo Domingo. No longer could the Church expect to be self-
sufficient from land donations. The clerics inability to support themselves indicates the 
Haitian state’s success in appropriating and nationalizing Church lands and making them 
dependent on new forms of material support to perform their services. In these instances, 
priests struggled to adapt their material conditions to their new reality as state employees.  
The 1824 law altered the dynamics between the Haitian State and the Church by 
making both institutions interconnected. By targeting the Church’s practices of collecting 
expired capellanías and providing the secular clergy a salary, religious officials became 
more financially tied to the Haitian government. The requirements for land cultivation 
legally placed priests under direct state control. The Church retained control over 
spiritual matters because of the absence of formal diplomatic relations with the Vatican. 
This situation forced Boyer to rely on Varela y Jimenez and the other clerics for the 
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recruitment and training of native priests for the Haitian Church. With the previous 
disagreements over sovereignty and autonomy between Boyer and Varela y Jimenez 
there were limits to the level of cooperation between the Church and Haitian state. 
Haitian state practices transformed the relationship between the Dominican clergy and 
government by making them state employees at the expense of Byer ceding religious 
control.  
PARISHONERS AND PRIESTS 
On 14 August 1827, Dominicans from the town of Moca in the northern part of 
Santo Domingo submitted a petition to Varela y Jimenez. They requested the archbishop 
send a priest because their former cleric abandoned them. The petitioners argued for the 
need of a priest to perform sacraments such as Communion or Penance citing the long 
distance between Moca and the cities of Santiago de los Caballeros and La Vega.401 They 
noted that they still maintained Christian services to the best of their ability. The 
petitioners requested Gabriel Sánchez Cabrera, a cleric they were familiar with.402 Their 
request and familiarity with Sánchez Cabrera suggests he was a vicario who may have 
spent time in Moca. The petitioners noted if Sánchez Cabrera would be their priest they 
would not “work harder than his own efforts for the holy church.”403 They continued that 
they were “so grateful that we cannot desire his absence only when God is served to take 
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him.”404 The Mocano inhabitants used the absence of a regular priest to justify their 
petition for Sánchez Cabrera to serve the town.  
The Mocanos used both official support and their earlier relationship with 
Sánchez Cabrera to make their argument. They emphasized the priest’s impact on their 
“figurative hearts,” that another cleric could not replace. Among the Mocanos who signed 
their petition included the town’s official military officer Captain Agustin Sicard, his 
administrative assistant Manuel Angeles, as well as “the majority of the inhabitants.405 
Sicard supported the Mocanos' requests for Sánchez Cabrera and vouched for the cleric’s 
conduct making him suitable to serve in Moca. Sicard even referred to Sánchez Cabrera 
as “our priest” stressing his commitment to having Varela y Jimenez to appoint this 
cleric.406 The officer’s petition offered support and legitimized the Mocanos’ request. 
Sicard ended his request by petitioning for Varela y Jimenez not to send any other priest 
other than Sánchez Cabrera. The Church may have licensed Sánchez Cabrera to offer 
sacraments to parishioners making him even more desirable.407 By using Sicard’s appeal 
with their own, the Mocanos had a stronger argument to justify their petition for Sánchez 
Cabrera.  
Clerics also interceded on behalf of their parishioners in their request to the 
archbishop. On 8 May 1829, José Eugenio Espinosa requested for permission and funds 
                                                          
404 “Town of Our Lady of Rosario of Moca’s Residents to Pedro Varela y Jimenez,” Moca, 14 August 
1827, AHASD-Vicaría del Clero Estante 1, Anaquel 81, Caja 4, No. 10. 
405 “Town of Our Lady of Rosario of Moca’s Residents to Pedro Varela y Jimenez,” Moca, 14 August 
1827, AHASD-Vicaría del Clero Estante 1, Anaquel 81, Caja 4, No. 10. 
406 “Funcionarios y Personajes, 1822 – 1843” in Invasiones haitianas de 1801, 1805 y 1822 ed. by Emilio 
Rodriguez Demorizi (Ciudad de Trujillo [Santo Domingo]: Editoria del Caribe, 1955), 327;  and “Agustín 
Sicard to Pedro Varela y Jimenez,” Moca, 14 August 1827, AHASD-Vicaría del Clero Estante 1, Anaquel 
81, Caja 4, No 10.  
407 Despite being ordained many priest did not administer sacraments or sit for confession. Those priests 
who the Church licensed to administer sacraments were those tied to capellanias, Taylor, Magistrates of 
the Sacred, 78. “Agustín Sicard to Pedro Varela y Jimenez,” Moca, 14 August 1827, AHASD-Vicaría del 
Clero Estante 1, Anaquel 81, Caja 4, No 10.  
127 
to rebuild a chapel for the town of San José de las Matas.408 The town’s proximity to the 
city of Santiago explains why Espinosa petitioned on San José de las Matas’ behalf. In 
his report, Espinosa blamed the “indigenous” for burning down the old chapel where the 
Matenses previously worshiped. By offering money to rebuild the chapel, San José de las 
Matas’ inhabitants would have a place to receive sacraments.409 Like in Moca, 
Dominicans in San José de las Matas cited the difficulty in traveling to other towns to 
receive sacraments. These instances of celebration and worship provided parishioners 
with opportunities to create new kinship bonds and reinforced old ones. Parishioners in 
San José de las Matas would be rebuilding an important part of their community.410 
Espinosa served as an interlocutor for Dominicans in San José de las Matas to Varela y 
Jimenez in Santo Domingo City.   
 Other Dominican parishioners from San José de las Matas followed Espinoza’s 
illustrating they did not rely solely on the cleric to express their needs. Francisco Estevez 
emphasized the difficulty of worshiping at another place. Estevez framed the issue as 
long-standing by highlighting the thirty years since they last heard mass in the vicinity.411 
San José de la Matas’ location required Dominicans either to travel to other places such 
as La Vega to receive sacraments or to have priests ministering to them. Like Espinosa 
message, Estevez’s account insinuates the Matenses shaped the message of their clerics 
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even as they supplemented it with their own petitions.412 José Gonzalez, a justice of the 
peace, underlined the distance preventing them from traveling to other towns to receive 
sacraments. Gonzalez used examples such as rivers that made travel difficult. Despite the 
similarity in messages, the nuances in content convey how Estevez and Gonzalez’s 
petitions were far from formulaic.413 Their petitions supported Espinosa’s account and 
made a stronger appeal for the funds to rebuild San José de la Matas’ chapel that were no 
longer available because of Haitian Church reforms in Santo Domingo.  
The Matenses’ petitions offer a view of life in the town both before and after the 
chapel’s destruction. Juan Padilla noted how the chapel was the site where they 
celebrated the town’s patron saint San Ignacio. Padilla’s account illustrated the chapel’s 
importance for social gatherings and festivities.414 Gonzalez, the justice of the peace, 
recalled the difficulty facing priest who traveled to San José de las Matas to minister to 
the inhabitants after losing their chapel. The Matenses used the chapel’s former site as a 
cemetery. With fewer funds for the Church to sustain itself after the 1824 law and the 
difficulty in recruiting and training priest, external factors likely contributed to the 
situation faced in San José de las Matas.415 By enlisting the help of Espinosa to petition 
for more funds, the Matenses illustrated their ingenuity taking advantage of San José de 
las Matas’ proximity to Santiago. Officials could still make and receive reports as 
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Espinosa did a day later.416 The petitioners revealed a town where religion was at its core 
and now limited by the chapel’s destruction.  
Varela y Jimenez’s response was non-committal about whether the Church would 
support the new chapel’s building in San José de las Matas. He requested the 
communications from the priest who had served the town to provide Varela y Jimenez 
more information.417 He stressed the importance for the Matenses ability to worship and 
receive their sacraments. If one were to consider the political and financial handicaps 
Varela y Jimenez and clerics faced earlier, they would conceivably look for a prudent 
approach to resolving the different issues plaguing Santo Domingo’s various areas.418 
Unfortunately, the documents do not mention whether Church officials resolved the 
issue, but in this instance, they reveal how Espinosa served as the link between Varela y 
Jimenez and parishioners. While the cleric interceded, and framed their response, it was 
the Matenses descriptions serving as evidence.419 The uncertainty within Varela y 
Jimenez’s response illustrates that it was at least important to acknowledge and suggest 
the Haitian reforms limited the ways the Church could respond to the Matenses.  
Several Dominicans petitioned Haitian authorities in 1832 protesting a priest 
serving their community. A disagreement between the community and priest stemmed 
from understandings and practices of worship.420 By marshaling support from others in 
the community, these Dominicans sought to offer credibility to their complaint to Haitian 
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authorities and suggesting the expected the state to mediate this situation. The community 
noted how various public officials such as the justice of the peace and another army 
commander supported their request and “more than 100 of the most notable of the people 
without counting the women and children,” suggesting a consensus among the 
community’s males.421 As officers and leaders within the community, they aligned 
themselves with having the best interests of the Haitian state and of society. The 
petitioners stressed religion’s importance in their argument as a way of allying the 
interests of Haitian officials with the community’s. They looked to the authorities and not 
the Church to rectify the doctrinal dispute between the community leaders and the 
cleric.422 Communal support among the solicitors legitimized their assertion to the 
authorities to rule in their favor.  
 Haitian secularization weakened the Church’s institutional strength, which in turn 
affected Dominican parishioners. One overarching theme connecting these religious 
communities within Moca, San José de la Matas, and Santo Domingo City was the 
importance and centrality of priests and religiosity. Whether the impact was positive or 
negative, the petitions illustrate clerics were a part of these societies.423 In the first two 
examples, petitioners stressed priests’ positive influence of the clerical relationship 
because they performed religious functions. Town officials concurred with the 
inhabitants, legitimizing their requests. The last community resisted their cleric, 
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highlighting how his religious teachings threatened the community’s stability. The cases 
all stressed their religiosity whether it was by traveling great distances to worship, 
highlighting past acts of piety, or demonstrating knowledge of Church custom and 
tradition.  One key difference was in those authorities who they reached out to. The 
Mocanos and Matenses submitted their petitions to Varela y Jimenez through 
intermediaries to discuss their issues. Santo Domingo City petitioners directed their 
grievances at Haitian authorities. The Church reforms in Santo Domingo hindered this 
institution from adequately providing priests but gave parishioners an additional authority 
to overstep its boundaries in seeking redress.  
CONCLUSION 
On 23 July 1830, Varela y Jimenez fled Santo Domingo with forty-nine other 
passengers to Cuba.424 The accounts conflicted as to the cause of his exit and will be 
addressed later in the study.  Among the passengers who left with the deposed Varela y 
Jimenez was  Correa y Cidrón, the cleric who chastised the former archbishop.425 
Previously, Correa y Cidrón noted, that the day Varela y Jimenez “says [‘]yes president I 
am the archbishop of Santo Domingo and as the Archbishop of Santo Domingo from the 
papal bull, I am the archbishop of Haiti and [the] pastor of the Haitians” because of the 
Haitian Unification, “this will be a day of celebration for Boyer and for the entire 
state.”426 Instead, Varela y Jimenez’s exit highlights the limits of Haitian Church reform 
and an unforeseen consequence.  
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This chapter has argued that Haitian secular reforms in Santo Domingo created a 
triangulation between local communities, the Catholic Church, and Haitian state because 
of the shift in power dynamics. While the Haitian government and Boyer were successful 
in nationalizing ecclesiastical lands they did not provide adequate resources to have 
priests live sufficiently and consistently under their salaries and on the property provided. 
The Haitian state could not recruit or train new priests without the help of the existing 
clergy who Haitian laws and practices hindered from serving Dominicans in Santo 
Domingo. When obstacles restricted Dominican parishioners from worshiping it was the 
Church and not Boyer who they petitioned to for redress. If a clergy member proved to be 
the obstacle then the change in the structure meant parishioners could appeal to the 
Haitian state directly. Haitian secular reforms intended for the church to be subordinated 
to the state, but in disrupting the autonomy of the church the changes served to facilitate a 




CHAPTER 4: “A NATION IS TO WATCH ITS CONSERVATION AND TO 
GUARANTEE ITS SECURITY”: HISPANIOLA AFTER RECOGNITION, 1824 – 1830
 
On 28 June 1825, a Spanish diplomat in Paris wrote to his superiors regarding 
negotiations between France and Haiti over recognizing of Haitian independence.427 
After both parties had ended talks, he doubted that the French would continue to bargain 
with “those revolutionaries” over recognizing their independence.  According to the 
Spanish diplomat, the other European powers celebrated French king Charles X’s actions 
towards Haiti. The European rulers supported a peer trying to assert their authority over a 
former colonial possession. Nevertheless, the Spaniard soon discovered from a French 
official that his government never intended to stop negotiations with their Haitian 
counterparts. He noted that former colonists pressured the French government to obtain 
“some commercial advantages” and for the Haitian government to pay an indemnity.428 
The deal brokered between the French and Haitian governments caught the Spanish 
diplomat off guard. He wrote, “I could not manifest less the surprise that occasioned me 
with this resolution, and the bad effects it could produce with respect to the Spanish 
colonies.”429 The consequences of French recognition of Haitian independence not only 
affected Spain’s last Caribbean possessions where slavery remained entrenched. But, it 
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also, created new questions regarding Haitian sovereignty over Spain’s former colony in 
Santo Domingo.  
By pondering the fate of Spain’s remaining colonies in the Caribbean, the Spanish 
official’s writings reveal that the impact of France’s recognition of Haitian independence 
extended beyond the French empire. The official recognition is misleading because it 
obscures the earlier ties the Haitian government had with the outside world through 
unofficial channels. Scholars such as Julia Gaffield have previously explored how 
alternative interactions through commerce were the ways foreign nations implicitly 
recognized Haitian sovereignty, challenging the idea of an isolated Haitian republic 
during the nineteenth century.430 French negotiations with the Haitian state set the 
parameters for future British and Spanish dialogues revolving around sovereignty, 
slavery, and nationhood. Even as European empires reconfigured their modes of 
government, commitments to slavery, and focus in the Caribbean, the Haitian Republic 
and its fate was a part of this process.431  
This chapter examines the French, British, and Spanish negotiations with the Haitian 
government from 1824 – 1830 and its culmination of the republic’s defense of its 
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sovereignty in Santo Domingo. This study begins by asking how did the Haitian Republic 
benefit from France’s recognition of its independence? Next, how did diplomats shape 
foreign perceptions of the Haitian Republic and its politics? And lastly, how did the 
Haitian and Spanish perspectives clash over justifying their sovereignty in Santo 
Domingo? This chapter argues that the Haitian Republic’s aggressive diplomatic strategy 
assured its possession of Santo Domingo despite the impact of the French recognition in 
1825.  
RECOGNITION AND AUTHORITY 
Since its 1804 independence, France refused to recognize the Haitian Republic as 
a nation because of its symbol of black freedom, resistance to slavery, and anti-colonial 
rule. The French already saw an example of the spread of anti-slavery and insurrection 
during their attempts to reinstitute slavery in Guadeloupe in 1802 and were not keen for it 
to occur in their other colonies. Exiled colonial planters pressured the French government 
to invade Haiti, which kept Haitian President Jean-Pierre Boyer on high alert.432 By 1820, 
it became less likely France would be able to reconquer its former colony. In 1821, the 
French government proposed to its Haitian counterparts a deal to make the Haitian 
Republic a French protectorate. Plantation owners from Saint-Domingue wanted 
restitution for the loss of property and slaves because of the Haitian Revolution.433 Like 
his predecessor, Alexandre Pétion, Boyer had previously expressed interest in paying an 
indemnity to French planters for the loss of their property in exchange for France’s 
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recognition of independence.434 By negotiating a financial settlement with the French, 
Boyer could ensure Haitian authority on the island and did not have to worry about an 
invasion. If France saw Haiti as the antithesis of slavery and colonial rule, Haitian 
assertions of their authority mattered greatly.  
Despite the Haitian government rejecting the status of a French protectorate, there 
was still the possibility to discuss the parameters of a financial settlement with France.435 
On 17 April 1825, Charles X issued a royal ordinance presenting the terms of an 
agreement between France and Haiti. Since the French had not recognized Haitian 
independence they could not present a treaty to the Haitian state because only 
independent states could carry out this act. On the other hand, if the French recognized 
Haiti as an independent nation then it did not have to right to impose any financial 
demands on its former colony.436 A royal ordinance addressed internal matters within a 
kingdom and became the solution to this conundrum. This decree was effectively Charles 
X’s order to Boyer’s government treating the Haitian Republic as if it were Saint-
Domingue. Here we see an example of the legal pluralism that enabled this kind of 
flexibility for the French king to impose these demands.437 The ordinance discussed both 
the issues of French commerce and “the misery of former colonists of Saint-Domingue,” 
calling for the opening of Haitian ports to trade with other nations. In return, the Haitian 
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government would give the French preferential treatment ahead of other nations.438 By 
issuing this decree, Charles X acknowledged the unlikelihood of a French conquest to 
increase the likelihood of the Haitians meeting his demands.  
The terms of this indemnity presented the legal justification for how the French 
understood their relationship with Haiti. First, Charles X ordered “the inhabitants of 
Saint-Domingue” to pay 150 million francs as the compensation for the planters of Saint-
Domingue. The Haitian government was to meet this payment in five installments 
beginning in 31 December 1825.439 What was significant of the ordinance was that it only 
applied to France’s former colony of Saint-Domingue illustrating that they did not 
recognize Haitian sovereignty in including the republic’s Santo Domingo. Since French 
officials still considered Santo Domingo a Spanish territory, they could not legally 
intervene in its status.440 The French legal justification suggests even though they still 
saw Haiti as a colony, the Haitians successful defense of their authority on the island took 
away the choice of a war of conquest. Still, the French were not willing to acknowledge 
the Haitian Unification, focusing instead on their past colonial relationship with the 
western side of the island.   
Charles X ordered Ange René Armand, the Baron de Mackau to go to Haiti to get 
the Haitian government to agree to the ordinance.  Arriving with a squadron of warships 
from Martinique, Mackau demanded a meeting with President Boyer who responded by 
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appointing a committee to deal with the situation.441 The presence of the French navy 
right outside Haitian ports illustrates the precariousness of the situation and coercion for 
the French. Upon learning of the Charles X’s ordinance content, they refused its terms 
with one member remarking that Mackau “was surprised at the energy of the 
commission.” Even the threat of renewed hostilities between France and Haiti was not 
enough to convince them to agree to Charles X’s demands.442 Therefore, Mackau set up a 
personal meeting with Boyer and directly negotiated with the Haitian president. Boyer 
accepted the terms of the ordinance perhaps confident of the republic’s ability to meet the 
terms the French set. It could also be that Boyer perceived French recognition of Haitian 
independence as the only way to truly safeguard Haitian sovereignty.443 Mackau 
completed Charles X order as Boyer signed the agreement signifying a different direction 
for France and Haiti.  
Boyer’s negotiation with the French made it more likely that other foreign powers 
would recognize Haitian sovereignty. The commercial stipulation the French gained with 
its recognition of Haitian independence drew the attention of the British who also wanted 
a trade agreement for themselves. The British observed that the Ordinance of 1825 called 
for all nations who traded with the Haitian Republic would have to pay full tariff duties 
but the French would only have to pay half. This stipulation effectively gave the French 
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special trade arrangements at the expense of the Haitian state.444 Great Britain also paid 
close attention to the Haitian state’s foray into emancipation especially as abolitionist 
debates clamored for slavery’s end in the British West Indies. The British had already 
been involved in trade with Haitian leaders who had sought to set up official diplomatic 
relations through back channels.445 By negotiating and conceding to the French over 
negotiation, the Haitian government created the opportunity to engage with Britain to 
negotiate their own treaty. 
Haitian officials were aware of the growing British interests and sought to 
collaborate with their merchants to establish a diplomatic presence in Port-au-Prince and 
Cap Haitien. A British merchant even argued that the government would strengthen both 
nation’s commerce if the British checked France’s influence446. Still, one cannot discount 
that a growing British interest would not benefit the Haitian Republic to have a potential 
rival to check the balance of French power. For their efforts, Haitian officials, 
spearheaded by Secretary-General Joseph Balthazar Inginac wanted to highlight their 
improvements in education, agriculture, and commerce to demonstrate how important it 
was to begin diplomatic relations.  Later they would use the French government 
recognizing their independence as a reason to sign a treaty of commerce with Great 
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Britain.447 By taking advantage of its change and status and merchant interest, the Haitian 
government took steps to negotiate with the British.  
The Foreign Office in London appointed Charles Mackenzie as Consul to Haiti in 
December 1825, instructing him to gather information on the Haitian Republic. 
Mackenzie was also to study the different labor regulations imposed by Haitian leaders 
from Toussaint Louverture to President Boyer to assess their impact on the nation.448 
Mackenzie’s superiors had also warned him of the Haitian government’s eagerness to 
negotiate a commercial treaty and provided him with examples of commercial treaties 
signed with the emergent nations of Latin America as a guide.449 Mackenzie’s 
instructions reveal that the British government felt it did not have reliable information on 
Boyer’s government and Haiti more generally. Moreover, the British caution was in 
response to the aggressive Haitian diplomacy that had gained them official recognition 
and now sought a beneficial treaty with Great Britain. Consequently, Mackenzie’s orders 
to learn more about Haiti reflected British cautiousness.  
Both Haitian and British officials wanted leverage what would enable them to 
negotiate a favorable treaty for their respective nations. The Foreign Office appropriately 
directed Mackenzie to glean information about the agreement between France and Haiti, 
notably where it pertained to trade with French colonies. The British government had 
banned trade between its Caribbean colonies and Haiti where slavery still existed and did 
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not pose a threat to those colonies.450 Nevertheless, if the Haitians obtained any 
concessions to trade with the French colonies, the British would need that information in 
the event Boyer brought it to their attention. The British also suspected the French had 
intercepted some of their letters and had an unfair advantage in further negotiations with 
Haiti.451  The Haitian government sent a list of its demands for the commercial treaty and 
even considered sending its own agent to Great Britain to negotiate directly to force the 
situation. The Haitian proposal called for British recognition of its independence, 
neutrality from Great Britain if a naval war occurred, and the ports in the south of the 
country opened to trade. The British would receive assurances of security for its 
Caribbean colonies, protection for its citizens involved with trade in Haiti, and to admit 
more diplomats to the island.452 While the British searched for more information, the 
Haitians took the initiative to offer their proposal, illustrating a struggle for leverage.  
The Haitian government wanted to avoid signing an agreement with the British 
like the French and one that favored the island nation. Mackenzie suspected this view and 
noted that in November 1825, the Haitian government took out a loan from a French bank 
to meet the first payment of 30 million francs at 80 percent interest and made it nearly 
impossible to pay off.453 British officials did not see such a an agreement, but must have 
been confident when Mackenzie provided Haitian officials with the terms of a 
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commercial treaty that Great Britain signed with the new republic of Gran Colombia.454 
One advantage that Boyer had was that the Foreign Office did not initially know the full 
terms of the commercial agreement between his government and the French counterparts. 
Because they did not have all the information, the British could not situate the Haitian 
government’s terms in proper context. The Foreign Office found the terms vague and 
decided to grant Mackenzie full power to negotiate a commercial treaty, trusting the 
consul’s judgment to get the best deal for Great Britain.455 The Haitian government not 
only evaded signing an agreement like the French but also forced the British to involve 
themselves more with the negotiations on the republic’s terms.   
The British delayed the negotiations during the summer of 1826 to gain more 
leverage. While Mackenzie diligently drew up the parameters of the first draft of a 
commercial agreement between the two nations, the Foreign Office learned that French 
and Haitian officials had drawn up a commercial agreement. The British used this as a 
pretext to slow down their negotiations with one official not wanting Britain to be an 
obstacle “to the conclusion of an act, which was considered by us and by the world as the 
foundation of Haitian independence.”456 The British were not willing to negotiate a final 
treaty before the French especially if it was to their detriment. Consequently, the Foreign 
Office took away Mackenzie’s full powers and ordered him to stall even as he warned 
them that not moving forward with the transaction would lose the goodwill between the 
two countries. Mackenzie believed this move would benefit the French more than the 
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British.457 By commanding Mackenzie to feign ignorance of the decision-making process 
in London, the Foreign Office brought a measure of duplicity into these arbitrations. This 
tactic also made sure the negotiations would continue and shift control back to the 
British. 
Eventually, the Haitian government desired an alliance with the British as equal 
sovereign states to counteract France’s influence. On 8 October 1826, General Inginac 
presented Mackenzie with a revised treaty between the two nations. First, the Haitian 
government wanted the British to send any Africans captured as contraband from the 
slave trade to Haiti. Inginac argued that the Haitian constitution would guarantee the 
former enslaved Africans freedom and the Haitian government would be in charge with 
“civilizing” them. The British would not be the ones to decide the fate of enslaved 
Africans.458 Second, the Haitian government wanted to institute a commercial 
relationship between themselves and the British North American colonies in present-day 
Canada. Haitian officials likely understood that the British were not likely to allow trade 
between their Caribbean colonies despite its call from some commercial interests. This 
part of the agreement would replace the commerce lost by Haiti with the United States.459  
Lastly, the Haitian government wanted the British government to support them in other 
negotiations with foreign governments. Inginac emphasized that the Haitian government 
wanted to continue to have a good relationship with Britain and this article hints at a 
formal extension of this reality. The British, however, suspected the Haitian government 
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was scheming to have the British establish a protectorate.460 By allying with the British as 
equals, the Haitian government could counteract the French influence on the island.  
The Haitian Republic benefited from the French recognition of independence by 
using it as leverage in its immediate future during talks with Great Britain. While the 
indemnity the French imposed would prove to be detrimental, it also provided a basis for 
future negotiations with other foreign powers. The Haitian government’s attempts to use 
Britain as a buffer against the French illustrates how these talks were not just a one-sided 
affair. If British Consul Mackenzie as his superiors were ignorant on the details of the 
agreement between Haiti and France, Boyer and his government could hold Britain off 
and entice it with the possibility of commerce. With the foreign recognition of its 
sovereignty, the Haitian Republic could use it as the basis to support its claims to Santo 
Domingo as well. The Haitian government’s aggressive negotiations gambled the 
republic’s present and immediate future to assert its influence for long term stability and 
peace.  
FOREIGN NARRATIVES OF HAITI 
Within his first year in 1826, Mackenzie reported on the causes he perceived as 
contributing to the Haitian Republic’s political instability. Mackenzie reserved praise for 
Boyer’s Secretary General Inginac who he described as a “self-taught man” who was 
important to running Boyer’s government.461  The Consul presented Inginac as pro-
British compared to the rest of Boyer’s cabinet who he saw as pro-French. Mackenzie 
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disparaged them as unfit for their jobs.462 It is likely the difficulty in negotiating with 
Boyer’s regime informed this observation. Mackenzie described Boyer’s government as 
“despotic,” without the Haitian citizens’ popular support, and openly questioned whether 
the current government could continue to rule from Port-au-Prince. For Mackenzie, the 
indemnity and ordinance signed in 1825 by Boyer was part of the reason for Haiti’s 
political unrest.463  
Mackenzie concluded Boyer’s leadership would affect the Haitian Republic’s 
ability to honor a commercial treaty with Great Britain. The British Consul used the 
financial settlement between Haiti and France as a parameter to assess the republic’s 
government. Although he found its terms oppressive, Mackenzie blamed the Haitian 
government for “accepting the Ordonnance [sic] to pay as the price of the recognition of 
her independence to the mother country one hundred and fifty millions [sic] of francs in 
five equal annual payments.”464 By focusing on the Haitians’ role in agreeing to this 
financial settlement, Mackenzie discredited Boyer’s regime and decision making. 
Mackenzie scrutinized the Haitian government for not only getting itself involved in a 
deal it could not afford but for not renegotiating the settlement with France. He 
particularly directed his ire towards Boyer observing that, “his utter inability to pursue a 
straight forward course and his propensity to intermeddle on every occasion convince me 
that so long as he is at the head of the government, no obligations contracted with it can 
be binding.”465 From the Consul’s perspective, the Haitian government irresponsibility 
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and Boyer’s duplicity would put the British at risk if they signed a commercial 
agreement.   
Mackenzie’s arrival in 1826 coincided with the Haitian implementation of the 
Rural Code, which the British were aware of.466 The French recognition of Haitian 
independence and the financial burden it imposed forced the Haitian government to 
explore ways to extract labor from its citizens. In 1826 the Haitian government passed the 
Rural Code, building on the premise of agriculture’s importance to the Haitian economy 
with the intention to increase state control over labor and discipline like the military.467 In 
a proclamation directed to Haitian military and civil officials, Boyer noted “that 
overseers, drivers, and field negros [sic], who in like manner have their superiors, should 
conduct themselves as officers, non-commissioned officers, and soldiers in whatever may 
concern them.”468 By comparing cultivators to soldiers, Boyer expressed his expectations 
for citizens’ contribution to the state. Mackenzie’s visit to Haiti was intentional as it 
provided an observer to the Rural Code’s effectiveness.  
Boyer and the Haitian ruling elite sought to counter the development of what one 
scholar referred to as the “counter-plantation” system. Boyer expressed this concern to 
Haitian officials and officers, observing that “labourers [sic] of both sexes, then too 
young to be employed in the field, refuse to go now, under the pretext of freedom, spend 
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their time wandering about, and give a bad example to the other cultivator.”469 For Boyer, 
emancipation had given Haitians a misguided perception of their responsibilities. 
Emancipation did not signal the end of plantation labor as the Haitian government aimed 
for the cooperation between military and civil officials. In what appeared to be a draft of 
the Rural Code, Boyer provided articles holding military officers responsible for knowing 
the cultivators’ location, for ensuring agricultural production, and to monitor the free time 
that cultivators spent outside of their work. He wanted the different levels of 
municipalities, generals, and officers to collaborate and report abuses within the 
system.470 The final version of the Code Rural was expansive consisting of 202 articles 
that covered aspects from labor to punishment, and policing.471 This labor code was the 
Haitian government’s solution to combat the threat to the complete abandonment large 
scale agricultural production in favor of subsistence farming. 
Mackenzie blamed the general unrest in Haiti on the indemnity and Rural Code. 
Nonetheless, he had not ventured out to other parts of the island, admitting having spent 
time in Port-au-Prince.472 Scholars, however, have assessed the Rural Code’s impact, 
concluding it was unsuccessful. Haitian cultivators had become accustomed to working 
on their plots of land for the last 20 years and the government could not compel them to 
work. Many of those in charge of enforcing the laws associated with the cultivators 
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themselves and took care of their own interests at the Haitian state’s expense.473 While 
the Haitian government could at least nominally enforce the provisions of the Rural Code 
in the first years of the western part of the island, it was not as successful in the eastern 
part in Santo Domingo. The Haitian government’s limited presence in the eastern part of 
the island meant that local officials could not consistently prevent the labor force’s 
movement or punish those who left.474 Haitian scholars attributed the state’s inability to 
successful enforce the Rural Code to the proliferation of subsistent farming as Boyer did 
not reconcile the old and new regimes of labor. Dominican scholars have pointed to the 
Rural Code’s ineffectiveness because of the rise of tobacco cultivation. The Haitian state 
had difficulty implementing certain laws and punishments.475 From his view in Port-au-
Prince, Mackenzie concluded that the Haitian government could not consistently enforce 
the code in the republic.  
Despite the limited information at Mackenzie’s disposal, he believed it was not in 
Great Britain’s interest to conduct a deal Boyer’s government. Mackenzie’s observed that 
the key to Boyer’s power was his influence on Haitian officers that in effect turned the 
Haitian Republic into a “military aristocracy.” While Haitians felt this influence in and 
around Port-au-Prince, Boyer’s tenuous hold concerned Mackenzie. He noted that British 
financial commitments in Haiti were small, meaning their investment was not as great in 
the island nation. Nonetheless, Mackenzie understood that Haitian officials would not 
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agree with the consul’s assessment and sought to leave negotiations in a reasonable state 
for his future replacement if they could negotiate an advantageous deal.476 Given that 
Mackenzie did not travel to the other parts of the island, it was plausible to understand 
their concern. By focusing on the political and economic ramifications of a possible 
treaty, Mackenzie concluded the British had little to gain from an agreement with the 
Haitians.  
During the summer of 1827, Mackenzie finally traveled to Santo Domingo, 
observing tension between some Dominicans and the Haitian government.477 The consul 
devoted his attention to analyzing the consequences of the 1824 law that appropriated 
land from the Catholic Church. Mackenzie concluded  that the Haitian government 
benefited from these reforms and suggested “white Spanish Haitians” did not support the 
measure. He wrote that when the white Spanish Haitian “looks forward for some 
redeeming pledge in his favour [sic], he cannot find one.” 478 Through looking at an 
important Haitian reform in Santo Domingo, Mackenzie suggests white Dominicans did 
not profit from the Haitian Unification. He continued, writing that “he [white Spanish 
Haitian] finds the clergy of the Church reduced to beggary, and claiming support from 
has already reduced Pittance—his religion degraded in the persons of her Ministers.”479 
Mackenzie’s observations illustrate white Dominicans’ concerns with the Church’s state, 
illuminating divisions between themselves and the Haitian government.  
Mackenzie’s report on the grievances between some Dominicans and the Haitian 
government alluded to the Haitian Unification’s impact in Santo Domingo. According to 
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Mackenzie, the Haitian state had not reimbursed former masters for the loss of their 
slaves after emancipation. Once the former slaves became soldiers and left, the former 
owners had lost help to cultivate their properties.480 Mackenzie revealed one aspect to 
how the Haitian Unification altered Santo Domingo’s hierarchy. According to his sources 
in Santo Domingo, Mackenzie claimed that changing the language of official documents 
from Spanish to French alienated Dominicans. Although the extent to which the Haitian 
government replaced Spanish at the local levels was probably not as strong as Mackenzie 
or other later scholars implied.481 Another grievance that Mackenzie mentioned was that 
the Haitian government forced the inhabitants in Santo Domingo to contribute revenue 
for paying the indemnity even though the French government directed this amount 
towards its former territory of Saint-Domingue and not the former Spanish side of Santo 
Domingo. Lastly, Mackenzie illustrated that because the Haitian Republic lacked 
commerce with other parts of the Caribbean it hurt the cattle ranching business in the 
eastern part of the island.482 Mackenzie’s report suggests the Haitian Unification’s was 
uneven with how it benefited some sectors of Dominican society but not others.  
Mackenzie used his observations in Santo Domingo to argue that Haitian 
prospects in the east were not favorable. He inferred Dominicans would seek out any 
European power that would involve themselves in their affairs such as France and 
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Spain.483 The threat of foreign occupation from two European powers with claims to the 
island was something Mackenzie used to convince his superiors to second guess Britain’s 
commitment. Mackenzie noted the Spanish would defer to the French before acting in a 
hostile manner towards the Haitian Republic. By only extending recognition to its former 
claims in the western side of the island, the French government gave Spanish officials an 
opening to consider pressing their claims to the eastern part of the island. French officials 
benefited from this scenario because the Spanish would continue to pressure the Haitian 
government as the French sought to impose the indemnity.484 The idea of a French 
conspiracy with the Spanish supported Mackenzie’s argument that Haitian rule in Santo 
Domingo was tenuous.  
Mackenzie was not the only one to consider this scenario as Dominican royalist 
Felipe Fernandez de Castro used the possibility of a French invasion against Haiti for his 
discussion. He recommended that the Spanish should have a presence in Haiti to preempt 
an attack by the French, convinced that France officials would respect Spain and allow 
them to negotiate with Haiti.485 Fernandez de Castro used the possibility of a French 
invasion to spur the Spanish into acting against the Haitian Unification. He believed that 
if the Spanish government engaged with their Haitian counterparts it would “also [serve] 
to ferment the opinion of those Spaniards and to encourage their hope in the sovereign’s 
protection that their king demonstrates and devout drive in such a manifested way.”486 By 
negotiating on behalf of Dominican loyalists in Santo Domingo, Fernandez de Castro 
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calculated for Santo Domingo’s population to instigate resistance against Boyer and in 
support of the Spanish. He believed that the Spanish government should negotiate under 
the premise that the Haitian government took possession of Santo Domingo in the 
interests of security.487 Fernandez de Castro used the idea of a possible French invasion 
to convince the Spanish to involve themselves on the island, whereas Mackenzie 
regarded an increasing French presence as reason for Britain to hold back.   
Fernandez de Castro’s strategy to reclaim Santo Domingo was contingent on 
Spain’s preparation beforehand. Therefore, he noted that Spanish officials should give the 
commissioner the power to take possession of Santo Domingo in the name of the Spanish 
Crown. Moreover, he was to count on assistance from the Captain-General of Puerto 
Rico to reinstitute Spanish laws in Santo Domingo.488 The astute Fernandez de Castro 
thought ahead if negotiations between the Spanish and Haitian governments failed. He 
wrote, “the same decorum and dignity of the nation demands the support of the armed 
forces.” The armed forces from Puerto Rico were to go only into Santo Domingo to take 
possession of Spain’s claims.489 Fernandez de Castro associated Spanish success with 
loyal Dominicans’ support. They were “willing to reunite their forces at the first cry, 
supporting and leading and which to be firm to redraw the party and spread the 
operations.” Fernandez de Castro strategically offered these examples to draw parallels to 
1809 when loyal Dominicans and Spanish support in Puerto Rico took Santo Domingo 
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back from the French.490 With the right preparations, Fernandez de Castro argued the 
Spanish would succeed in reclaiming its possession of Santo Domingo.  
By writing their reports on Haitian politics on the island, Mackenzie and 
Fernandez de Castro’s contributed to a growing number of foreign accounts and reports 
presenting the Haitian Republic in a negative light. Mackenzie’s reports illustrated poor 
leadership under Boyer, which coupled with political instability made a reciprocal 
commercial treaty risky. The British Consul presented Haitian rule in Santo Domingo as 
another source of instability, pointing to Boyer’s command of the island as tenuous, 
further  encouraging France and Spain to take advantage to take advantage of the 
situation. Even with the attention that the British gave to Haiti’s experiments in free 
labor, Mackenzie’s imperial commentary presented Haiti in negative terms. Fernandez de 
Castro’s report conveyed the potential of loyal “Spaniards” in Santo Domingo who 
looked to the Spanish Crown to inspire rebellion against the Haitian state. While he 
sought to convince the Spanish of Dominican fidelity, Fernandez de Castro 
simultaneously displayed Haitian claims to Santo Domingo about security not focusing 
on other reasons such as Dominicans rejecting Spanish rule for their actions. These 
reports had notable limitations as Mackenzie spent much of his time in Port-au-Prince 
and Fernandez de Castro made few trips to Santo Domingo. Still, metropole officials 
relied on these accounts as they that shaped their perspectives and policies, granting 
legitimacy to perceptions of Haitian decline and instability.  
                                                          
490 “Felipe Fernandez de Castro to Overseas Ministry,” Madrid, 11 July 1824, AHN-Estado 3395 Exp. 4, 3ª.  
 
154 
STRUGGLES OF SOVERIGNTY 
More than a year passed before Captain-General of Cuba Francisco Dioniso Vives 
learned about France’s recognition from a French squadron that embarked on the island. 
Vives had been in constant communication with Spanish officials in Madrid over the 
different internal and external threats that challenged his rule in Cuba, including the 1825 
slave uprising in Guamarco in the western part of the island, which he was in the midst. 
This change in fortunes, however, was not the topic of discussion. The discouraged Vives 
noted that the Spanish saw “disappear the abundance and the security and with them their 
property and fortune.”491 Cuba’s plantation economy and commitment to slavery framed 
Vives’ thinking. France’s recognition legitimized the success of enslaved insurrection 
and its consequences, making this threat more a possibility for Cuba. Vives felt France’s 
recognition of Haiti would encourage “the natural inclination that we see transform of the 
blacks towards their liberty, for the desire to abolish the slavery in which their brothers 
lie.”492 Vives suggested that this would spread the Haitian Republic to Cuba in the same 
way that it did in Santo Domingo.493 Based on the information he received, Vives 
concluded the French granted official legitimacy to the Haitian struggle against slavery, 
endangering Cuba and Puerto Rico’s place with slavery in the Spanish Caribbean.  
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Vives sought to sway his superiors in Madrid that the Haitian Unification was a 
danger to Spanish slave interests in Cuba. He spoke from experience after dealing with 
1825 slave rebellion in Guamarco in the western part of Cuba, noting that “enemies twice 
as terrible that exist in our rooms and in the heart of our families’ trust.”494 Cuba’s past 
and present with slave insurrections influence Vives’ perspective. He saw the Haitian 
Unification as part of this long-standing threat going back to the 1790s and relied on 
Dominican royalists’ reports for his information. For Vives, it was important to defend 
Spanish rule in Cuba against the “contagion of the principles of emancipation.”495 The 
potential for Cuba to end up as Santo Domingo was very much a reality for the Cuban 
Captain-General. Vives believed the Spanish would weaken the Haitian Republic and 
defend slavery in Cuba if they took back Santo Domingo.496 By convincing the Spanish 
of the Haitian Unification’s threat, Vives desired to involve his superiors’ more.  
 More than four years passed after French negotiation of Haitian independence 
until events in the Caribbean convinced Spanish officials to order Fernandez de Castro to 
negotiate Santo Domingo’s return to Spain. First, Fernandez de Castro was to leave in 
only one naval ship and to arrive in Port-au-Prince—not Santo Domingo—on a mission 
of peace and with no intentions of warfare. Second, he was to focus on the legality of the 
Haitian Unification and engage with the notion that Boyer wanted to contain the 
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“anarchy” and instability in the eastern side of the island.497 By referencing this part of 
the Haitian argument, Fernandez de Castro could negotiate to receive compensation for 
the loss of property and land of exiled Dominicans during the unification. Fernandez de 
Castro had consistently articulated this point in other reports to the Spanish.498 Lastly, if 
Fernandez de Castro’s mission was successful, he would have a Spanish Consul establish 
formal diplomatic relations.499 The French example and Dominican royalists’ reports 
swayed the Spanish to begin making efforts to retake Santo Domingo.  
Fernandez de Castro arrived in Port-au-Prince in January 1830 not certain as to 
who he would be negotiating with. The Dominican royalist learned he would be deal with 
Haitian envoys and not Boyer directly. The Haitian commission included the president’s 
Secretary-General Inginac, Senator J. F. Lespinasse, and Colonel Marie-Elizabeth-
Eustache Frémont.500 Fernandez de Castro as the Spanish Crown’s representative was 
negotiating among equals, Boyer’s representatives rather than the Haitian President 
himself.  
Fernandez de Castro disputed the Haitian Republic’s legal claims to Santo 
Domingo. One of the rationales that Boyer made for Haitian claims in Santo Domingo 
was Article 40 of the 1816 Haitian Constitution that established the republic borders over 
the entire island of Hispaniola. Fernandez de Castro argued that the Haitian government 
did not make that claim at all during the second period of Spanish rule until 1821, noting, 
“from 1809 until 1814, neither from this year until 1821 elapsing more than twelve years 
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of good peace and harmony.”501 By referring to the Haitian Republic’s not asserting this 
claim, Fernandez de Castro questioned the entire validity of Article 40. Not only did 
Boyer not assert this claim to any Spanish official in Santo Domingo, he had in fact, 
publicly rejected the notion that he would involve himself in Santo Domingo’s affairs in 
1821. Ultimately, it was Núñez de Cáceres’ coup d’état that accelerated the turn of events 
that ended with Boyer’s entrance in Santo Domingo City. Fernandez de Castro and the 
Spanish were not interested in those details particularly Núñez de Cáceres’ grievances.502 
From their point of view, Núñez de Cáceres’ betrayal was not representative of the 
feelings of Dominicans at large. Since Fernandez de Castro claimed Dominicans were 
still loyal at the moment of independence and there had been no problems between Haiti 
and Spain, the Dominican royalist concluded that Boyer’s actions violated Spanish 
sovereignty and the peace engendered by both nations for almost twenty years.503 
Fernandez de Castro asserted that the Haitian Republic’s legal claims that did not 
supersede the Spanish Crown’s.  
Fernandez de Castro, however, did not to completely condemn Boyer’s actions in 
Santo Domingo. The threat of a French invasion made it plausible to apprehend why 
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Boyer would invade a neutral territory.504 By playing off this plausible possibility, 
Fernandez de Castro set up the next part of his argument to delegitimize another Haitian 
claim. With the threat of a French invasion gone, the Spanish government did not see any 
reason for the Haitian Republic to hold on to Santo Domingo. Fernandez de Castro 
assured the Haitian commission that the intentions of security that had animated Boyer’s 
actions in Santo Domingo would allow for its return to Spain because they did not 
threaten Haitian interest in the west.505 By not disregarding Boyer’s other claims to Santo 
Domingo, Fernandez de Castor aimed to convince the Haitians of how Spanish 
possession of Santo Domingo would serve their security interests.  
The commissioners’ response to Fernandez de Castro based the republic’s claims 
on the Haitians Constitution, their government’s past actions and their relationship to 
Santo Domingo. It was Toussaint Louverture who had first united the entire island to set 
up French rule before Leclerc’s invasion in 1802.506 Haitian officials argued that the 
eastern side of the island became “indispensable” to their territory and independence after 
1804. Hence, this viewpoint of Santo Domingo informed Haitian government’s actions 
on the island. The Haitian commissioners reminded Fernandez de Castro that it was the 
arms and munitions from Alexandre Pétion that also contributed to Spanish reconquest in 
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1809.507 The Haitian commissioners addressed Fernandez de Castro’s claims regarding 
the Haitian Constitution’s article writing that “from 1809 to 1821, the Government of 
Spain never made a protest against the Haitian Constitution article.”508 The Haitian point 
of view staked its claims to the constitution’s validity and their role in securing Santo 
Domingo from the Spanish.  
The Haitian commissioners disputed other parts of Fernandez de Castro’s version 
of events surrounding Spain’s loss of its colony. They asserted that it was much of the 
inhabitants who sought to become a part of the Haitian republic and not a “few vassals” 
as the Spanish claimed who were discontent.509 By emphasizing the degree of Dominican 
support for Haitian rule, the commissioners argued that the Unification was a 
manifestation of popular sovereignty. The Haitian commissioners did not deny Núñez de 
Cáceres and his supporters’ independence who sought to become a part of a federation 
with Gran Colombia or the anarchy that his regime brought. Nonetheless, they added that 
the Dominicans reached out to Boyer for him to intercede to become a part of Haiti.510 
Intriguingly, the Haitians flags flown in support of Boyer occurred everywhere but Santo 
Domingo City. The Haitian version of events presented the Unification as an act 
supported by Dominicans that clashed with Fernandez de Castro’s depiction of Santo 
Domingo’s loyalty.  
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Fernandez de Castro response emphasized Dominicans’ loyalty to the Spanish 
crown. He asserted the Spanish would “not abandon the men that have reunited in the 
firm hope to be protected, that only to have tried to reinstitute the fatherly dominion of 
his Catholic majesty.”511 By concentrating on Dominicans’ desires, Fernandez de Castro 
emphasized their loyalty and part of the Spanish empire. It was with this fidelity that the 
consistent Fernandez de Castro used in his arguments to convince Spanish officials to 
retake Santo Domingo from Haiti.512 He disputed Haitian claims that the Dominican 
population supported Haitian rule. 
Fernandez de Castro based Spanish sovereignty on Dominicans’ actions and the 
validity of treaties. He noted that the Treaty of Paris of 1815 signed between Spain and 
France assured Spanish sovereignty in Santo Domingo. A treaty of this magnitude “could 
not be disvalued by a simple Constitution, conceived in the exaltation of animosity of a 
cruel war against France.”513 For Fernandez de Castro, a treaty between two imperial 
powers trumped the constitution of a republic. He disagreed on the degree of Haitian 
support contributing to Dominicans victory over the French in 1809, focusing on Spanish 
support from Cuba and Puerto Rico contributed to Dominicans taking Santo Domingo 
from the French.514 By minimizing Haitian contribution for this victory, Fernandez de 
                                                          
511 “Felipe Fernandez de Castro to Haitian Commissioners,” Port-au-Prince, 24 January 1830, in 
Reclamation de la Partie de L’est d’Haïti par l’Espagne (Port-au-Prince: De L’imprimerie du 
Gouvernement, 1830) in AGI-Cuba 2014. 
512 “Felipe Fernandez de Castro to Haitian Commissioners,” Port-au-Prince, 24 January 1830, in 
Reclamation de la Partie, AGI-Cuba 2014. The Spanish Monarchy was a composite that incorporated 
different places and regions hence the Crown’s to its vassals. For more on the composite Spanish monarchy 
see Jamie E. Rodriguez O., “We are now the true Spaniards”: Sovereignty, Revolution, Independence, and 
the Emergence of the Federal Republic of Mexico, 1808-1824 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 
2012), 7 – 8.   
513 “Felipe Fernandez de Castro to Haitian Commissioners,” Port-au-Prince, 24 January 1830, in 
Reclamation de la Partie AGI-Cuba 2014. 
514“Felipe Fernandez de Castro to Haitian Commissioners,” Port-au-Prince, 24 January 1830, in 
Reclamation de la Partie, AGI-Cuba 2014. 
161 
Castro whittled away at the Haitian government’s justification for its sovereignty in Santo 
Domingo. Fernandez de Castro used the 1825 French recognition of independence to 
further underline his argument, stating that it only extended to the western side of the 
island. According to Fernandez de Castro, the French government did not include the 
eastern part of the island because they still recognized Santo Domingo as a Spanish 
possession.515 By focusing on treaties and Dominicans’ actions, Fernandez de Castro 
asserted another argument for Spain’s benefit.  
Fernandez de Castro disputed the Haitian arguments of security and popular 
sovereignty. Focusing on the Haitian Republic defense against enslavement, Fernandez 
de Castro contended that “slavery in its duration that exists in the day on the civilized 
nations, it is the country’s right,” of which no foreign state or power could interfere 
without threatening a country’s independence.516 For Haiti to use the issue of anti-slavery 
to invade another part of a country was akin to threatening that nation’s sovereignty. 
Fernandez de Castro, however, could not deny the Haitian commissioners’ claims of 
Dominicans calling to Boyer to come into Santo Domingo in support of the Haitian 
Republic. Nonetheless, this point did not convince the firm Fernandez de Castro that the 
general population shared this sentiment. Núñez de Cáceres’ independence movement 
from Santo Domingo City provided Fernandez de Castro a telling example to once again 
dispute his Haitian counterpoints’ claims.517 Even if the larger population wanted to 
become a part of Haiti, Fernandez de Castro considered it “indisputable” that a colony 
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could change governments.518 The Dominican royalist contended that Haitian arguments 
for security and popular sovereignty did not trump Spain’s right to impose and maintain 
slavery.  
Fernandez de Castro offered the Haitian commissioners an ultimatum to return 
Santo Domingo to the Spanish Crown’s possession as his final argument. If not he wrote 
that the, “evil things that [a state] produce towards one or the other state [out of] 
necessity can place the consequences that trace the case.”519 Fernandez de Castro implied 
the Spanish government would use force if the Haitian government did not consent to the 
Spanish state’s wishes. Spanish officials in Madrid had not given Fernandez de Castro 
any orders relating to the use of force in negotiation. Yet, his bluff hinted at a calculated 
risk meant to convince Boyer that there was no other option.520 Despite these Spanish 
terms for negotiation, Fernandez de Castro wanted to also commend the Haitian 
government to meet his demands. He expressed that if the transaction could occur 
peacefully then both nations could continue in friendship. Any other kind of negotiation 
outside of transferring to the former Spanish colony was unnecessary.521 Fernandez de 
Castro’s ultimatum ended Spanish negotiations as he waited for an answer.  
The Haitian commissioners countered Fernandez de Castro’s arguments with their 
own assertion of their constitution’s legality and defending Dominicans’ popular choice. 
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The Haitians did not deny the law of reconquest of the Spanish who drove the French 
out.522 Despite the contrary, the commissioners defended the right of the Haitian republic 
to live in safety writing that “a nation [has the right] is to watch its conservation and to 
guarantee its security.” Therefore, the laws of the constitution were against the claims of 
Fernandez de Castro and Spain.523 The Haitian commissioners did not challenge anti-
Haitian opposition expressed by some elements of the Dominican population. Yet, they 
flipped the argument by asking Fernandez de Castro to consider whether other factions 
existed among the different groups of people who the Spanish had dominated in the past. 
They questioned where the Spanish could apply this concept to “the Batavians, the 
Portuguese, and other nations who are taken away from Spain’s domination.” The Haitian 
commissions plainly referenced Spanish control over the Netherlands and Portugal who 
overthrew their rule to be independent. How could Fernandez de Castro and the Spanish 
consider a small fraction of counter-revolutionaries if they were ultimately against the 
will of the larger public?524 The Haitian Constitution’s legality and Dominicans’ support 
of the republic repelled Fernandez de Castro’s point of view.  
Haitian and Spanish perspectives clashed over sovereignty in Santo Domingo by 
focusing on the causes and legality of the Haitian Unification. Fernandez de Castro 
argued that the Spanish Crown established its rule in Santo Domingo with the final defeat 
of the French on the island and the later treaty, which confirmed these acts. While 
                                                          
522 “Haitian commisioners to Felipe Fernandez de Castro,” Port-au-Prince, 29 January 1830 in Reclamation 
de la Partie de L’est d’Haïti par l’Espagne (Port-au-Prince: De L’imprimerie du Gouvernement, 1830) in 
AGI-Cuba 2014. 
523 “Haitian commisioners to Felipe Fernandez de Castro,” Port-au-Prince, 29 January 1830 in Reclamation 
de la Partie, AGI-Cuba 2014. 
524 “Haitian commisioners to Felipe Fernandez de Castro,” Port-au-Prince, 29 January 1830 in Reclamation 
de la Partie in AGI-Cuba 2014. 
 
164 
acknowledging the Haitian Republic’s emphasis on security, Fernandez de Castro assured 
his counterparts that Spanish possession of Santo Domingo would not threaten the 
Haitian Republic. Importantly, he presented Santo Domingo and Dominicans as pro-
Spanish royalist and questioned the popular sovereignty for Haitian rule. The Haitian 
commissioners asserted that the Haitian Constitution enshrined the republic’s borders in 
Santo Domingo and its importance for security. They countered Fernandez de Castro’s 
claim of loyalty by focusing on the Dominicans who asserted their desire to join the 
Haitian Republic that resulted in Boyer’s arrival in the east. The Haitians could not 
support Fernandez de Castro’s claim for a nation to defend its right to slavery out of 
principle. The Spanish perspective of Haitian rule as a foreign imposition and act of 
aggression against loyal Hispanic Dominicans was a stark dichotomy to the Haitian 
viewpoint of two sides of the island making one whole and supported by its inhabitants.  
CONCLUSION 
Between February and June 1830, the Haitian government published a series of 
correspondences documenting the events leading up to the unification and the subsequent 
negotiations between the Haitian commissioners and Fernandez de Castro. The recent 
discussions caused Boyer’s regime to offer evidence of its claims of sovereignty. By 
printing the debates between the two sides Boyer wanted to express in “plain confidence 
in the justice of its cause, the Haitian Government seeks to impress the occasion to 
introduce to the world the negotiations between the Republic and foreigners.”525 What on 
the surface appeared as a tract of propaganda to combat the negative views from the 
Spanish was also a defense of the choices made by Dominicans to join with the Haitian 
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Republic and institute its rule on the entire island. “How can one imagine that a 
population with an enthusiasm and unanimous for liberty, and in which to taste the 
sweetness after nine years can be disposed of and resumed a new shameful chains of 
servitude?”526 By publishing the negotiations and accounts of pro-Dominican support, the 
Haitian state aimed to highlight their argument’s validity.  
This chapter has argued that Haitian diplomatic strategy and the decision to agree 
to indemnity with the French enabled it to defend its sovereignty in Santo Domingo 
because the Spanish government had to deal with the Haitian Republic as a legitimate 
nation. By having France recognize Haitian independence, the republic could now 
negotiate with other foreign powers such as Great Britain, which had taken an interest in 
the commercial affairs of the island. The French and Haitian negotiations took away an 
important threat to Boyer’s sovereignty and erased the possibility of joint action between 
Spain and France. Consequently, the Spanish finally turned to Dominican royalist 
Fernandez de Castro and his reports to formulate a plan to regain possession of Santo 
Domingo. The Spanish and Haitian negotiations represented a culmination of hardened 
perspectives of Santo Domingo and its inhabitants on a rhetorical level. Despite Spanish 
threats and the looming uncertainty of large forced payments, the Haitian Republic 
defended the legitimacy of Dominicans’ rights to choose which government to live under 
in this struggle of sovereignty.     
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CHAPTER 5: “DOMINICANS…THE FIRST SPANIARDS OF AMERICA”: SANTO 
DOMINGO AND THE DISCURSIVE STRUGGLE FOR IDENTITY, 1830 – 1833
 
On 16 February 1830, Haitian President Jean-Pierre Boyer issued a proclamation 
addressed to Santo Domingo’s inhabitants. In response to the Spanish Crown’s claim to 
Santo Domingo. Boyer proudly proclaimed, “the response of this petition could not be 
doubted, she [Santo Domingo] derives naturally from our December 1806 
Constitution.”527 By referring to one of its early constitutions, he sought to illustrate since 
its independence in 1804, the Haitian government always intended to unify both sides of 
the island. Boyer grounded his argument not just in the Treaty of Basel transferring Santo 
Domingo to France in 1795, but the later fight against the French to reestablish slavery on 
the island. Boyer rhetorically asked whether it was “undeniable” that a nation looking to 
its future security would not look to uniting the entire island. He considered the island’s 
history under colonialism to underline his point of view for the Haitian Unification. The 
French and Spanish, two colonial slaveholding powers could not coexist in peace, and 
went to war during the Haitian Revolution.528 How would such a case bode for two 
governments as different as Haiti and Spain? Boyer’s proclamation, however assured 
Dominicans of their place in the Haitian Republic.    
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By justifying Haitian claims in Santo Domingo, Boyer and pro-Haitian supporters 
contended directly with Dominican royalist rhetoric depicting the Haitian Unification as 
an unlawful foreign occupation. Haitian claims captured Dominican dissatisfaction with 
Spanish rule in and their choice for independence and Haitian rule over Spain.529 
Dominican royalists responded by emphasizing their support to Fernando VII and later 
Isabel II, claiming to represent Santo Domingo’s population at large. Their active 
rewriting of the past and interpretation of its events served to convince Spanish officials 
to wrestle control of Santo Domingo from the Haitian Republic. With conflict between 
Spain and Haiti possible, it was imperative for despondent Dominicans fleeing Santo 
Domingo to prove their fidelity to the  Spanish.530 Both sides contended whether the 
Haitian rule was indeed an occupation or the popular act of Dominicans who appealed to 
Boyer.  
This chapter examines the fallout of the negotiations between the Haitian and 
Spanish government from 1830 – 1839 and their different arguments to support their 
positions for unification and separation. This study begins by asking how did the Haitian 
government and supporters respond on the island to the end of negotiations over Santo 
Domingo? Second, how did Spanish officials deal with the Haitian Republic after the 
failure to diplomatically obtain possession of Santo Domingo? And last, how did 
Dominicans fleeing Santo Domingo depict themselves and their loyalty to the Spanish? 
This chapter argues that Haitian success in asserting its sovereignty in Santo Domingo 
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drove Dominican loyalists to use racism and racial superiority, and prominent Hispanic 
cultural ties to bolster their arguments for assistance from the Spanish Crown.  
THE RIGHTS OF A REPUBLIC 
The fallout from the Spanish and Haitian negotiations left the republic hold in 
Santo Domingo in a precarious position. According to British Consul Harrison James 
Thompson, Boyer believed Spain would ask for an indemnity in exchange for Haitian 
sovereignty in Santo Domingo.531 While Thompson never verified this claim’s validity, it 
is plausible the Haitian negotiators were flexible to other arrangements that could appease 
Spain in order to hold on to Santo Domingo. Thompson believed Fernandez de Castro’s 
warning of armed conflict would not bode well for the Haitian Republic’s rule in Santo 
Domingo. He observed that “in the East there are many persons who have refused, ever 
since the union, to accept any employment from the Republican government, or to take 
the oath of allegiance.”532 Thompson alluded in part to the struggle between Archbishop 
Pedro Varela y Jimenez and President Boyer where the prelate refused to accept Haitian 
sovereignty over the Church and spurned a state salary. From his perspective, the Haitian 
government could lose a potential source of trade if Santo Domingo’s inhabitants broke 
away. Furthermore, the agreement between the two nations, would continue and the 
Haitian state would still have to continue paying for an army for its defense against 
foreign invasion.533 The consequences of the negotiation over Santo Domingo jeopardize 
the Haitian government’s control over the entire island.  
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Haitian officials, however, did not express concern about the ramifications and 
instead illustrated a firm but flexible stance with the Spanish. Upon his return to Cuba, 
Fernandez de Castro reported that Boyer and his agents were willing to negotiate any 
other demands with the Spanish besides Santo Domingo’s return.534 It is likely that 
Haitian officials possibly could have offered the financial settlement Thompson had 
alluded to his British superiors. Fernandez de Castro mentioned that he tried to speak to 
the Haitian commissioners individually and even found an opportunity to speak directly 
to Boyer.535 Through attempting to speak to his counterparts individually, Fernandez de 
Castro wanted to sow dissension among the group, hoping one or two would follow his 
line of reasoning. For all his efforts, Fernandez de Castro was unable to convince Boyer 
or his officials to transfer Santo Domingo back to a Spanish possession.536 With rejecting 
Spanish sovereignty claims to Santo Domingo but showing a willingness to negotiate, the 
Haitian government illustrated that it was not preoccupied with the consequences of 
rejecting Spain. 
It was within this climate of uncertainty when Boyer issued his proclamation that 
asserted Haitians and Dominicans similarities as opposed to their differences. For Boyer, 
their Haitian experiences with slavery connected them noting,  “like all of the Haitian 
sons, your origin you will always remember [begins with] the African blood that 
circulates in your veins.”537 By focusing on the experiences they shared as African 
descended people, Boyer asserted that Haitians and Dominicans shared a black identity 
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which erased any notion of essential differences. Boyer’s discourse drew parallels with 
the ways that African-Americans and Britons sought to unite different people within the 
Diaspora together. Scholars have argued that that people of color in the Black Atlantic 
used a collective African identity that helped to challenge discrimination and slavery. 
Boyer previously attempted to appeal to other people of color during the colonization 
attempts with African-Americans in 1824. Consequently, Boyer’s appeal to a common 
black identity born out of slavery and racial discrimination uniting Haitians and 
Dominicans was part of a larger political platform aimed at people of African descent 
throughout the hemisphere.538  Boyer’s message was silent on those Dominicans who 
claimed European ancestry and who may have been former slave owners themselves. 
When considering the Haitian government recognized all white Dominican nationals as 
Haitian citizens and outlawed discrimination based on skin color it is likely he saw no 
need to address it.539 Boyer saw considered it more important to bring Haitians and 
Dominicans together in the face of a familiar enemy in this uncertain time.  
Boyer actions, however, suggests he feared internal enemies as much as a foreign 
invasion. He ordered Haitian officers to fortify key entry points from a Spanish invasion 
such as throughout Santo Domingo and had them lead the defenses in important cities 
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and towns.540 Yet, one scholar notes how Boyer also issued secret orders to his 
subordinates to counteract the spirit of opposition among Dominicans and halt any kind 
of insurrection from taking place, worrying that the news of Fernandez de Castro’s 
travels would spark a sense of hope among them. Haitian officers also removed any 
remaining Spanish coats of arms and replace them with the Haitian equivalents.541 By 
giving these decrees to the Haitian army, Boyer’s actions suggest that he feared a threat 
from Dominican royalist sympathizers. Another scholar confirmed Boyer ordering 
Haitian officers to monitor any identified Spanish sympathizers among Dominicans in 
Santo Domingo.542 The Haitian government prepared for the defense of its sovereignty in 
Santo Domingo. Boyer took these measures to prepare against internal enemies among 
Dominicans.  
Spanish officials in Puerto Rico learned of Haitian responses pin Santo Domingo 
from two men who arrived claiming to have escaped the island on 13 March 1830 in 
Mayaguez. The previous month they left Puerto Rico intending to fish in the Mona 
Channel, which is the body of water separating Hispaniola and Puerto Rico to the East.543 
After facing bad weather, an “indigenous” warship with 30 men approached the fishing 
vessel of the two men. Given the circumstances, Haitian officer Jérôme Maximilien 
Borgella could not be certain whether the fishermen were spies or members of an 
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invading force from Santo Domingo.544 Accompanied by other officials, he interrogated 
them asking “if in Puerto Rico there were many troops, boats, and what creoles could 
embark to attack them?” The concerned Haitian and Dominican officials focused on a 
possible Spanish attack as a means of retribution against the Haitian Republic.545 The 
fishermen’s experiences in Santo Domingo provided Spanish officials with eyewitness 
accounts of the Haitian government’s preparations in Santo Domingo in the aftermath of 
the negotiations.  
During the summer of 1830, Dominican official and interlocutor Tomas Bobadilla 
published a pamphlet defending Dominicans and condemning the Spanish perspective.546 
He noted, “in the nineteenth century, in the century of illustration, in the century where 
the progressives of reason have spread in all parts, there are apologists of the injustice, 
not recognizing the imprescriptible rights of nature.” Bobadilla referenced Fernandez de 
Castro’s disregard of Dominican desires to join Boyer and the Haitian Republic.547 
Bobadilla noted those who persisted in this belief were unable to understand the “love for 
social institutions” created to inspire men to love their country. His comments referred to 
the Haitian Republic and the type of government institutions it supported. Bobadilla 
expressed a disconnect between governments devoted to their citizens and those that 
looked for their own self-interest.548 His tract served as a defense of Dominicans’ choice  
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Bobadilla’s writing noted Boyer’s earlier call to Dominicans to defend the Haitian 
Republic noting how the “tree of liberty” he planted in Santo Domingo was to always 
have indestructible “fertilized roots.” The Haitian president had indeed metaphorically 
and literally planted a tree representing the republic’s commitment to freedom after 
emancipation, which he used to galvanize Santo Domingo’s inhabitants’ support against 
the perceived Spanish threat.549 Boyer recounted the period of Spanish rule from 1809 to 
1821 as an aberration and implicitly disregarded Spain’s claims to its former colony. 
Dominicans’ place within the Haitian nation was a voluntary incorporation and yearning. 
Boyer’s points echoed the larger themes the Haitian commissioners presented to 
Fernandez de Castro during their earlier negotiations.550 Boyer asked whether then 
Dominicans should take the same measures that others such as the Portuguese and North 
Americans had in defending their sovereignty alluding to both wars against foreign 
invaders and colonial empires. By drawing those parallels to other struggles of 
independence, Boyer presented the Haitian Unification as a legitimate act of self-
determination. His message downplayed any connection or sentiment that had existed in 
Santo Domingo from the Spanish and calling on Dominicans to defend their liberty.551  
Bobadilla defended this liberty with his writing, disputing Fernandez de Castro’s 
frame of reference disregarding any independence movements, particularly José Núñez 
de Cáceres’ conspiracy. The Dominican official dismissed them noting, it was “not for 
                                                          
549 Boyer, “Proclama, AGI-Cuba 2014. For an account of this palm tree Boyer had planted upon his 
entrance into Santo Domingo City in 1822 see Anne Eller, We Dream Together: Dominican Independence 
and the Fight for Caribbean Freedom (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2016), Ch. 1. The tree of 
liberty also invokes the Haitian Revolution’s symbolism and legacy for natural rights and citizenship, 
Laurent Dubois, Avengers of the New World: The Story of the Haitian Revolution (Cambridge, MA: The 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2004). See also Alfred Young, Liberty Tree: Ordinary People 
and the American Revolution (New York: New York University Press, 2006).  
550 For more on the negotiations over Santo Domingo between Haiti and Spain see Ch. 4.  
551 Boyer, “Proclama,” AGI-Cuba 2014.  
174 
rebellion but by mistake, they did not want to adhere to the universal principles of the 
citizens and the vote of the people.” Núñez de Cáceres did not misinterpret the 
Dominicans general discontent with Spanish rule, but the real desires of Dominicans to 
join the Haitian Republic.552 Bobadilla argued that it was the majority’s “irresistible 
forces” that brought Boyer into Santo Domingo who entered as an “angel of peace” to 
unite the entire island. He admitted there were similar “elements” the Gran Colombian 
and Haitian governments shared but doubted anyone would raise their flag to join the 
federation.553 With acknowledging the separate independent movements and Haitian 
unification, Bobadilla asserted against Spanish claims that most Dominicans did not 
support. He struck down another one of Spain’s claims underlining their conquest of 
Santo Domingo from the French in 1808. The Dominican official asserted that it was 
from Haitian support and supplies that Dominican commander Juan Sánchez Ramirez 
could defeat the French. Bobadilla contended it was through a small pro-Spanish faction 
that Spain implemented its control implying many Dominicans did not support the 
colonial regime.554 His arguments disputed any Spanish claims of support and asserted 
Dominicans’ call for independence.  
As president, Boyer wanted the entire island to defend this independence from 
Spanish claims and invasion. He wanted no foreign government to doubt the Haitian 
Republic’s intentions to defend itself.555 He argued that the Haitian government’s actions 
in Santo Domingo consisted of implementing state laws and constitutional articles. 
Boyer’s point was consistent with earlier Haitian arguments asserting Santo Domingo as 
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a part of the republic and its anti-slavery stance. Historians have argued that the Haitian 
Revolution precipitated a culture of fear among the Spanish possessions of Puerto Rico 
and Cuba over the course of the nineteenth century. 556 Boyer dissuade Spanish officials’ 
arguments in the Caribbean, warning that “if in another time our territory comes to be 
violated, we would stay free of our promise for our aggressors.”557 Boyer’s message 
suggested the Haitian Republic would be justified in defending itself and taking any 
action it sought appropriate because of foreign threats.  
Borgella followed Boyer’s suit in his interaction with the Spanish fishermen and 
made sure to dispel any notion of fear in the fishermen’s presence. He assured them it 
was only through “bayonets” the Haitians would cede the plaza of Santo Domingo City. 
His response supported Boyer’s stance in his proclamation to Santo Domingo’s 
population.558 According to Borgella, Boyer warned Spanish emissaries, “if they attacked 
the plaza [of Santo Domingo] then Puerto Rico and Cuba would feel it.” Boyer’s 
admonishment boldly asserted that the Spanish would not intimidate the Haitian 
Republic.559 It was likely Boyer’s way to astutely play on Spanish officials’ fears of a 
Haitian threat to their slave possessions in the Caribbean. Borgella’s detainment of these 
fishermen illustrate the Haitian officer embodying Boyer’s proclamation to defend Santo 
Domingo.  
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Bobadilla defense was in his criticism of the Spanish, observing that they did 
know or understand the society the Haitian government established on the island. This 
suggestion of Spain’s ignorance was quite accurate as Spanish officials relied on 
Dominican loyalist who no longer lived in Santo Domingo. The Dominican official 
lauded Haitian institutions and the open reception extended to foreigners such as 
Fernandez de Castro when he returned in 1824. Bobadilla stressed how Fernandez de 
Castro sought to live in Haiti, insinuating the republic had something to offer that Spain 
could not. He could not understand “how a man wanted to live and be an individual in a 
state where there are not rights guaranteed and where they do not know or observe nature 
and people.”560  Bobadilla’s observation questioned Fernandez de Castro’s true intentions 
and earlier claims during his 1824 travel to the island. By discrediting Fernandez de 
Castro’s reports and observations, Bobadilla was striking at the heart of Dominican 
royalist discourse. The Dominican official did not consider it necessary to justify why 
Dominicans should separate from the Haitian Republic. Simply put, they would not 
choose a return to a system that supported slavery as before.561  
Bobadilla disagreed with Spain’s committal to slavery and seeing it as a nation’s 
right. From the Spanish perspective, the right for a nation to have slavery conformed to 
natural rights of property. Bobadilla countered them noting, a “sweet religion, tolerate 
and paternal of Jesus Christ, has destroyed slavery in Europe. A poorly understood 
Christianity has been introduced in America. They made blacks into slaves to convert 
them.”562 Bobadilla argued that the Spanish incorrectly used religion and natural rights to 
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justify slavery’s existence in the Americas even after it met its end in Europe. For 
Bobadilla, it was because of the American movements for independence that brought 
forth the language of “the natural rights of man.” Bobadilla warned that a slave can “lose 
up to the desire for liberty but an entire people and the generations that succeed cannot 
love without ceasing their brutalization.”563  For those knowing the negative impact of 
slavery on a single person and society, they would call for its end. Bobadilla’s comment 
was akin to the entire island’s experiences with enslavement, emancipation, and for those 
in the east even possible re-enslavement under the Spanish. For Bobadilla, slavery was 
not a natural right that the Spanish could justify protecting or extending into Santo 
Domingo.564  
In sum, the Haitian government and its supporters responded to the end of 
negotiations by galvanizing Dominicans to defend the island from a possible Spanish 
invasion. By issuing a proclamation and publishing the earlier diplomatic 
correspondences, Boyer wanted to inform Dominicans of the steps the Haitian 
government took and was willing to take to defend their sovereignty. The Haitians 
followed these messages with the strengthen of defenses, which included key cities and 
settlements. The Spanish fishermen’s accounts illustrate the vigilance that Borgella and 
his officers took to defend Santo Domingo City and to find out more information about 
Spain’s force in Puerto Rico. Bobadilla’s tract offered a rhetorical defense of the Haitian 
Unification, which Dominicans supported. By simultaneously questioning Spain’s 
commitment to slavery and defending Dominicans’ choice to be a part of Haiti, 
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Bobadilla’s writing disputed earlier Dominican royalist contentions of a loyal former 
colony that never wanted to sever its ties with Spain. The Haitian Republic responded to 
Spain’s threat with its own counterargument and military build-up to prepare.  
SPANISH RETREAT 
Spanish officials learned more about Haitian preparations in Santo Domingo from 
Dominicans who fled to Puerto Rico.565 According to the exiled Dominicans, the Haitian 
government under Boyer had not only declared war against the Spanish government and 
monarchy but also gave fifteen days for all Spaniards who had remained on the island to 
leave. Therefore, they took it upon themselves to leave Santo Domingo for Puerto Rico 
because of relatives they had on the island. They noted that other “Spaniards” fled to 
other Caribbean islands such as St. Thomas.566 Through this testimony, the Captain 
General of Puerto Rico and his officials learned that Dominican royalists had fled Santo 
Domingo because of this militarization, likely creating communities on other islands.  
These Dominican informed officials that the Haitian government reinforced Santo 
Domingo City’s plaza with 2,000 men, but there was only one boat to patrol the borders. 
They observed “that similar to a mob the troops frequently threatened those for being 
Spaniards with the loss of life making everyone ready to leave.”567 By listening to 
Dominican royalists, the Spanish learn that the Haitian government had begun expelling 
sympathizers among the population and strengthening their defenses.  
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The Spanish in Cuba received reports from the British and Dominican exiles, 
confirming a possible Haitian invasion.568 Captain General of Cuba Francisco Dionisio 
Vives met with other Spanish ministers and reported that the Haitian government 
intended to send 8,000 men from Santo Domingo in preparation for an invasion. From 
this number, Boyer would portion 3,000 men to invade Cuba as the Haitian government 
was gathering the boats necessary for the invasion. Five Dominicans who immigrated to 
Cuba confirmed this information, bringing more news of battalions forming.569 The 
reports from the British and Dominicans illustrated that Haiti threatened Spain’s rule and 
slavery in Cuba. For Vives, the Spanish failure to negotiate Santo Domingo’s return 
resulted in the unchecked Haitian Republic building its military. He had previously 
warned Spanish officials of this possibility when Vives learned of France’s recognition of 
Haitian independence in 1825.570 With the information that the Spanish received, a 
possible Haitian invasion threatened Cuba and Spain’s sovereignty.  
Vives and the other administrators appropriately used this news to propose a 
serious of measures meant to balance security of Spain’s remaining possessions and 
peace. First, Vives called for the Spanish to send a squadron to patrol the eastern part of 
Cuba or to the south of the island of Hispaniola. This act would serve as a precaution if 
negotiations continue and were not successful. Second, was to send a Spanish subject on 
a foreign boat to the island of Hispaniola to cover the political and social state of the 
island. Lastly, Vives called for the Spanish to send a separate ship with an official to 
Port-au-Prince to speak and negotiate again with Boyer, the same way as Fernandez de 
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Castro did before.571 Vives hoped to use these two officials would give those in Cuba and 
Puerto Rico more time to prepare if the Spanish reestablished communication channels. If 
the Spanish were not successful, officials in Cuba’s eastern part were to have the island’s 
defenses ready with the right amount of forces and weapons. Vives’s proposal to officials 
in Madrid sought to find a middle ground of relying on diplomatic channels while 
strengthening military forces in Cuba in case of an attack.  
Fernandez de Castro, however, disagreed with Vives’ assessment and believed 
that the Haitian Republic’s current situation was advantageous to the Spanish reclaiming 
Santo Domingo.572 The failures of negotiations between the Spanish and Haitians resulted 
in the militarization of the eastern part of the island putting a financial burden on Boyer 
and his government. Haitian Secretary-General Joseph Balthazar Inginac had in fact 
written to Fernandez de Castro surprised at the claims of pro-Spanish support on the 
island. The Haitian government still had not resolved its negotiations with its French 
counterparts for the indemnity payments. Until both sides agreed, Boyer would be on 
guard if the French involved themselves militarily.573 Haiti was in fact in a situation 
where it had to deal with multiple problems that could threaten its security. Fernandez de 
Castro believed both the French and Spanish should ally to put pressure on the Haitian 
government. By facing a simultaneous attack from France and Spain, Fernandez de 
Castro thought Haitian forces would retreat from Santo Domingo out of necessity. With 
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the Haitian military situated on the western side of the island, the Spanish could repossess 
Santo Domingo taking advantage of their former enemy’s retreat.574 For Fernandez de 
Castro, Haiti’s militarization would work in Spain’s favor as it attempted to colonize 
Santo Domingo.  
Other Spanish officials shared the same sentiment as Fernandez de Castro but they 
sought had a different view on alternatives to regaining Santo Domingo. One 
administrator considered attracting the free people of color living in Santo Domingo to 
the Spanish side. He believed those “of good inclination would go under the protection of 
the European nation with who they were raised.”575 This relationship included the 
language and customs the Spanish gave Dominicans of color. The official insinuated 
Dominicans of color would seek a return to Spanish rule because Spain had protected 
their interests when Santo Domingo was a colony. If colonial authorities had mistreated 
them, it was because they were leaders who feared to lose their authority.576 The Spanish 
official dismissed any grievances that Dominicans of color had with mistreatment noting 
those instances were an exception and not indicative of conditions under Spain’s rule.  He 
justified the Spanish Crown’s claims to Santo Domingo for historical reasons, which he 
believed no person could reject.577 For the Spanish official, gaining Santo Domingo’s free 
people of color’s support was key for gaining control of the former colony.  
The Spanish official did recognize the Haitian Unification made a return to 
slavery unfeasible. He presented a strategy to entice the free people of color in Santo 
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Domingo to rejoin the Spanish side. Therefore, he recommended the Spanish Crown 
recognize blacks and mulattos as free subjects and to stress there was no chance of re-
enslavement.578 For the same reason, the Spanish government would provide land to free 
people of color in Santo Domingo land they could choose to live on. By accepting these 
parts of Haitian reforms already in place in Santo Domingo, the Spanish official hoped 
that some people of color would not “be late to ‘come’ to search for the advantages of 
civilization.”579 His comment insinuated a dichotomy between the positive attributes of 
Spanish rule from Europe versus the negative view of Haitian rule from blacks and 
mulattos. The Spanish official’s proposal acknowledged free people of color’s freedoms 
that they earned in Santo Domingo under Haitian rule by keeping them in place. He 
hoped the Spanish would have the support of Dominicans of color to regain Santo 
Domingo from Haitian rule. The Spanish official intended for his plan to serve some use 
to the Spanish Crown in their attempts to regain Santo Domingo serving as an alternative 
if diplomacy proved futile.580  His plan was in response to the changes in the geopolitical 
situation threatening Spain’s Caribbean slave enterprise.   
Spanish officials in the Caribbean considered a mix of force and finesse because 
of the negotiation failures. One official reflected on how the Haitian commission only 
sought to defend its justification with the Haitian Constitution’s laws and Dominicans’ 
desires in supporting Haitian rule.581 Haitian and Spanish officials were far off in terms of 
their interest in Santo Domingo. As a result, the Spanish official recommended the best 
course of action for Spain was to keep the relationship between the two nations friendly. 
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In the meantime, Vives requested no barrier be issued to people or commerce traveling 
from the island of Hispaniola to Cuba.582 The Haitian government sought a peaceful way 
to solve the “difficult situation” between the two nations. Boyer hoped the Spanish 
government would both recognize Haitian independence and sovereignty over the entire 
island. As Spanish officials in Cuba considered a blockade, they awaited orders from 
Madrid enabling them to put more pressure on the Haitian Republic through force or 
diplomacy.583 
By September 1830, Spanish officials made little headway with Haitian forces in 
Santo Domingo and it was clear that the republic would not invade.  Fernandez de Castro 
reported the number of troops that the Haitian government stationed in Port-au-Prince 
numbered between 5,000-6,000, “but they lacked discipline.”584 Despite the armed 
confrontation’s absence, Fernandez de Castro earlier warned of the potential threat for 
Spanish slaveholding interests. He observed that “since the reclamation that has been 
done for the Spanish part, those islanders are irritated against us and appear are well 
prepared to defend themselves vigorously.”585 Far from pushing Santo Domingo closer to 
the Spanish orbit, Fernandez de Castro’s diplomatic mission had strengthened Haitian 
resolve on the entire island. He received reports the Haitian government had sent 6,000 
men to Santo Domingo to defend the eastern part of the island. Yet, the Haitian 
government had not allied with Mexico or Gran Colombia to attack the Spanish in 
                                                          
582 sin nombre y sin fecha AHN-Estado 3395 Exp. 04. 
583 sin nombre y sin fecha AHN-Estado 3395 Exp. 04. 
584 “Felipe Fernández de Castro to Secretary of State,” Santiago de Cuba, 16 September 1830, AHN-Estado 
3395 Exp. 04.  
585 “Felipe Fernández de Castro to Secretary of State,” Santiago de Cuba, 16 September 1830, AHN-Estado 
3395 Exp. 04. 
184 
Cuba.586 Despite Fernandez de Castro’s exaggerated claims and Spanish forces headway, 
Cuban Captain-General Vives concluded the threat of a joint attack by Spain’s enemies 
was as unlikely as the Haitian government ceding its claims over the Spanish in Santo 
Domingo.  
After failing to acquire Santo Domingo diplomatically, Spanish officials dealt 
with the Haitian Republic by simultaneously building up defenses in the Caribbean and 
observing events on Hispaniola. The different and conflicting reports suggested a 
potential threat to Spanish economic and political interests in its remaining colonies, most 
notably in the expanding slave colony of Cuba. This change of events fed into existing 
fears perceiving Haitian strength as a threat to slavery and colonial rule in the Caribbean. 
While the Spanish continued to observe Haitian actions from their nearby colonies and 
consider a blockade, other officials such as Fernandez de Castro pitched alternatives 
highlighting their preoccupation with the Haitian Unification. These substitutes included 
enticing Dominicans of color to the Spanish cause and continued negotiation backed by 
force. The unlikelihood of a Haitian invasion gave the Spanish some consolation as they 
shifted their focus away from the events in Santo Domingo that tacitly acknowledged the 
success of Boyer’s government in defending its legitimacy in Santo Domingo.  
LOYAL VASSALS 
Dominican royalists who lived in Santo Domingo after the negotiation’s failure 
characterized Haitian rule as an occupation. They spoke of Haitian insults towards the 
“loyal Spanish spectators in Santo Domingo.” These actions included taking the coat of 
arms from the Cathedral of Santo Domingo and the damage done to other churches and 
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other religious structures.587  These attacks also included other public places in Santo 
Domingo City. Interestingly, the Dominican petitioners’ accounts offer a perspective of 
the results of Boyer’s decree seeking to destroy the remaining Spanish coat of arms on 
the eastern side of the island. Their accounts hint at some form of soldiers’ excess in 
Santo Domingo with damaging other Dominican loyalist properties. But without more 
evidence, one can only speculate on their claims’ validity.588  From the Dominican 
petitioners’ perspective and like other loyalists, Haitian soldiers’ actions in Santo 
Domingo resulted in their “uncontrolled liberty” on the eastern side of the island. To 
emphasize the severity and disapproval towards Haitian rule, the Dominican petitioners 
noted it was worse than French rule during the early part of the century.589  By comparing 
Haitian and French rule in Santo Domingo, the Dominican petitioners underlined that 
Boyer’s government was a foreign occupation and unwanted. 
The Haitian Republic’s successful defense of its legitimacy in Santo Domingo 
contributed to the exodus of the pro-Spanish Dominicans such as archbishop Pedro 
Varela y Jimenez. Haitian officer Borgella believed Varela y Jimenez was in 
communication with Spanish authorities and aided their efforts to undermine Haitian 
rule.590 While it is not certain whether the archbishop secretly wrote to Spanish officials 
in Madrid or the Caribbean, Varela y Jimenez already expressed his continued loyalty to 
the Spanish Crown. One scholar alleged that the Haitian government’s bitterness towards 
Varela y Jimenez caused them to plot the archbishop’s death. When finding himself face 
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to face with the prelate, the would-be murderer fell to his knees confessing his mission.591 
This apocryphal story suggests a continuing schism between the highest-ranking secular 
and religious powers on the island. It is likely Varela y Jimenez did fear for his safety 
given the increased militarization of the island while the fact that the prelate requested his 
passport gave Haitian officials the right pretext to rid themselves of a nuisance.592  Varela 
y Jimenez soon left for Havana accompanied by former vicar general Bernardo Correa y 
Cidrón, a Boyer supporter.593 Haiti’s unchecked sovereignty in Santo Domingo resulted 
in Varela y Jimenez exile to Cuba.  
Varela y Jimenez was not the only Dominican loyalist the Haitian government 
granted a passport to leave. On the same day, various individuals and their families took 
advantage of this moment to flee from the Haitian Republic to Cuba. Gabriel García 
wrote some “embarked secretly” while others Haitian officials sent to Port-au-Prince.594 
Haitian officials granted passports certified by a greffier, or notary, for Santo Domingo’s 
inhabitants to leave. While uncertain as to the criteria for inhabitants, the remaining 
passports suggest some truth to the Dominican exiles’ accounts of Spaniards and pro-
Spanish Dominicans leaving Santo Domingo. Instead of an expulsion, the passports 
suggest a voluntary action of migration.595 From 17 July to the 26 July 1830, the Haitian 
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government issued passports from individuals to those with families.596 With Santo 
Domingo City as the departure point, Haitians granted safe passage for those Dominicans 
choosing to flee.  
Upon his arrival to Santiago de Cuba on the eastern side of the island, Varela y 
Jimenez wanted to establish a post in Cuba and receive compensation from the Spanish 
government. He wrote to the Count of Villanueva eager to seek employment and situate 
himself in Cuba.  By writing about his experiences as the archbishop in Santo Domingo, 
Varela y Jimenez made his case for assistance and to defend his actions.597 He notes, “the 
torrent of afflictions, bitterness, penalties, and indescribable pain that I have seen in the 
narrow case and tough necessity to abandon the flock that without my merit I am 
confided.” Through referring to external factors beyond his control, Varela y Jimenez 
presented himself as the victim who held out until the end. Varela y Jimenez subtly noted 
how he shared the same loyalty and support for the Spanish Crown with Dominicans.598 
With mentioning this faithfulness, Varela y Jimenez discreetly upheld his support for the 
Spanish Crown as a pretext for help. Moreover, he also hinted that his stay in Santo 
Domingo up until that point was for those parishioners who were left. Through presenting 
his role as tending to the loyalty of Dominicans, Varela y Jimenez deliberately set 
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himself up for more benefits from the Spanish Government as officials would soon 
realize.599  
Varela y Jimenez was the first of petitions from an exiled Dominican community 
increasingly depicting Haitian rule in stark and negative terms. The petitioners hailed 
from Santo Domingo City and claimed to speak in “the name of the natural inhabitants of 
the Spanish part.” They wanted military support for Dominicans to overthrow the “yoke 
of the mulattoes and blacks” from Haiti.600 The Dominican petitioners blamed the 
maligned Dominican Creole Núñez de Cáceres for their situation, accusing him of being 
in secret agreement with Boyer. They believed Núñez de Cáceres’ actions allowed for 
Boyer to enter Santo Domingo, which struck “a mortal blow to the nation” to 
Dominicans’ detriment. For the Dominican migrants, Haitian rule had introduced “stupid 
men” among a “docile, obedient, and peaceful people.”601 By depicting themselves as 
innocent and defenseless in the face of Haitian aggression, these Dominicans negatively 
presented the Unification as an occupation that they did not warrant.  
Archbishop Varela y Jimenez based his argument for compensation on his loyalty 
he exhibited in Santo Domingo. The Haitian state appropriated ecclesiastical land as a 
part of its 1824 land reform and allowed Varela y Jimenez’s a salary to make up for it. 
Nevertheless, the archbishop rejected this offer to prove that he served as the archbishop 
of Santo Domingo and not Haiti.602 By emphasizing his antagonism towards Boyer, 
Varela y Jimenez intended to underline his loyalty and support to the Spanish Crown as 
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opposed to Boyer and the Haitian Republic. The archbishop referred to the “good 
[financial] accounts during the other government in the other Spanish part and none after 
the intrusive and usurper [Haiti] that in actuality the rule and tyranny for which I 
justifiably resisted.”603 With juxtaposing the Spanish and Haitian regimes in Santo 
Domingo, Varela y Jimenez idealized Spain’s rule and his resistance to Boyer’s authority 
in Santo Domingo He wisely sought to convince Spanish officials that he served as their 
archbishop who refused to collaborate with Boyer and the Haitian government. This 
notion included refusing the Haitian government’s salary signifying Varela y Jimenez’s 
role as the archbishop of Haiti. Any hint of Varela y Jimenez’s cooperating with the 
Haitian government as the archbishop of Haiti would hurt his chances of gaining 
compensation from the Spanish.604 Varela y Jimenez’s best way to acquire Spanish 
compensation would be to present his steadfast loyalty as the Spanish archbishop of 
Santo Domingo.  
The Dominican royalists would later use their loyalty to their arguments for the 
Spanish by emphasizing their innocence at the Haitian entrance into Santo Domingo. The 
Dominicans noted it surprised a nation of “love and loyalty to their sovereign” of the 
Haitian government’s domination. Boyer’s entrance into Santo Domingo resulted in him 
emancipating the remaining enslaved peoples. This act ended ranches and reduced the 
property of others.605 From Dominican loyalists’ perspectives, Haitian rule resulted in 
seized property, imposed contributions to the state, and the Haitian state persecuting 
Dominican youth to serve as soldiers in the Haitian army. They wrote, “in a word, the 
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Spaniards were betrayed for what they were calling human liberty affiliated with their 
persons who were little more than prisoners.” Land reform, emancipation, and other 
Haitian reforms proved to be a form of enslavement by their twisted logic as opposed to 
liberty.606 The petitioners emphasized how Dominicans’ suffer under Haitian rule 
continued after Boyer’s reforms in Santo Domingo. The Dominican loyalists not only 
continued to express their loyalty and faith for the Spanish Crown but how the rest of 
Santo Domingo’s population but also offered evidence of these actions. They used the 
period of 1822 – 1824 as one in which conspiracies characterized the Dominican 
population in favor of Spanish king Fernando VII’s reign.607 By presenting their 
innocence and entrapment, the Dominican petitioners not only wanted to convince 
Spanish officials of their support but how they and others actively desired to overthrow 
Haitian rule.   
To persuade the Spanish of his loyalty, Varela y Jimenez needed to prove why he 
stayed in Santo Domingo for nearly a decade under Haitian rule. The archbishop argued 
that he stayed and resisted Haitian rule “for the obligation in that was to not dissuade the 
flock whose merits they were confiding in me.”608 Varela y Jimenez explain his reasons 
for staying in Santo Domingo via his obligations to administer sacraments to Dominicans 
as a part of his spiritual role. It was with this public spirit Varela y Jimenez justified 
weathering “sad luck and [being] miserable” under Haitian rule. For instance, Haitian 
land reform and secularization in the 1820s was one example Varela y Jimenez observed 
and lived through during his tenure as the archbishop of Santo Domingo. The archbishop 
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asserted that it was because of this “hate and the persecution” eventually forcing him to 
flee Santo Domingo for Cuba.609 Varela y Jimenez hoped his justification and actions in 
Santo Domingo warranted a pension for which the archbishop could pass his days “with 
rest in an advanced age and in a state full of affliction and bitterness affecting afflicting 
my spirit for the consideration of having separated from such a docile flock.”610 By 
stating his reason for staying as spiritually taking care of Dominicans in Santo Domingo, 
Varela y Jimenez explained why he stayed on the island and to support his case for 
loyalty to the Spanish Crown.  
The Dominican petitioners used their account of Santo Domingo’s conditions to 
plead for their sincere loyalty. They believed Haitian rule reduced Dominicans to “the 
most severe slavery” and desire to “liberate themselves from the brutal domination.”611 
To express the cruelty they suffered under Haitian rule, the Dominican loyalists turned to 
what for them was the worst thing imaginable, chattel slavery. What they desired from 
Spain was to restore Spanish rule under Isabel II in Santo Domingo. The Dominican 
petitioners invoked past Dominicans’ victory in 1809 taking back Santo Domingo back 
from the French. They noted, “it is not possible, great Madam that some vassals that in 
each past century from their discovery have given glorious evidence of their fine love and 
important memorable victories against the tenacious enemies.”612 By situating their past 
descendants’ actions with the exploits of other great Spaniards in their history, 
Dominican loyalists fashioned an interpretation of the past celebrating their Hispanism. 
This account was silent on the help Haitian leaders Alexandre Pétion and Henri 
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Christophe provided to help them get rid of the French, and historians have offered 
evidence conflicting with such pro-Spanish loyal accounts.613  Dominican petitioners’ 
pro-Hispanic rhetoric offered past exploits as evidence of their fidelity contradicting and 
distorting the truth of the past and present of Haitian rule.   
 Varela y Jimenez’s petition and descriptions became a subject of discussion 
among Spanish officials as they pursued to make sense of his version of events in Santo 
Domingo. According to the archbishop’s explanation to the Spanish, the Haitian 
government had come to violently occupy Santo Domingo; however, Dominicans 
continued to demonstrate their loyalty to the Spanish Crown. From this perspective, 
Varela y Jimenez differed little from Dominican loyalist reports fleeing Santo Domingo 
in the 1820s but it won over Spanish officials.614 His account took pro-Spanish 
Dominican experiences to speak for most of the population. Where Varela y Jimenez 
differed from early accounts was that he did not leave during the early years of Haitian 
rule in Santo Domingo and even applied for a passport from the Haitian government. 
Varela y Jimenez claimed he sought a passport to use it under the right conditions and 
circumstances. Boyer interpreted this request as a sign of Varela y Jimenez’s resignation 
as archbishop of Haiti. The change in circumstances with the Haitian government 
combined with the existing hostile conditions resulted in Varela y Jimenez leaving for 
                                                          
613 “Dominican petitioners to Isabel II,” Santiago de Cuba, 1834, AHN-Ultramar 4601 Exp. 15. For more 
on the Dominican and Haitian collaboration to rid Santo Domingo of the French see Charlton Yingling, 
“Colonialism Unraveling: Race, Religion, and National Belonging in Santo Domingo During the Age of 
Revolution” (Ph.D.: University of South Carolina, 2016). For continued links between both sides of the 
island see also Anne Eller, ““All would be equal in the effort”: Santo Domingo’s “Italian Revolution,” 
Independence, and Haiti, 1809-1822,” Journal of Early American History Vol. 1 (2011), 105 – 141.   
614 “Spanish official to the Grace and Justice of the Indies Minister,” Havana, 26 November 1830, AGI-
Ultramar 147 N. 2. For more on anti-Haitian narratives by Dominican loyalists see Ch. 2.  
193 
Santiago de Cuba with his passport.615 The archbishop expressed how he and another 
Dominicans lived in misery under Haitian rule, which Dominican loyalist Fernandez de 
Castro’s arrival exacerbated. According to Varela y Jimenez, Fernandez de Castro’s 
failure to negotiate a transfer of power resulted in the worsening of the situation 
Dominicans found themselves under. Through their discussions of Varela y Jimenez’s 
accounts of Haitian rule in Santo Domingo, Spanish officials found he qualified for 
financial compensation and granted the archbishop 3,000 pesos to live under on 14 March 
1831.616 By proving the Spanish with his observations of the Unification in Santo 
Domingo, Varela y Jimenez’s loyalty rhetoric convinced the superiors to support him.  
The Dominican royalists combined their loyalist pleas with racist arguments with 
the notion of a menacing Haitian threat to call for Spanish support. The Dominican 
petitioners called for the Spanish protection from the “ferocious Ethiopians of the French 
colony.”617 Nineteenth-century black and white contemporaries used Ethiopia or 
Ethiopian as a synonymy for black when speaking of people of color in the present. 
White speakers or writers used this term to underscore the concept of an embodied 
threat.618 By referring to Haitians as French Ethiopians, the Dominican petitioners 
presented them as both being different and dangerous. The Dominican royalists criticized 
the Haitians as “men without character” attributing it to slavery in Saint-Domingue. They 
warned how Haitian President Boyer was “a bad example for those of color in the other 
                                                          
615 “Spanish official to the Grace and Justice of the Indies Minister,” Havana, 26 November 1830, AGI-
Ultramar 147 N. 2.  
616 “El Conde de Villanueva to Intendente de Havana,” Havana, 14 March 1831, AGI-SD 1108.  
617 “Dominican petitioners to Isabel II,” Santiago de Cuba, 1834, AHN-Ultramar 4601 Exp. 15. 
618 For more on writers using Ethiopia as a synonym for black see Stephen Howe, Afrocentrism: Mythical 
Pasts and Imagined Homes (London: Verso, 1998), ix, 32; and Wendy Laura Belcher, Abyssinia’s Samuel 
Johnson: Ethiopian Thought in the Making of an English Author (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2012), 19 – 20. For differences in uses of Ethiopia see Ferrer, Freedom’s Mirror, 309. 
194 
Spanish Antilles and the French” alluding to the symbol of Haitian sovereignty for 
enslaved and free people of color.619 The Haitian Unification was “a dangerous 
movement” that could spread to Caribbean colonies with plantation slavery. With their 
time in Cuba, the Dominican were probably aware of the fears of slave insurrection and 
sought to capitalize on it. They claimed Boyer sought to spread revolution and his 
“depraved system.”620 By pointing to the danger to Puerto Rico and Cuba with racist 
arguments towards Haitians, the Dominican royalists wanted to sway the Spanish to go to 
Santo Domingo.  
Despite Dominican loyalists’ failure in overthrowing Haitian rule, the petitioners 
wanted to sway Spanish officials to involve themselves more directly. They did not want 
outward resistance absence against Haitian rule after 1824 to turn the Spanish from 
offering a “strong arm” for those “love and support at their dear king and at his great 
nation.” By associating their loyalty to the Spanish Crown with the nation, the petitioners 
linked themselves as Spaniards who were a part of the Spanish empire.621  The petitioners 
strategically reminded the Spanish Crown how it was because of the actions of 
Dominican Creole Núñez de Cáceres, “an ungrateful vassal” who separated Santo 
Domingo from Spain. Curiously, they blamed former Captain-General of Santo Domingo 
Sebastian Kindelan who could not make headway from his new station in Cuba to regain 
Spain’s former colony. What this reference did for the petitioners was to shift the blame 
for their failure to something beyond their control.622  The Dominican petitioners 
reminisced about Dominican loyalist Fernandez de Castro’s failure to negotiate Santo 
                                                          
619  “Dominican petitioners to Isabel II,” Santiago de Cuba, 1834, AHN-Ultramar 4601 Exp. 15. 
620 “Dominican petitioners to Isabel II,” Santiago de Cuba, 1834, AHN-Ultramar 4601 Exp. 15. 
621 “Dominican petitioners to Isabel II,” Santiago de Cuba, 1834, AHN-Ultramar 4601 Exp. 15. 
622 “Dominican petitioners to Isabel II,” Santiago de Cuba, 1834, AHN-Ultramar 4601 Exp. 15. 
195 
Domingo’s return to Spanish control with the Haitian commissioners. Through 
mentioning the previous negotiations in 1830, the Dominican petitioners could also reject 
Boyer’s claims of sovereignty to Santo Domingo viewing them as “frivolous reasons,” 
and it presented them an opportunity to further align themselves with the Spanish.623  
Through linking their perspectives with Spain, the Dominican loyalists hoped to bring in 
more direct Spanish support.  
The Dominican petitioners offered an interpretation of the past underscoring their 
Hispanic cultural ties as a stark dichotomy between themselves and the Haitians they left 
just a few years prior. The presented themselves as “the Dominicans, who[are] the first 
Spaniards of America, that those distinguished men for their fidelity, that in the middle of 
the most barbaric slavery, and the hard chain, that at much lift [themselves] up to the 
royal throne their weak voice.”624  The Dominican loyalists put for their interpretation of 
the past offering contradictory logic to the emancipation Boyer’s rule brought to Santo 
Domingo. By offering examples of their fidelity and focus on enslavement, the 
Dominican petitioners strategically interpreted the past in this way while denying the 
current present of the Haitian Unification.625 These Dominican loyalists underscored their 
relationship to the Spanish Crown as vassals by referring to themselves as “faithful 
subjects and children of both worlds.”626  Their paternalistic framing of the relationship 
between themselves and the Spanish monarchy draws parallels to the work of scholars of 
Latin America exploring the ties between the Crown and its subjects during the colonial 
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era.627  This past interpretation of Hispanic vassalage allowed the Dominican petitioners 
to draw themselves closer to Spain as opposed to Haiti. 
Dominican royalists fleeing Santo Domingo depicted themselves as loyal to the 
Spanish Crown and against the Haitian government by highlighting the differences 
between them. Varela y Jimenez and later Dominicans emphasized an unwavering if not 
static loyalty as vassals of the Spanish Crown. This rhetoric entailed focusing on the 
negative impact of Haitian rule in Santo Domingo to dissuade any question of collusion 
between Dominican royalists and Haitian officials. This made sense as these Dominicans 
had stayed living in Santo Domingo after the earlier conspiracies and attempts to 
overthrow Haitian rule were unsuccessful. These Dominicans further unpinned their 
argument by accentuating their affinity for Hispanic culture and the ties that brought 
them together as Spaniards. Their arguments rested on representing the rest of the 
Dominican population with whom they shared their loyalty and support to the Spanish 
Crown and Spanish rule as they condemned the Unification as a foreign occupation in 
racially explicit terms.  
CONCLUSION 
On 30 January 1838, the Captain-General of Puerto Rico communicated to other 
officials about his observation of a French squadron. According to the Captain-General, 
the French intended to deliver an announcement to the Haitian government. Judging by 
the size of the squadron numbering eight ships, the Spanish official concluded the French 
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intended to blockade the island of Hispaniola.628 The Spanish were silent over any action 
to take on the change of events just as they were silent over the decision to not intensify 
their attempts to regain Santo Domingo. The struggle Dominicans and Haitians had and 
continued to have as a unified republic was reminiscent of the same fight other former 
colonial possessions had against Europeans. During the tense moments after the 1830 
negotiations, Bobadilla called for Santo Domingo’s inhabitants to stay united with the 
Haitian government and to prepare to use force if necessary. He wrote, “we leave 
victorious or we bury ourselves in our ruins before we become slaves.”629 Bobadilla’s call 
to rally Dominicans to defend Haitian sovereignty on the island against the Spanish could 
be applied for the French or any European power that sought to clash with Boyer.  
This chapter has argued that Dominican loyalists strengthen a discourse 
promoting ties to the Spanish Crown and Empire while using a racist argument to 
discredit Haiti because of the successful Haitian assertion of the republic’s sovereignty in 
the face of Spanish diplomatic pressure. The Haitian government committed itself 
militarily and rhetorically to defend its sovereignty in Santo Domingo and Dominicans’ 
choice to join the republic. The decline of Spanish interest to regain Santo Domingo left 
it up to Dominicans who left Santo Domingo to convince Spain to redouble its attempts. 
These attempts created a discourse of Hispanism to separate themselves from Haitians 
and their supporters. By presenting themselves and the rest of Dominicans as staunch 
Spaniards, Dominican loyalists sought to sway Spanish officials to regain Santo Domingo 
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even if the distance between what they expressed and what was the reality was an entire 
fiction based upon a nostalgic past.   
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CONCLUSION: A NATION DIVIDED
 
On 22 August 1843, Spanish royalist priest Gaspar Hernandez wrote to the 
governor of Puerto Rico after fleeing Santo Domingo for exile in Curaçao. Hernandez 
pleaded with officials, asking them to “shake off the yoke of Ethiopia” and to “indicate 
their unchanging loyalty to the Spanish nation.”630 The cleric referred to the former 
Spanish colony of Santo Domingo that had been a part of the Haitian Republic for the last 
twenty-one years. Hernandez’s reference to Ethiopia was a negative depiction of the 
Haitians who he presented as black foreign occupiers in Santo Domingo.631 His language 
and appeal to the Spanish echoed the earlier calls of Dominican royalists during the 
previous decades as Hernandez took the initiative to present himself as speaking for 
Santo Domingo’s inhabitants. Hernandez wanted to convince the Spanish to occupy 
Santo Domingo and break up the union Dominicans and Haitians forged in 1822. 
Compared to the early decades where Dominican royalist wrote at the peak of Haitian 
power, Hernandez wrote after an island-wide insurrection forced Haitian President Jean-
Pierre Boyer into exile.632 Now out of favor with the current Haitian regime, Hernandez 
wrote to the governor of Puerto Rico to entice him to renew Spanish attempts once again 
to retake Santo Domingo. 
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In the year leading up to Boyer’s fall from power, British Consul G. M. 
Mountery’s reported unrest manifesting itself in the Haitian legislature. Mountery noted 
how the dispute between the Haitian President and the Camara (lower legislative body) 
had its origins when Boyer previously expelled Haitian legislators from the chamber who 
opposed his presidency.633 Among Boyer’s critics were Hérard Dumesle, a Haitian 
legislator, who pointed out the president’s abuses in his role as the leader of the 
government. Dumesle and others came back into power because their constituents had 
reelected them. They wanted to assert legislative control by having the Senate elected by 
constituents rather than appointed. The Haitian Constitution stipulated the process 
whereby special voters would select the Senate on a rotational basis that Boyer could 
influence. By having other people elect the Senators into office, it assured that the Senate 
would periodically change as a counter to Boyer’s influence. According to Mountery, 
Dumesle and his supporters also wanted greater authority in drafting, interpreting, and 
implementing Haitian laws.634 The clash between the different Haitian government 
branches in the late 1830s involved protests over the power Boyer wielded in ruling the 
country. 
  The Haitian president’s political enemies also questioned his decision-making as 
they challenged his hold on power. Earlier, the Haitian navy seized a series of Spanish 
ships on their way to Cuba.635 The British Consul was not clear about the reasons for the 
Haitians detaining the ships, but it was not the first time the Haitians had seized foreign 
shipping. Earlier in the nineteenth century, Alexandre Pétion had ships stopped that 
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drifted to close to Haitian coasts that transported slaves. It could be likely that Boyer’s 
officials suspected that the Spanish were importing slaves to Cuba for its plantations.636 
Spanish officials protested this act and demanded the Haitian government pay them back 
for the loss of cargo. Unlike in 1830 when Boyer refused to give up its claims to Santo 
Domingo, the Haitian president capitulated and agreed to pay the amount. The Consul 
noted that Haitian officials in the government were not happy about Boyer’s decision as 
he had a history of making decisions with little to no consultation with his advisors.637 
The opposition had another opportunity to discredit Boyer who became further isolated. 
The result was a conspiracy forming in the southern part of the republic in Les Cayes. 
The British believed that the conspirators would seek to form a federal republic under a 
European power’s protection and that the conflict would result in further bloodshed. With 
the opposition questioning his political acumen and the loss of support, Boyer held on to 
power by relying on the army and their loyalty to him.638  
It took collaboration among Haitians and Dominicans to challenge Boyer’s 
regime. Dominican elites negatively affected by Boyer’s policies grouped around Juan 
Pablo Duarte, Ramon Matías Mella and Francisco del Rosario Sanchez in Santo 
Domingo City and created what became known as La Trinitaria in 1838. In 1842, 
Dusmele founded the Society for the Rights of Man and of the Citizen in Haiti in 1842. 
Both organizations coordinated their efforts, circulating proclamations to incite Haitians 
and Dominicans to overthrow Boyer’s regime. Later reports surfaced of Haitian and 
Dominican elites accusing Boyer of tyranny, robbery, and a weak show of force against 
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the Spanish.639 In a call for freedom of the press, protection for local industry, and a 
political rights opened to Haitian residents in towns and cities, Dominicans and Haitians 
came together in what is known as the Praslin revolt.640 Boyer’s political enemies on both 
sides of the island forced the Haitian president into exile on 13 February 1843.  
 Despite earlier British fears of chaos and revolution, a later report after Boyer’s 
disposal revealed that the provincial government largely maintained order in Port-au-
Prince. Charles Rivière-Hérard, cousin of Dusmele, lead the troops in Port-au-Prince and 
the British consul noted that there were those who believed the Haitian general would be 
the next leader in charge.641 Even as the provisional government began setting up a new 
regime, Hérard marched to the northern part of the Republic and to Santo Domingo in the 
east to keep the Haitian government’s hold on the island. Despite the four-person 
committee he left to rule in his stead, Hérard’s absence created a power vacuum that 
engendered new plots to overthrow the Haitian provisional government.642 While they did 
not come to fruition, it appeared that the stability and order of the provisional government 
masked discontent.   
The end of Boyer’s presidency resulted in an opening for the Haitian Unification’s 
supporters and detractors to express their voices. Royalist priest Gaspar Hernandez 
circulated a sermon arguing that the twenty-one years of rule under Boyer was both a 
source of division and unity for Haitians and Dominicans. Hernandez referred to those on 
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the western side of the island as their “brothers of the west,” who “cried over their luck 
and ours, and we lament their sad state, and ours.”643 This narrative of shared misery was 
one that united the island’s population, however, the reasons for distress were different 
for Haitians and Dominicans. Hernandez recounted the origins of this unification, as 
starting under false pretenses. Boyer “looked to give Dominicans a fraternal arm, and to 
unite with them as neighbors, without change nor harm in anything of their destinies and 
properties. But when the men entered, how far they were from keeping their 
promises!”644 For Hernandez, Boyer’s reforms suppressed the Catholic Church and 
brought Dominicans such misery. Hernandez’s message targeted Dominicans who 
identified with and shared these experiences. The end of Boyer’s rule provided an 
opportunity for Hernandez’s expression of betrayal that he used to differentiate between 
Dominicans and Haitians.  
Yet, despite the “harm” brought about by Boyer, the Praslin revolt offered 
Hernandez and others a chance for opportunities to right the wrongs of the past under 
Boyer. Hernandez proclaimed: “Oh March 24! You will be memorable in the 
extravagance of this city. The sweet voice and agreeable reform that will be heard in the 
west of the Republic animate here the bereaved Dominicans….[whose] determination 
accompanies the military uprising of Les Cayes.”645 The experiences of the populace of 
the eastern side of Hispaniola had influenced them enough that they not only welcomed 
the uprising against the ex-president, but also were willing to throw their support behind 
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the uprising. By acknowledging his support for March 24, Hernandez reinforced his view 
that Boyer’s fall was an act of God’s providence, legitimizing his alternative version of 
events. Hernandez’s sermon recognized that Boyer’s exit from Haiti offered the entire 
island new possibilities. 
Other Dominicans used this regime change as a moment to challenge Haitian 
legitimacy in Santo Domingo. On the eastern side of Santo Domingo, far from the seat of 
power in Haiti in a region called El Seibo, Pedro and Ramón Santana, two brothers who 
were influential ranchers and landowners organized an extensive conspiracy to separate 
from the Haitian state. As Dominicans organized themselves, Hérard arrived with his 
army on 18 July 1843 to stop the conspiracy. The Santana brothers were unsuccessful as 
Hérard’s troops seized and arrested them. The Haitian general charged Hernandez with 
circulating subversive ideas in Santo Domingo and exiled him while other fled to 
Curaçao.646 Some Dominicans’ confrontation to Haitian rule was unsuccessful.  
A popular junta or committee of Dominicans formed in Santo Domingo declaring, 
“we profess ourselves subjects of the legitimate government to sustain the union of the 
Republic, only and indivisible of all the indigenous and inhabitants of this island.”647 
Like Hernandez’s sermon, these Dominicans noted how the Praslin revolt ended a 
government that from their perspective oppressed them for 21 years. Where the 
committee differed from the cleric was in how they saw their relationship to the Haitian 
Republic. These junta members claimed to speak for the rest of Santo Domingo. These 
Dominicans pictured themselves as a part of the nation and not from “the force of arms or 
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for the title of conquest that they had associated spontaneously to be a part of the Haitian 
Republic.”648 Through mentioning their choice to join Haiti, the Dominicans wanted to 
present themselves as loyal and not seeking to end the Haitian Unification. The 
committee wanted to assure Haitian officials that the population’s anxiety was natural 
and did not call for patrols or extraordinary measures. Given that there were Dominicans 
not in support of Haitian rule and the conspiracy that would later happen, the Haitian 
provisional government had enough evidence to take a cautious approach to hold the 
republic together. Still, these Dominicans assured Haitian officials their committee was a 
measure they took to select delegates for the Constitutional Assembly to draw up the new 
Haitian Constitution.649 Their diplomatic approach and willingness to take part in 
drawing up the new government illustrated their wish to stay within the Haitian Republic.  
The committee, however, desired some concessions from the Haitian government 
as they wanted to protect their interests. By underlining that they were not a “conquered 
people” and instead represented a “voluntary portion” of the Haitian Republic, the 
Dominicans couched their demands as if they were diplomatic requests.650 The 
Dominicans requested: laws written in their “common” language, which was Spanish; for 
the Haitian government to observe their “Catholic Religion;” and to conserve their 
“language, uses, and local and native customs.” If the Haitian government honored these 
request, Dominicans would not oppose or weaken the union between Santo Domingo and 
Haiti. They would not cause any discord over “the differences of the color of skin,” the 
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origin of birth for themselves now being Haitian.651 The Dominicans requests suggest 
even though the constitution guaranteed them certain rights as Haitian citizens, questions 
of race and ethnicity were still unresolved. Nevertheless, the committee did not consider 
the use of armed force and looked to the United States as a model. The Dominicans noted 
how the “general laws constitutive of democracy” govern the U.S. and made up “their 
union and indivisibility of the Republic.”652 They expressed how Santo Domingo’s 
inhabitants shared this sentiment of reconciliation and negotiation despite the changes 
they wanted as citizens of the Haitian Republic.  
For some Spanish officials’ perspective, Boyer’s fall from power created an 
opportunity for Spain to involve itself once again in Haiti’s affairs.653 The Spanish Vice 
Consul of Jamaica and the Spanish governor in Cuba communicated with a Dominican 
royalist exile who wanted them to consider renewing attempts to take Santo Domingo 
from the Haitians. One official proposed that retaking Santo Domingo from the Haitian 
Republic “would be a measure of security for the island of Cuba.”654  Resurrecting an old 
theme, Dominican royalists aimed to convince the Spanish that Santo Domingo was 
willing to rejoin the Spanish empire. Still, not all Spaniards agreed with this assessment 
and did not want to involve Spain in such an endeavor because of the danger it entailed.  
Perhaps they considered the previous Haitian regime’s commitment to defend its 
sovereignty in Santo Domingo during the 1830 negotiations.655 A Spanish official saw 
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this potential mission in the given circumstances as “difficult” and “adventurous.” 
Consequently, to not lose this opportunity, he proposed a joint venture with the French 
who would deal with the Haitians in the west, while the Spanish took over Santo 
Domingo in the east.656 The end of Boyer’s regime convinced some Spaniards to revisit 
an alliance for armed confrontation as they consolidated their influence.  
 The arrival of Dominican royalist Antonio López de Villanueva to Cuba in 1843 
in part piqued Spanish officials’ interests in Santo Domingo.657 López de Villanueva, a 
former colonial official in Santo Domingo, stated President Boyer’s resignation 
reanimated Dominicans’ overtures to Spain for reincorporation into their empire. López 
de Villanueva claimed to express “the positive feelings the inhabitants of that [Spanish] 
part was having to shake off the yoke of the Haitians and submit themselves under the 
protection and ample benefits and paternal government of Spain.”658 By depicting Santo 
Domingo’s inhabitants as royalist Dominicans who rejected Haitian rule, López de 
Villanueva aimed to convince the governor of Santiago de Cuba to establish a Spanish 
presence on the island. López de Villanueva most certainly hoped the governor would 
report to his superiors in Havana as the Dominican royalist continued towards Jamaica. 
Shortly thereafter, Santiago de Cuba’s governor communicated this information with 
Havana officials in response to López de Villanueva’s arrival.  
 The Cuban Captain-General was aware of the situation as he and others weighed 
arguments from both sides. He believed the issue was “so arduous that it cannot give 
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interest to our metropolis a similar proposition” in respect to the Antilles’ security.659 
Dominican royalist interests were second to the larger goal of preserving Spain’s empire 
and slavery in the Caribbean. He worried that if the Spanish became more did involve in 
Santo Domingo, then the “revolutionaries of Santo Domingo” (meaning the Haitians) 
would turn their attention towards Cuba. The “ever faithful isle’s” security from a Haitian 
invasion resurfaced in the Captain-General’s mind as it did in other officials during the 
previous decades. Yet, the Spanish could take advantage of the Haitian Republic’s 
weakness because of its political uncertainty. Consequently, The Captain-General 
advised Santiago de Cuba’s governor to not discount scenarios of Spanish involvement in 
Santo Domingo or keeping their distance.660 He would not dismiss entirely the potential 
scenario for active involvement, but balanced it with assessing its threat toward Cuba’s 
internal security should they become involved in Santo Domingo once again.  
Spanish officials in Madrid met to review the information they received from the 
Caribbean concerning the Haitian Republic.661 There was the sense among the 
administrators that Dominicans rose up against the Haitian government in 1843 because 
they wanted to rejoin the Spanish Empire. Therefore, they ordered to have assembled and 
reviewed all documents about Santo Domingo since 1814 when the end of the 
Napoleonic wars assured Spanish possession of the eastern part of Hispaniola. Spanish 
officials also formed a commission review this evidence and make recommendations on 
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the best course of action.662 Despite the order for assembling and review of the relevant 
documents, it appears at an administrative level no further action was taken as the extant 
archival records do not provide any additional details regarding further specific action.   
Nevertheless, this did not stop Spanish officials in the Caribbean who continued 
to interact with Dominican royalists and seeking out their information on Santo 
Domingo. In Curaçao, royalist priest Hernandez and another cleric assured the Spanish 
that “the mulatto part like the black [part] are decidedly in favor of the Spanish 
government.”663 While Hernandez began his request asking for help in overthrowing the 
“yoke of Ethiopia,” depicting black and mixed race support for Spanish rule illustrates a 
distinction between those in Santo Domingo and those outside. In addition, with a large 
population of people of color in Santo Domingo, it was imperative for Hernandez and 
others to convince the Spanish of the success awaiting them if they involved themselves 
in Santo Domingo. To further emphasize his point, Hernandez assured administrators in 
Puerto Rico that if they sent help to Santo Domingo, it would always be a part of the 
Spanish empire. He further included news of “Spanish” troops deserting the Haitian army 
as they made their way to Santo Domingo.664 Hernandez used these examples to support 
his argument of Dominicans’ loyalty and the loss of Haitian support. The information 
provided by the royal priest made a Spanish victory seem all the more likely. 
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 Hernandez took it upon himself in speaking for the “disgraced Spaniards, so 
religious, and so moral when loyal to the benign Spanish monarchy.”665 Through serving 
as the mouthpiece for Dominican royalists, Hernandez intended to sway the Spanish to 
seeing Santo Domingo was a royalist bastion. Furthermore, he confirmed other parts of 
Santo Domingo felt the same one way, citing Santo Domingo City, Puerto Plata, Santiago 
de los Caballeros, La Vega, and Moca among the towns that wanted to return to Spanish 
rule. Besides Santo Domingo City, the other places Hernandez referenced were 
strongholds of Haitian support and in the northern and western parts of Santo Domingo, 
closer to the former border. For Hernandez, it was important to illustrate this Hispanic 
affinity. He blamed Dominican Creole José Núñez de Cáceres discussed earlier in the 
dissertation for being “under the yoke of the blacks.”666 Hernandez claimed free people of 
color had previously feared that Núñez de Cáceres’ regime would result in enslavement 
under a Simon Bolivar led South American federation.667 Consequently, the result was 
Dominican support for the Haitian regime and the Unification to the royalists’ detriment.  
The Constitutional Assembly of 1843 was an opportunity for Dominicans and 
Haitians to come together and ratify a constitution for all. The Constitution of 1843 that 
came out of this meeting, as a result, was in some parts dissatisfactory for both sides. 
While the assembly met, General Hérard assured Dominican separatists that the new 
Haitian government would respect their requests such as those the committee articulated. 
There were some Dominicans, however, who did not trust Hérard and felt he was trying 
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to get supporters to pick him as president. Entering with this assumption, the Dominican 
delegates representing different parts of Santo Domingo found the Haitian delegates to 
not be as accommodating as Hérard had predicted. The new Haitian Constitution of 1843 
did alter the use of French by making its use in public and official settings and documents 
optional. Even so, it also allowed freedom of worship to other religions, which had the 
effect of limiting once again the Church’s singular prominence it once had exercised in 
Santo Domingo. On December 30, 1843, the new constitutional assembly enacted the 
new constitution.668 
As the new Haitian Constitution passed through ratification, Dominican separatist 
who had followed Pedro Santana’s fight against the Haitians published a manifesto 
illustrating their grievances.669 Santana’s partisans were probably fellow landowners and 
ranchers from the same region of El Seibo and nearby Higüey, in the east of Santo 
Domingo. These petitioners expressed their feelings about Boyer’s regime, calling it a 
“fallacious system” that “passed legislation for the eastern part that was contrary to all the 
principals, forgetting in her the most sacred rights.”670 This protest stemmed in part from 
the 1824 law that secularized Church lands that Chapter Three covered. Cautious and 
rightly so because of the Haitian army’s presence, Santana’s partisans voiced some 
expectation that the new government would “turn to ensure the enjoyment of the citizens 
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of this portion of the republic.”671 The state was responsible for the welfare of the citizens 
of the Haitian Republic. Consequently, Dominicans demanded that they could enjoy their 
sacred rights that had not occurred under the old regime. 
While some Dominican separatists dialogued their grievances with the Haitian 
government, another faction led by Buenaventura Baez, a rich landowner, appealed to the 
French for aid in separating Santo Domingo from the Haitian Republic.672 Among Baez’s 
supporters were former administrators in the Haitian government whose familiarity with 
French legislation convinced them France offered the best possibility to end Santo 
Domingo’s union with Haiti.673  The pro-French Dominicans identified themselves as 
representatives for the Spanish part, implying they represented most if not all of Santo 
Domingo. They and the partisans of Santana were similar in their list of grievances used 
to validate a language of separation from the Haitian state and shaped their interpretation 
of the past twenty years under the Haitian state. One such commonality was their 
displeasure towards the 1824 law and described it as a “tyrannical law” which “stripped 
the eastern part of the major part of its properties.”674 It is important to note former 
Haitian president Boyer created commissions to deal with the changes in land tenure that 
some members of the pro-French Dominican faction were a part of. Instead of including 
this important piece of information, the Dominicans twenty-two years later stressed the 
measure was “another trick,” and denoted themselves and others as “an impotent 
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minority of Spaniards in concurrence with the Haitian majority.”675 Baez and his cadre of 
supporters aimed to appeal to the French by presenting themselves as victims of Haitian 
aggression and different from their neighbors.  
This narrative of alienation espoused by the pro-French Dominicans could not be 
more exemplified than their response to Boyer’s actions towards the Catholic Church in 
Santo Domingo. They described their faith as the “Catholic Religion, Roman, Apostolic, 
[and] generally professed in the former Spanish part, the object of an imponderable 
enthusiasm and whose worship had been sustained with splendor for three centuries.”676 
The Church and Dominicans forged their relationship over time that resulted in a part of 
their identity according to the solicitors. Baez and his followers perceived any attack on 
their faith and Church by the Haitian state as an assault on their identity. They felt that 
their faith had been “vilified and persecuted” despite the Haitian Constitution’s protection 
of religion. Their interpretation of the relationship between the Church and Haitian state 
portrays them as martyrs—attacked because of their faith that went against not only the 
laws of the land but further aggravated by Boyer’s promises to keep up the customs and 
traditions of Santo Domingo. The attack on the Church and their faith was another 
measure that alienated the Dominican populace and was a grievance against Boyer’s 
regime.  
While a pro-French separatist movement formed among Dominicans, another 
faction lobbied to become a British protectorate led by a landowner from Las Matas de 
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Farfán named Pimentel.677 The British concerned themselves about the declining stability 
of the Haitian government as it appeared Dominicans in the east would take up arms 
against them. The British diplomat in Haiti was neither sure about what spurred the 
separatist movement nor what flag they would have as it appeared more likely the 
Haitians would lose Santo Domingo. The British declined Pimentel’s request claiming 
they would not interfere within the domestic affairs of Haiti.678 Without more reason 
given by the British consul, one can surmise that Great Britain’s commercial interests 
with Haiti superseded any political aspirations by Dominicans or Haitians. The British 
were wary of former president Boyer’s political instability and did not want a repeat of 
those circumstances. Pimentel’s movement was not the first-time Dominicans sought to 
join the British empire, trying to do so during the Haitian Revolution. In that instance, 
Britain’s moderate rule in comparison to the French, defense of Catholicism, and 
commercial benefits drew Dominicans in.679 It is likely these reasons drew Pimentel and 
his followers away from the flailing Haitian Republic.  
A fourth movement led by independence leader Duarte and the Trinitarios 
illustrated the divisions among Dominican separatists.680 Duarte and his supporters 
wanted to achieve independence without foreign aid or intervention. With the help of 
Dominican rancher Pedro Santana and his supporters, Dominican conspirators under the 
Trinitarios launched a coup against Haitian forces in Santo Domingo City on 27 February 
1844. Negotiations over the course of two days resulted in the peaceful surrender of 
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power to the Dominicans with the deposed Haitians able to leave under favorable 
conditions.681 In a proclamation to the leading Haitian officer in Santo Domingo, the new 
Dominican provisional government stated, “the provocation of our rights, the 
humiliations and bad administration of the Haitian government, you have put us in the 
firm and indestructible resolution to be free and independent.”682 Similar to the pro-
French leader Baez and Santana’s earlier protest, the provisional government accused the 
Haitian government of injustices during the period of the Unification. The Trinitarios 
success was not the result of direct foreign aid or involvement, but the support among 
Dominicans at a crucial moment with the Haitian government divided. Duarte’s vision 
for “an independence pure and simple” for Santo Domingo came to fruition.683 Yet, the 
divisions among the Dominican separatist were left unresolved and would have 
consequences for the new state of the Dominican Republic.  
Despite the anti-Haitian rhetoric motivating Dominican separatists, they found 
that the rest of the population did not forget the Haitian Republic’s defenses of their 
freedom. The Dominican provisional government was not in agreement over the 
immediate steps to take in setting up a nation. Some members considered turning the 
Dominican Republic into a French protectorate and giving away Samaná bay in the north 
to France in exchange for protection and supplies against Haiti. When a Dominican 
officer found out about the scheme, he stated to the rest of the population that the French 
intended to enslave the rest of the population.684 By bringing up the threat of reinstituting 
slavery, Dominican detractors intended to discredit the pro-French movement. Moreover, 
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it illustrates how after more than twenty years of freedom in Santo Domingo, the fear of 
re-enslavement was still on the minds of many Dominicans.685 The pro-French 
Dominicans saw Boyer’s general emancipation as a “general risk and ruining the 
country.”686 They did not present the end of slavery negatively, which was “done to 
protect the political independence” but “in its form and management that it was verified, 
in the middle of a simple people, kind, and of good faith.”687 Their attempts to distinguish 
between gradual emancipation under slave masters and instant emancipation enacted by 
Boyer is worthy of comment especially when it threatened Dominican elites’ political 
power.  
As the Dominican provisional government fractured over rancher Santana and 
Trinitario leader Duarte vying for influence, the specter of slavery persisted. Santana’s 
asserted himself through his fighting against the Haitians and soon strengthened his hold, 
however, the new Dominican government only had control of Santo Domingo City and 
its surrounding area. Duarte fled to the Cibao region to fight Santana who the British 
claimed wanted to separate into its own nation. These divisions occurred while the 
frontier area still desired to main ties to the Haitian Republic.688 These separate 
movements illustrating independence was not a given and there were those still seeking 
union with Haiti. Santana capitalized on these divisions by accusing Duarte and the 
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Trinitarios of wanting to replace the Dominican flag for Colombian flag and to 
reintroduce slavery. Duarte would eventually flee the Dominican Republic, leaving 
Santana unchallenged.689 The threat of re-enslavement once again challenged the 
legitimacy of another Dominican leader and illustrated freedom’s uncertainty in a nation 
founded in response to perceived political and social inequalities.  
SUMMARY 
“A Divisive Community” has examined the Haitian Unification in the context of 
Spanish and Haitian struggles for Santo Domingo beginning with its impact on 
Dominicans’ political allegiances on the island. From 1809-1821, Spain’s second rule of 
Santo Domingo pushed Dominicans away from Spanish support as they sought other 
options. Inspired by the political movements against colonialism across the Americas, 
Dominican Creole José Núñez de Cáceres led a moderate faction aiming for the political 
change of the Spanish government while maintaining things as they were. This vision for 
a nation clashed with much of the Dominican population who looked to their Haitian 
neighbors to the west. Haitian president Boyer’s entrance into Santo Domingo in 1822 
was the result of many Dominicans aspirations and vision for independence from 
colonialism. With the Dominican Creole elites’ experiment for independence ended, they 
looked to the Spanish Crown and its empire as the best way to keep things the way they 
were. The Haitian Unification hardened existing divisions within Dominican society by 
making colonialism and slavery a practical option against republicanism and 
emancipation.  
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This study has analyzed the writings of Dominican royalists and Spanish officials 
to illustrate how they presented the Haitian Unification as it related to slavery. The 
Spanish were aware of the potential danger of Haiti to its possession of Santo Domingo 
but did not prioritize it with the defense of the rest of its empire in the Americas and 
Caribbean. Dominican royalist fleeing Santo Domingo brought accounts of a society 
transformed by emancipation and the end of legal racial discrimination. Spanish officials 
in Puerto Rico and Cuba used these accounts to make larger arguments of a Haitian threat 
to the Spanish Antilles’ remaining slave systems. Dominican royalist Felipe Fernandez de 
Castro was among those who asserted that by regaining Santo Domingo, the Spanish 
would contain the Haitian Republic and protect slavery. To further convince Spanish 
officials in Madrid to involve themselves in Santo Domingo, Fernandez de Castro and 
others presented Dominicans and Santo Domingo as Hispanic, loyal to the Spanish 
Crown, and Catholic as a counterpoint to the Haitians who they presented as immoral, 
dangerous, and incapable of effective rule because of their skin color and former enslaved 
condition. At least initially, Dominican royalists made allowances for Santo Domingo’s 
free people of color who they depicted as culturally different from Haitians and would 
not support the Unification.  
The Haitian Unification’s success drove Dominican royalists to develop an 
increasingly exclusive argument for their loyalty that drew on their interpretations of the 
past. The Dominicans and other foreigners watched as Haitian president Boyer’s 
aggressive diplomatic strategy mortgaged the republic’s present with a larger financial 
indemnity. The French recognition of Haitian independence made Spanish armed 
intervention less likely as officials in Madrid acquiesced to the calls of Dominican 
219 
royalist and Spanish officials. Spain appointed Fernandez de Castro to negotiate Santo 
Domingo’s return to Spanish possession with the potential threat of force against the 
Haitian government. The Haitian Republic called Spain’s bluff and relied on the support 
of Haitians and Dominicans to defend its borders, Dominicans’ choice to unite with Haiti, 
and the rights of a nation-state against an empire. The Spanish retreated with the 
consolation that the Unification was not a threat to slavery in the empire’s remaining 
Antillean possessions. Consequently, Dominican royalist continued arguing for Santo 
Domingo’s loyalty to convince the Spanish to regain Santo Domingo by underlining a 
more exclusive Hispanic heritage.   
“A Divisive Community” has argued that the Hispanism at the center of 
Dominican royalists’ arguments disrupted the Haitian Unification on Hispaniola because 
it created an alternative and contrast to the Haitian Republic. Dominican royalist used 
interpretations of the past to present Dominicans as loyal, Catholic, and Hispanic victims 
to Haitian aggression in the face of Boyer’s rule over the entire island. Within their 
arguments, the Dominican royalist denigrated Haitians and their supporters because of 
their race, formerly enslaved condition, and secularism while accusing them of 
“enslaving” the Dominican population. Dominican royalists claim for representing all of 
Santo Domingo marginalized and silenced those Dominicans who choose and supported 
Boyer and the island-wide Unification. Hispanism and disavowal of the past actively 
rewrote Santo Domingo’s history and excluded Dominicans of color and their desires, 
which resulting in fermenting a divisive community.  
By examining Dominican royalists and their construction of a Hispanic narrative, 
this study illustrates how the origins of an anti-Haitian rhetoric tradition has embedded 
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itself within Dominican politics despite its inconsistency.690 Scholars must continue to 
illuminate how relations between the Dominican Republic and Haiti were not always 
contentious. Mid-nineteenth-century Dominican elites inconsistent and convenient racist 
rhetoric personified in the Haitian Republic silenced alternative notions of belonging and 
narratives within the Dominican population that later writers and hijacked for their own 
purposes.691 One of the notable embodiments of this power was during the Rafael 
Leónidas Trujillo Molina’s dictatorship from 1930-1961. Among the infamous acts of the 
Dominican Republic under his leadership was the Parsley Massacre killing Haitians and 
Dominicans of Haitian descent to uphold a white Hispanic ethos. Less notable was 
Trujillo’s early reaches of friendship with the Haitian government, even celebrating his 
Haitian heritage.692 The legacy of this dictatorship and racism that contemporaries 
associated with it influenced Joaquin Balaguer, a Trujillo intellectual and member of the 
regime, rise to power during the 1970s and 1980s. This legacy even affecting a 
contentious election in the 1990s surrounding Dominican politician José Francisco 
Antonio Peña Gomez and his Haitian ancestry.693 This royalist rhetoric or Hispanism has 
ebbed and flowed throughout Dominican history, often sparking political waves of 
xenophobia during times of contentious politics.  
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Through a singular focus of this period, “A Divisive Community” reveals that the 
Hispanism articulated by Dominican royalists did not stand for Santo Domingo despite 
their intentions. This study has situated these pro-Spanish Dominicans with their pro-
Haitian counterparts to posit that the Haitian Unification hardened exiting regional, 
ethnic, and class divisions within Santo Domingo.  Through investigating these 
arguments and Santo Domingo’s conditions under the Unification, scholars can 
understand a society that was more inclusive than Spain’s former colonial society, even 
as the Spanish and other foreigners focused on the opposite. Rescuing these alternative 
narratives and situating them with the existing Dominican nationalist narratives brings 
balance to the literature and offers crucial insight into the relationship between the 
Dominican Republic and Haiti during the Unification. This study highlights that the 
existing nationalist account from this period fueling anti-Haitian arguments was far from 
correcting in depicting Dominicans’ sentiments.  
The events leading up to Santo Domingo’s union with Haiti in 1822 provide 
scholars the opportunity to study opposing independence movements from Spain during 
the Age of Revolutions. Regional and specific case studies in Latin America offer 
examples of Iberian Creoles eclectic use of symbols, imagery, and history to affirm their 
independence and build the basis of new nation-states where nationalism had not existed 
before.694 Subaltern groups’ contributions to independence and nation-building highlight 
politicized Africans, Amerindians, and their descendants from the Andes to Mexico to the 
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Caribbean.695 Santo Domingo was the site of two such as movements as Dominican 
Creoles raced to end Spanish sovereignty on the eastern part of the island, even 
fashioning their new republic “Spanish Haiti” to establish support for a moderate and 
exclusive notion of nationhood. Boyer’s later entrance to the east and consolidation of 
both sides of the island was less a foreign occupation and more the culmination of those 
Dominicans’ choice to align themselves with the Haitian Republic as opposed to the path 
Creoles had trodden on the mainland.696 By situating Santo Domingo in the larger 
independence movements of the Americas, the Haitian Unification becomes one of many 
alternatives that historical actors had at their disposal.  
“A Divisive Community” is one of the few accounts of the Haitian Unification to 
assess its importance for both Haitian and Dominican history. The different foreign 
responses to Haitian independence would affect the republic’s union with Santo 
Domingo. A focus on the indemnity signed between France and Haiti not only draws 
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attention away from the former colony successfully consolidating its independence in a 
world of slavery and colonialism. But it also obscures how the Haitian state’s continued 
to struggle against attacks on its sovereignty in its negotiations with the British and 
Spanish.697 The variety of Spanish, English, and French language sources this dissertation 
analyzed will hopefully encourage other scholars to revisit overlooked repositories to 
complement existing nation-state documents to offer new historical interpretations.  
Haitian and Dominican actions to create and uphold their union on Hispaniola do 
not fit neatly into regional, national, and imperial perspectives. The Haitian Unification is 
like other independence movements in Angola and New Granada’s Caribbean coast or 
even Cuba except that the Dominican and Haitian one was successful.698  The new island-
wide Haitian Republic faced challenges from the British, French, and Spanish that 
illustrated the island’s continued importance to European slave empires. Focusing on 
Santo Domingo from a “single imperial geography” such as Spain obscures the link 
between French recognition of Haitian independence and its impact on later negotiations 
for the eastern side of the island.699 The nuances of the Haitian and Spanish negotiations 
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become blurred when scholars consider it strictly from studying Santo Domingo’s path to 
independence as the Dominican Republic, or its relationship strictly to Spain. By 
studying the Haitian Unification and its lifespan in Santo Domingo, this event becomes 
broader and connected beyond just Spain and its relationship with its former colony.  
The British Consul’s bleak assessment of the Dominican Republic’s future from 
Haiti offers a perspective of the island’s state of affairs in 1844 when the Unification 
came to an end. He considered the Dominican ruling elite “fortunate in uniting the whole 
of the Spanish part of the Island under one Republic, but unless they can induce 
immigrants to locate among them of the black and coloured [sic] race, and engage 
capitalist from Europe to cultivate the soil, it will be impossible that they can long exist 
as a separate government.”700 His observations illustrate the sense that agriculture and a 
relationship in Europe were the Dominican Republic’s best chance as the new nation 
floundered. He further noted how “the blacks in the Spanish part, who form a small 
portion of the population, will always look towards their brethren in the West[sic] for 
security against any attack on their liberty.” The Haitian Unification offers one example 
of Dominicans of color seeking the Haitian Republic as their choice for nationhood. The 
British official further observed, “and the fear of what may happen from one moment to 
another, will in all probability, deprived the Dominicans of those aides, which in their 
enthusiasm, they look upon as certain.”701 Both in 1822 and in 1844, Santo Domingo’s 
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elite overlooked Dominicans of color’s political aspirations to impose their vision for the 
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